紀要論文

Borda Count Method for Fiscal Policy : A Political Economic Analysis

eng

09111247

https://doi.org/10.15002/00025446

Journal of International Economic Studies

36

25

40

2022-03

Version of Record

Survey data reveals that government budgets tend to go into the red. Public Choice economists as well as public finance economists have been interested in this phenomenon and have come up with several explanations, such as fiscal illusion. This paper presents a new explanation for this tendency from the political economic point of view; the current voting system might have a tendency to bring about a budget deficit. If policy choices only deal with the current tax rate and do not take into account the intertemporal tax rate, it may be difficult to select a budget-balanced choice. Even if voting choices take into account intertemporal aspects, as there exist so many choices to increase tax rates to reimburse government deficits, votes from people who support a balanced budget are split and therefore it may be difficult to select a budget-balanced choice under the relative majority rule even if a balanced budget is supported by a majority of voters. We further demonstrate that the Borda count method, known to mitigate vote-splitting problems, might overcome this issue.

Article

AA10459262