紀要論文

自由意志の「向こう側」としてのスピノザの自然主義プログラム : 青山拓央氏の「無自由」概念との対照を手引に

Beyond Free Will, or Spinoza’s Naturalist Program and an attempt to compare it with Takuo AOYAMA’s concept of “being afree”

jpn

13498088

https://doi.org/10.15002/00030895

法政哲学会

18

13

24

2022-12-29

Version of Record

Spinoza’s Ethics contains his version of naturalist program which consists in two essential and interrelated components: a throughout denial of teleological view of nature and a strict causal determinism. Since Spinoza views the human illusion of free will as a result of human belief in teleology and indeterminism, his naturalist program “goes beyond free will”. This vision reveals that so-called free will is essentially teleological notion and so we may situate the contemporary “free will controversy” in the final stage of the long process of declination of the teleological view of nature from the scientific revolution to this age of evolutionary biology and neuroscience. According to this view, the true opponent of free will is not determinism but ananke or ateleological contingency （i.e. contingency in the sense of the absence of any teleology）. Then we compare such a concept of ananke or ateleological contingency with Takuo AOYAMA’s concept of “being afree”. Though we can find many points of agreement between them, he seems to hasten in attributing “afree will” to us directly and so incline to ignore the naturalistically evolved quasi-teleological processes in us.

Article

AA12104417