研究報告書

Undertaking nonharmful or harmful public projects through unit-by-unit contribution : Coordination and Pareto efficiency

eng

202

1

32

2016-09-05

Version of Record

政治経済学的要因を考慮に入れた経済政策分析と経済制度設計 : 理論と実証;3

巻末に付録ⅰ-ⅱ有

We examine in detail the implementation of a project that is nonharmful for all agents as well as a project that is harmful for some agents through a unit-by-unit contribution mechanism. For a project that is nonharmful for all agents, effient implementation is supported at one regular Nash equilibrium and several refined Nash equilibria that are stable against coalition deviations. In this sense, this mechanism works well. On the other hand, when the project is harmful for some agents, this mechanism may not have a Nash equilibrium with effient implementation of the project. Even when such a Nash equilibrium exists, it may not be selected by any of the refned Nash equilibria. Thus, in this case, this mechanism does not work. Our result shows that the merit of the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism reported in the literature is partially extensible to the implementation of a public project.

Working Paper