

# We, the Defective Commodity-Beings

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# We, the *Defective* Commodity-Beings<sup>1</sup>

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## Abstract

The main aim of this text is to reconstruct an ontic (and *therefore* ontological) theory of the event *qua* value-theory. For this attempt, I base my arguments on a re-reading of *Capital*. The “events” posited in this re-theorization of *Capital* are “translated/transferred” into three *commencements* from which logical descriptions of capital in *Capital* appear to start respectively yet interrelatedly. As a theoretical procedure, I disarticulate a single theoretical *commencement* of *Capital* – i.e. a commodity – into three *commencements* (-qua-events), and decipher their inter-relations. The first *commencement*/event is, as is usual with the currently ordinary understanding of *Capital*, the commodity posited at its very outset, which turns out to be a *capitalist* commodity in the course of my elucidation in this text. The second is the so-called originary accumulation of capital which has been and still is regarded as a historical origin/invention of capital-ism but is retrospectively crossed out from and for the first *commencement* that regards itself as solely legitimate: violent expropriation. The third is the exchange (process), which is incorporated into the first as the *peaceful* contractual transaction among so-called equal “owners,” which is usually called exploitation. In so doing, I try to de-logicalize the purely logical descriptions of *Capital* upon which capital arrogates its logicity and circularity to itself, while at the same time avoiding a simple and naïve historicization of *Capital*. In this way, I try to ontologize the second and third *commencements*-qua-events as ontic agents in order to subvert the *commandment* of capital based on the first commodity.

**Keywords:** *Capital*, Capital, Commencement, Event, Commodity, Originary accumulation, Exchange process, Ontic, Ontological

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## 1. The *Arché* that *ought to be* Contaminated

Nous ne sommes donc pas sortis du cercle d'une seule et même question: si nous avons pu, sans en sortir, ne pas tourner dans un cercle, c'est que ce cercle n'est pas le cercle clos de l'idéologie, mais le cercle perpétuellement ouvert par ses clôtures mêmes, le cercle d'une connaissance fondée (Althusser, 1996, p.79).

In this text, I attempt to pluralize the theoretical *arché*<sup>2</sup> of *Capital* into three interconnected dimensions. This is in order to de-hegemonize the commodity that is posited at its very outset,<sup>3</sup> a commodity that is *logically supposed* to solely and preemptively “ordain” the whole description of *Capital*. In short, I attempt to posit “das Verschwindende [the vanished]” not as “das Aufgehobene [the sublated]” (Hegel, 1969a, p. 112) but as, following Hegel himself, “etwas Unvollkommenes [something imperfect/something that is not-fully-to-come]” which is, nevertheless, to be “condemned/reprimanded [rügen]” by the “proximate truth [nächste Wahrheit]” that is alleged to finally emerge and firmly complete its logical circularity.<sup>4</sup> For this attempt, however, Althusser, not Hegel, must come first.

The Althusserian circle quoted above cannot be composed simply of a *commencement* that departs from the whole while securely anticipating a “clôture” by its necessary – precisely speaking, necessitated – return to the point of departure, because a circle, even according to its most relaxed definition, is inevitably conditioned both upon a pre-supposed unity between its departing-point and returning-point, on the one hand, and its eventual – and/or *evental* (Badiou, 1988) – vanishing of the *commencement*, on the other. Thus, it is, by definition, non-sensical to emphasize its “clôture” as a circle. In other words, the Althusserian “clôture” *implies* a certain opening – lack of suture – in the sense that the logical circle made possible by “clôture” is closed while at the same time disclosing, and vice versa.

Starting from this vista, I re-interpret the Althusserian quasi-circle as a defective circle [*fehlerhaften Kreislauf*] (Marx, 1962, p. 741), which is usually translated as a “vicious circle” (Marx, 1996, p. 704) or a “never-ending circle” (C1, p. 873).<sup>5</sup> Here the *commencement* inaugurating the logical circle of *Capital*, strictly due to a pre-supposition [Voraussetzung] anticipating its necessary “clôture” to come, *in and for itself*, undoes a logical circle, and as a result, contaminates its logical circularity while retaining its logicity. That is to say that the *commencement* is initiated only as accepting its being always already contaminated and in this sense deficient.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The word “*arché* (arkhē)” is derived from “arkheion,” which connotes the commencement and the commandment at once. Derrida wrote as follows. “*Arkhē*, we recall, names at once the *commencement* and the *commandment*. This name apparently coordinates two principles in one: the principle according to nature or history, *there where* things commence – physical, historical, or ontological principle – but also the principle according to the law, *there where men* (my emphases) and gods *command*, *there where* authority, social order are exercised, *in this place* from which order is given – nomological principle” (Derrida, 1996, p. 1). See also Arendt (1958, pp. 222ff.) and Arendt (1961, *passim*).

<sup>3</sup> Hegel calls this beginning “Aufgenommenes” (Hegel, 1969b, p. 553). It is literally something “*picked up*” and the English translation of *Logik* renders it “something assumed” (Hegel, 1969d, p. 827).

<sup>4</sup> I quote in full because I would force Hegel’s statement to stand on its hands: “Indem nun diese Bestimmtheit die nächste Wahrheit des unbestimmten Anfang ist, so rügt sie denselben als *etwas Unvollkommenes*, sowie die *Methode selbst*, die von demselben ausgehend nur formell war” (Hegel, 1969b, p.567, my italics), which is rendered in the English translation as “Now as this determinateness is the proximate truth of the indeterminate beginning, it condemns the latter as something imperfect as well as the method itself that, in starting from that beginning, was merely formal” (Hegel, 1969d, p. 839).

<sup>5</sup> Hereafter, I basically rely on the Penguin version (Marx, 1976a) for quotations with the abbreviation C1. When inserting the German original with brackets, I use Marx (1962).

<sup>6</sup> The Althusserian circle thus understood is very Spinozan. Spinoza criticizes the usual definition of the circle and redefines it as “the figure described by any line whereof one end is fixed and the other free” (Spinoza, 1990, 96:2).

Relying on this Spinozan definition (see footnote 6), I aim to elaborate both the theoretical status of the *commencement(s)* of the defective circle clandestinely *and yet* indispensably embedded in capital's would-be logical self-description qua *autós* (including its historical development) and the specific ways of covering up this quasi-*autós* associated with the former, only through which might one encounter the potency of the working class to implode this eternal circularity *ontically*.

Althusser, while providing us with overdetermination as a method which is destined to be “reproached” by the “proximate truth” in the end, probes this disseminative *dispositif* that renders a defective circulation possible and finds the “connaissance fondée” that cannot be but “the solitary hours of the ‘last instance’” which, nevertheless, “never comes” (Althusser, 1986, p. 113). However, we must not overlook the fact that in the background is the Althusser who struggles to censure “the Hegelian circle for having only a single centre in which all the figures are reflected and conserved,” as Gilles Deleuze shows in his discussion of the three types of theatre – tragedy, farce, and *choros* (Deleuze, 1968, p. 73), and it is this inextricably tangled tripartite stage that *is* precisely what I am about to decode in relation to the three *commencements*, all of which *except for one* are to be belatedly erased in *Capital*.

In order to delineate how this tripartite theoretico-methodological régime or the triumvirate of *commencements* in *Capital* works, I will push the Althusserian struggle forward by disseminating the “connaissance fondée [*fonder/fundus*],” on which any possible *commencements* can depend, to its maximum degree of ambi-valence.

If the foundation [*fundus*] incorporates the disseminative *dispositif*, or, relying on the reading of Spinoza above, if there is an embedded openness in the so-called *clôture* “described by any line whereof one end is fixed and the other free,” this is only insofar as the foundation is an inauguration [*fundus*] of *commencement* as an assemblage of the three *ad/e*-vents<sup>7</sup> or contingencies-qua-clinamen (Deleuze, 1968, p. 238; cf., Markovits, 1974; Serre, 1977). This is equal to emancipating “the last instance” not only from the “solitary hours” but also from *itself* and breaks out towards the event. Furthermore, at the kernel of this attempt there remains a procedural schema devoted to the logical description of *commencement* in order for the three possible *commencements* to be deployed onto “la structure à trois temps de la répétition” which “n’est pas moins celle d’Hamlet que d’Œdipe” (Deleuze, 1968, p. 123). Here their beginning-ness is *not fully* destroyed, yet this schema returns to *force* the circle *open* in various ways according to a *still*-logical re-configuration. This is tantamount to an emancipation and a *forcing out* of two special factors – labor and land – which are always already *forced into* the “*clôture*” at some point in time and space while at the same time being (supposed to be) *forced out*.

All in all, my present experiment attempts to re-grasp the Althusserian standpoint that “C’est-à-dire qu’au lieu de penser la contingence comme modalité ou exception de la nécessité, il faut penser la nécessité comme le devenir-nécessaire de la rencontre de contingents” (Althusser, 1994, p. 566) from the aspect of the inauguration [*fundus*] and/or the forcing [*forçage*] (Badiou, 1988, § 36) of the *commencement* of the defective circle, which I would call capital (*and therefore* its coerced counterpart, our living labor). The defective is therefore none other than the “us” who/which *are* and *is* (at once) continually forced to *jam* the human labor – his/her “Möglichkeit/Fähigkeit” (Marx, 1976b, p. 189), in other words *Dunamis*<sup>8</sup> – *into and through* the “*nigh-impossible/unreason* [Muri] (literally in Japanese, the nil of reason 無-理)” of the commodification of our labour power (Uno, 1973, pp. 134-5).

<sup>7</sup> This neologism, which frequently appears in what follows, means “advent-qua-event.”

<sup>8</sup> For details of this issue, see Virno (2002, pp. 79ff.) and Virno (1999, pp. 121-23).

More specifically, in *Capital*, which is compelled by Lenin to take pride of standing in for the *Logik*,<sup>9</sup> the *commencement(s)* qua *ad/e*-vents that logically prepare the theory of value-form are provisionally deployed in three domains: the commodity posited at the very outset of *Capital*,<sup>10</sup> the exchange (process),<sup>11</sup> and the *so-called*<sup>12</sup> originary accumulation.<sup>13</sup> The latter two are eventually and *eventally* incorporated as invisible facets *and yet* forced to be conserved (*aufgehobene*). Thus the direct task here is to re-interpellate these three *commencement(s)* qua *ad/e*-vents in their own right and elucidate their *hierachical* relationship disguised in the logical description of *Capital*.

As is well known, in *Capital*, these three *commencements* are given, in line with the above three realms, their respective names. These are the commodity [*Ware*], which always already *ought to be* capitalist, the exchange/deed [*Tat*], which can be observed as ubiquitous in history, and the *Gewalt*, which is mystified and concealed as the original sin [*Sündenfall*] and then appeared as the *Kraft*.

It goes without saying that they are, for those external observers who only seek to logicalize *Capital* according to the Hegelian logic, the names given only *ex post facto* or in retrospect. As the present text seeks to illuminate, in the particular process that is *re-membered* (literally) /internalized [*er-innern*] as an auto-history of the capitalist commodity<sup>14</sup> that continues to survive as the one and only *commencement*, the latter two are – albeit by different methods and functions – to be eventally reduced or domesticated into the unique *commencement* (the capitalist commodity) after being “under erasure [*sous rature*]” (Spivak, 1997, p. xiv) by being “forced into” the former as “a previously established identity” for the sake of logical description (Deleuze, 1968, p. 73). In the case of the exchange (process), it is – as a methodological *dispositif* that configures the structure of the narrative called the capitalist commodity as socially relevant/legal [*gültig*] – reduced into the former as two isomorphically connected equivalent forms (the general form of value or money and the Hobbesian state). In the case of originary accumulation, whose name is disgraced as *Sündenfall*, it is likewise *forced out* into the outside/invisible, behind which the structure of the capitalist commodity as an eternal present [*now-here qua no-where*] is to be narrativized.

This is the outer constellation of the theoretical *dispositif* in my re-reading of *Capital* where the *commencement* and the singular are deemed univocal. Amplifying this point just a touch further in order to paraphrase the path of the present project, what is under scrutiny here shall be the meanings of the contrast that are simultaneously formed and erased in the logical interpretation of *Capital*. On the one hand, there is a social “relevancy-legality/*Gültigkeit*” consigned to capital based upon exploitation, which is buttressed, firstly, by the idyllic “peace” that is fabricated thanks to complicity between the value-form and the exchange process, and, secondly, by violent expropriation,<sup>15</sup> which is presupposed to be destined to be “modernized” into a *peaceful* exploita-

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<sup>9</sup> Lenin once said that “If Marx did not leave behind him a ‘*Logic*’ (with a capital letter), he did leave the *logic* of *Capital*, and this ought to be utilised to the full in this question. In *Capital*, Marx applied to a single science logic, dialectics and the theory of knowledge of materialism [three words are not needed: it is one and the same thing] which has taken everything valuable in Hegel and developed it further” (Lenin, 1915, p. 315).

<sup>10</sup> This is the generic name given to the “elementary form” of an “immense collection of commodities” (C1, p. 125).

<sup>11</sup> The exchange process (*der Austauschprozeß*) in the original version (Marx, 1962, p. 99) is simply rewritten in the Lachatre version “*Des Échanges*” (Marx, 1967, p. 34).

<sup>12</sup> We are not allowed to forget that Marx adds a word “sogenannte (so-called),” which is strictly connected to “ursprüngliche.”

<sup>13</sup> Hereafter, I use “originary accumulation” in place of “primitive accumulation.”

<sup>14</sup> Hereafter, I use the word “capitalist commodity” as the commodity which is produced under the capitalist system.

<sup>15</sup> It goes without saying that the word “expropriation” is derived from the French “*exproprier*” whose etymon is the Latin adjective “*ex-proprius*.” “*Proprius*” means “own” or “belonging” so that “*ex-proprius*” literally means “*ex-property*” which is rendered in German “*Enteignung*.” Therefore, “expropriation” does not necessarily mean violent deprivation.

tion based on a “so-called” equal exchange among “owners.” On the other hand, there is another complicit relation between the exchange process that is re-membered/internalized *ex post facto* by embracing the former complicity and the originary accumulation that is pre-supposed to be erased [sous rature] and subsumed. Also, there is an eternity that is based upon “peace,” which is staged thanks to both the violent expropriation that has been legally pacified, and its formation as the law of private property.

Behind this, there exists the problematic of the procedure of exposition – *Darstellung*<sup>16</sup> – which is to say, the logically formal system, whose ultimate task in Hegel is to return to the departing-point and complete circularity. This procedure would never allow plural *commencements*, namely, plural *ad/e*-vents, no matter what kind of return or completion is presumed. Those observers who are fascinated by the elegance of logic as a system would therefore choose only the sort of *commencement* that initiates, only based upon the pre-supposition [*Voraussetzung*] of logical consistency, an itinerary of logic from a pre-determined *commencement* to a return to that *commencement* while belatedly demonstrating the logical legitimacy of positing the *commencement post-hoc* (or “picked up” to borrow Hegel’s expression). In this regard, *ad-hoc* [Zufall] is to be always already domesticated by *post-hoc* [Necessity] in capital and *Capital*, whose main task is, bearing in mind the Deleuze to be cited at the end of this text (Deleuze, 2002), to logically realize what capital dreams of with itself/*autós*.<sup>17</sup>

As a co(n)-sequence, in the logical system of *Capital*, the capitalist commodity that is fabricated as the one and only *commencement* is both continually – in the case of exo-colonisation – and cyclically – in the case of endo-colonisation such as industrial crises – haunted by the other two *commencements*<sup>18</sup> which are actually always *there* – as *archi-écriture* (qua Ur-teil/partage) and clandestine supplements – while it has to manufacture *every time* the possibility of the impossibility of erasing this haunting through formalization. This is the very reason that Marx, punning on the *Aeneid*, sarcastically appreciates capital’s historical and cyclical drudgery by saying: “*Tantae milis erat* [So great was the effort required ...]” (C1, p. 925).

In what follows, I shall first outline the issues around the first *commencement* (the capitalist commodity) without avoiding certain repetitions, then articulate the rapport between the third *commencement* (originary accumulation) and the first. Upon viewing the rapport above, I will scrutinize the relationship between the second *commencement* (exchange process) and the first. Lastly, I return to the ontic and therefore ontological problematic: «we, the defective commodity-beings».

## 2. The Commodity Complete(d)

As primary fact, the cause is qualified as having absolute independence and a subsistence maintained in face of the effect: but in the necessity, whose identity constitutes that primariness itself, it is wholly passed into the effect. [...] [I]t’s in the effect that the cause first becomes actual and a cause. The cause consequently is in its full truth *causa sui* (Hegel, 1892, pp. 276-7)

Here Hegel provides the expressive image that enables the capitalist commodity to *look back*

<sup>16</sup> For this point, Negri (1991, pp. 11ff.) is provocative.

<sup>17</sup> This task is the very task of Political Economy in Marx’s sense. *Capital* should be the Critique of Political Economy.

<sup>18</sup> This dichotomy (exo/endo-colonisation) is derived from Virilio (for instance, Virilio, 1978).

over its allegedly historical and logical path towards its self-stylized clean and cleansed *autós* (i.e. the capitalist commodity as the first *commencement*). This image is nothing but a mirror that reflects the second and third *commencements*, insofar as they are not only considered defective from the standpoint of the first *commencement* which claims to be complete(d); but they are also appropriated by it in a merely formal sense. An inverted mirror image, it is perhaps the past that the first *commencement* should prefer to disavow and exorcise. The reason why the second and third *commencements* are regarded as defective is the scandalous/obscene pore or *t(a)in* of the mirror memory which the first *commencement* fears while arrogating *causa sui* to itself as *complete(d)*. The *commencement* for the commodity to be able to *auto-describe* and *re-member* from the standpoint of *causa sui* is given at the outset of the Chapter on Commodities, which is supposed to be the inevitable ladder for the theory of value-form (Bensaïd 1995: 293ff). This first *commencement* is exactly the capitalist commodity. It is posited by a well-known phrase in the early part of *Capital*: “The wealth of societies in which *the capitalist mode of production prevails* [herrescht] appears as an ‘immense collection of commodities [Warensammlung]’; the individual commodity appears as its *elementary form*. Our investigation [Untersuchung] therefore begins with the analysis of the commodity” (C1, p. 125, my italics). This first *commencement* (already) at once subsumes and excludes the other two *commencements* as the identical (with itself) in the name of the logical circle. It not only arrogates its legitimacy and justification to itself but also secures capital’s perverted claim that it can fill the role of organizing modern (civil) society as the one and sole “Subjekt-als-Substanz,” to borrow Hegel’s expression (Hegel, 1969c, chap. 3).

Here I put aside various arguments concerning the character of the commodity posited at the very beginning of *Capital*. What is more important is the question as to whether or not we can talk about in this context labor power and land as distinct commodities from the commodity *in general*. Still, there seems to be little objection towards considering the commodity posited at the beginning of *Capital* as the capitalist commodity abstracted as a form of circulation. This would include its logical relationship with Uno’s standpoint of the so-called *osmosis* of circulation into the production from the outside,<sup>19</sup> which is becoming a “visible” narrative in the context of the theory of exchange. If so, then we can understand that the commodity prepared for the development of the theory of value-form in the Chapter on Commodities can be regarded as capitalist, and *therefore*, as far as capital is concerned, it also can be the “logical” commodity in that it is clearly distinguished from the historically ubiquitous simple commodities in their “antediluvian forms” (C1, p. 266). The historico-logical implications here deny the Diamat type of historical (materialism) model. Here it is assumed that, prior to the establishment of the capitalist system, the theoretical *Merkmal* of which assumes a perfectly complete(d) and closed cycle by virtue of the production of commodities by means of commodities (to borrow the title of Sraffa’s seminal book), there is a simple commodity society in which capital and labor encounter and merge in the course of a “slow” (C1, p. 905), time-consuming, peaceful and idyllic stratification.<sup>20</sup>

However, even the capitalist commodity *qua commencement*, too, *can only be* given a peaceful beginning in the paradoxical sense that it theoretically *ought to* internalize the originary accumulation (violence) by excluding it from the logical system. Marx regards “usurer’s capital [Wucherkapital]” and “merchant’s capital [Kaufmannskapital]” (C1, esp. pp. 256-7)<sup>21</sup> as “capital in

<sup>19</sup> Uno does not name his specific method “osmosis.” This term was used as a criticism by his adversaries.

<sup>20</sup> For the details, see Lefebvre *et al.* (1978), Aston and Philpin (1985), and Katz (1989).

<sup>21</sup> We should be very careful not to conflate both “commercial capital [Handelskapital]” with “merchant’s capital” and “usurer’s capital” with “interest-bearing capital [zinstragendes Kapital].” Of course, when thinking about so-called “cognitive capitalism” and the role of rent(-seeking) in it, the possible conflation is actual. We have to think about it from the viewpoint of fictitious capital (see Nagahara, 2000).

general or capital on the whole [Kapital *quand même*]” (C1, p. 914).<sup>22</sup> If so, then it can be said that a commodity insofar as it can represent the “commodity in general or commodities on the whole [Ware *quand même*]” – in comparison to the complete/perfect capitalist commodity – is “incomplete and defective” (Spivak, 2000, p. 7 *et passim*) and yet [*quand même*] is allowed to be called a commodity, which, in a bundle, is dressed in a “very simple and contentless” pure form of circulation (C1, p. 90).

In this sense, the capitalist commodity *qua* the first *commencement* tacitly presupposes that it can be an eternal totality as it invaginates its “before/past” as a defective commodity. Therefore, this first *commencement* merely envelops and subsumes from the outside (or from between-ness), being indifferent to the content of production itself or to how commodities are actually produced. This is what we call a function of *osmosis*, which only becomes possible on this basis of the capitalist indifference towards content. What is always and already presupposed here is a “translation” into “commodity-language [Warensprache]” (C1, p. 144), which is a completed form of the immature and savage defective commodity. An instance of this can be found, as we shall see later, in the metonymic slippages in word-use in Goethe’s *Faust* through which something like the Lacanian “point de capiton” is sought while at the same time presupposing its eventual destination (the Other). In this sense, this *commencement* is always in a state of constantly already cleansed contamination (cf. Hamacher 2001). Only as the *dispositif* which can internalize such “Fehler” through the *commencement* that opens up the theory of value-form is the capitalist commodity allowed to be the sole *commencement* for the system of *Capital* as a whole. The destination of its return is, in this sense, nothing but a form (commodity-*qua-Eidos*), be it the Classes defined in the last part of *Capital* and The Trinity Formula associated with it and the commodification of capital itself as fictitious capital in this Formula. Here the paradise of Bentham is *finally* finished (C1, p. 280).<sup>23</sup>

However, if so, in the capitalist commodity posited at the very beginning there also enfolds the *ad/e-vent* (Ur-arché or Ur-teil/partage) of something that allows it to be the capitalist commodity in various ways (as we have seen in the “peace” called the circulation form). It is possible to assume here a distant working, perhaps of the *Urstaat*, of another *commencement* that allows the *commencement* for capital to deploy and re-member itself in a logical manner. If this other *commencement* can be posited logically with its singular status, it can also be considered to be qualified to take the place of the capitalist commodity and become an un-*improper* or de-expropriated *commencement*. However, this might cause an infinite *regressus* and an “unendliche Progreß” (Hegel, 1969b, p. 567), which is problematic for the logical description. This infinite *regressus* must be halted. It should thus be (pre-)disposed as a dangerous supplement (Derrida, 1967, chap 2) for the logical completion *as if* it had no rapport or were non-existent. This disposition is an organized, i.e. logical condensation of the ontic eruption of the defect or of Uno Kōzō’s “Muri/*nil-of-reason/unreason*” (Uno, 1973, pp. 134-5) in(to) the perfect circle by way of the erasure/inclusion of the “Fehler” that are *yet be* attenuated. Insofar as the logical deployment of the *commencement* proves in itself to be a logically legitimate positing of the *commencement*, there is, as its logical co(n)-sequence, no other way for the *commencement qua* other *commencement* to be posited as non-logical in light of the logical circle that takes off from the posited *commencement*. Thus, it is required to be excluded from the *commencement*. As the alterity/alien to the logic considered as the *commencement* sustaining the capitalist commodity, namely, the autonomous circular movement of capital, the *possible commencement qua* other *commencement* must be the *ad/e-vent* of something that both haunts the logical completion and yet is *sine qua non* to the logic and, simulta-

<sup>22</sup> In the original version, Marx uses this wording “Kapital *quand même*,” to which a footnote is delivered that says that the “*quand même*” means “überhaupt” (Marx, 1962, p. 778).

<sup>23</sup> I would add, in passing, that Bentham’s panopticon is the cage of gaze through contentless form/Eidos.



neously, a certain non-logical *ad/e*-vent to the logic. So this *commencement* is a system within which is im-*pli*-cated an *ad/e*-vent of the radical *coup* of the non-logical, or the “historical.” This *coup* as such guarantees its rupture with the logical system.

In this respect, Spivak writes: “The *rest* is history,” parodying a well-known phrase from *Hamlet* – “... with th’occurents more and less/ Which has solicited – the rest is silence.” She is aware of this *dispositif* and she describes history as being forced to be silent as the residue of the logic which is supposed to take over from history (Spivak, 2000, p. 21, my italics). Perhaps, in this regard, Marx succinctly gives the legal maxim “*Le mort saisit le vif*?” (C1, p. 91).<sup>24</sup> The non-logical is transferred to the capitalist commodity and appears cyclically also as a fearful memory of something with its own inexorable logic but which, however, has to vanish as a mediator (Jameson 1988: pp.83-4; 2002: pp.84, 226). This is the point at issue of which Marx remarks in a different context, “The movement through which this process has been mediated vanishes in its own result, leaving no trace behind” (C1, p. 187). Traces, however, inevitably remain.

To describe the problem of the contamination of the *commencement* in the circle and to discuss who the ghosts [Geist], i.e. «we, the defective commodity-beings», are, there have been two powerful shibboleths. One is Augustine who says that “*non in tempore sed cum tempore incepit creatio*.” The other is Marx who distinguishes logic and history by maneuvering a Hegelian dialectical circle based on the *Voraus-setzung*. As we shall see, capital’s axiomatic auto-positing as *causa sui* had to pre-fix the *commencement* that allows a return to the first *coup* of *Genesis*, in order to imagine itself dialectically (Marx, 1967, p. 315). In order for us to scrutinize this process in more detail and discover or encounter «we, the *defective* commodity-beings» not in the future but now, we have to begin not with the second *commencement*, our storyteller, but with Marx, who takes the violence back to the third *commencement*.

### 3. *Original Sin* Theologized

L’invisible est défini par le visible comme *son* invisible, *son* interdit de voir: l’invisible n’est donc pas simplement, pour reprendre la métaphore spatiale, le dehors du visible, les *ténèbres extérieures de l’exclusion*, intérieure au visible même, puisque définie par la structure du visible (Althusser, 1996, pp. 20-21, my italics).

Here Althusser soberly notes the visibility *rightfully* haunted by the ghost [Geist] of the invisible. The same Althusser, who contributes a preface to the reprinted (Flammarion) version of the Lachatre version of *Capital*, enlists, as the two great discoveries of the book, the “*plus-value*” and “l’accumulation primitive,” and defines the crux of the latter as “*le pire violence*” (Althusser, 1969, p. 17). The Althusser of the above epigraph, dealing with the crux of a symptomatic reading, offers us the most crucial viewpoint with which to deal with originary accumulation as the third *commencement*. What he offers here is the perspective that originary accumulation as the third *commencement* is the darkness of exclusion internalized within (and haunting) the visible,

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<sup>24</sup> Please note that Marx gives a “legal” maxim. This conundrum can be dissolved only by some sort of imperative given from outside. In relation to this, Marx sometimes used an expression “*quid pro quo*”. It is nothing but the tragically annoying conundrum that the tit for tat [*quid pro quo*] of what has already happened as staged in *Hamlet* (and *Œdipus Tyrannus*) – the story of the repetition of the past *ad/e*-vent where, while it is the past [ghost] that haunts the living, it is the same past [ghost] that also solicits the silence (cover-up) – or the mourning that is the subjugation/appeasement of the turmoil for the sake of the bereft is guaranteed only by the imperative of the past [ghost] to continue to (be) memorize(d).

because it is defined as *ex post facto* (though it is factually *ex ante facto*) by the first *commencement* that seeks to lift its head independently as the visible. Now how does Marx describe this?

As is well-known, from the vantage point of the “starting-point” given retrospectively to the general law of capitalist accumulation, Marx defines originary accumulation as “the process [...] which creates the capital-relation” and “which divorces the worker from the ownership [Eigentum] of the conditions of his own labour.” The process of the commodification of labour power is based on a process where “great masses of men are suddenly and forcibly torn from their means of subsistence and hurled onto the labour-market as *free, unprotected and rightless proletarians*.” Marx discovers behind this process the “expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the soil” and its commodification. Having *pre-supposed* the third *commencement*, Marx sets up a “vicious circle” where “the accumulation of capital presupposes surplus-value; surplus-value presupposes capitalist production; capitalist production presupposes the availability of considerable masses of capital and labour-power in the hands of commodity producers” (C1, pp. 873-6, my italics). About this vicious circle, he left the following famous account:

The whole movement, *therefore*, seems to turn around in a vicious circle [*fehlerhaften Kreislauf*/defective circle], which we can only get out of by assuming a primitive accumulation (the ‘*previous* accumulation’ of Adam Smith) which precedes capitalist accumulation: an accumulation which is *not* the result of the capitalist mode of production but its point of departure [*Ausgangspunkt*] (C1, p. 873, my italics).

What is implied here is not a vicious circle in the common sense that a solution to one trouble invites another, but rather that there is *already* and *inexorably* something “fehlerhaft” in the *commencement* only by which capital initiates the circle in its accumulation. Capital, however, can never allow that a defective circulation exists in its self-describing *autós* as *causa sui* because the acknowledgment of this defect is a negation of the *autós* by the *autós* of the *commencement* or return. For capital, therefore, this should be described as a circulation mistakenly haunted or falsely assumed [*fehlerhaften*], namely, as an intentionally mis-recognized circulation. For it to be real, this defect *ought not* to be a defect. Instead, it must be a “Schranke” which is anticipated *so that it can be overcome*. Therefore the “Grenze” is regarded as “Zufall” (Marx, 1976b, p. 249). But what is to be done for capital? In order for capital to inaugurate its own *geometrically* smooth circular movement,<sup>25</sup> capital has to both recollect/internalize in itself [*sich erinnern*] originary accumulation as a historical rupture outside, and forget it in the logic to be complete(d). In this way is the ghost exorcised. In this manner, the recollection/internalization [*Erinnerung*] is always accompanied by dissent/warning [*Erinnerung*]. Here is the reason why an analogy is made here with a theology. However, this theology cannot simply erase the defect. What it can do is to *defer*<sup>26</sup> the defect by giving it a form appropriate to the first *commencement*, which is none other than a reduction of the defect into the *commencement* called the “simple and slight in content [*inhaltlos und einfach*]” commodity (C1, p. 90) by rendering and theologizing the *unreason* of the violent process of the double commodification of labor and land as *original sin*. *Vis-à-vis* the original sin/theology, Marx says as follows in relation to Political Economy: the capital(ist) science (Hardt and Negri, 1994, chap. 3).

This originary accumulation plays approximately the same role in political economy as origi-

<sup>25</sup> For detailed analyses, I refer readers to Derrida’s early texts (Derrida, 1989 and 1990) and Serres (1993).

<sup>26</sup> This Derridian wording (*différance*) also signifies two lexical meanings: procrastination and “to delegate to another/admittance.”

nal sin does in theology. [...] Its origin [*Ursprung*] is supposed to be explained when it is told as an *anecdote* about the past (C1, p. 873, my italics).

For capital, it ought to be “the past” – *what is always already passed and finished* – or “an anecdote” *in senso stricto*, i.e. “an-ék-dota.” For political economy, it is a mouthpiece of capital’s desire to describe itself as *causa sui*, about which Žižek not only points out correctly that originary accumulation is a *narrativization* of the *birth*(place) of its *autós*, but also stresses that the auto-narrativization (recollection/internalization) of capital itself can be(come) a narrative (recollection/internalization) only in complicity with the form-ism (morphology) given by the first *commencement*.

[B]oth Marx and Freud were the two great formalizers. In his analysis of commodity fetishism, Marx asserts that the mystery of the commodity-form resides in this form itself, not in the content hidden beneath it, thereby echoing Freud’s remark (in his masterpiece with the misleading title *The Interpretation of Dreams*) that the specificity of the dream resides in its form as such, not in the content encoded in this form. For this precise reason, Marx’s deployment of the commodity-form in Chapter 1 of *Capital* is not a “narrative,” a *Vorstellung*, but a *Darstellung*, the deployment of the inner structure of the universe of merchandise – the narrative, on the contrary, is the story of “primitive accumulation,” the myth capitalism proposes about its own origins. (Žižek, 2002, pp. 190-91)

So it is that Marx says: “To understand the course taken by this change, we do not need to go back very far at all” (C1, p. 875). He adds in the Lachatre version that: “L’histoire de leur expropriation n’est pas matière à conjecture” (Marx, 1967, p. 315). In the part that speaks of the transformation of surplus-value into capital where the commodification of labor-power must be an implicit yet inevitable logical presupposition, he states: “[O]riginal sin is at work everywhere. With the development of the capitalist mode of production, with the growth of accumulation and wealth, the capitalist ceases to be merely the incarnation of capital. He begins to feel a human warmth towards his own Adam” (C1, p. 740). These phrases suggest that a theological-type narrative both haunts and contaminates the formal purity/circularity not in the past but in the present and continues to create hybrids. Spivak correctly points out in relation to this device regarding theology: “Theory takes as its object things that are *birthless* and cannot be verbally articulated. Marx is looking at the circuits of capital, the birth of whose originary accumulation cannot be philosophically grasped, only narrativized.” Spivak does not simply insist upon a return from *form* (Eidos) in order to reconstitute *content* (Hyle); she stresses that for the subsumption of originary accumulation into the first *commencement* as form, the theologization of the originary accumulation is essential, so much so that she seeks to confront the narrative of capital with the necessity of “the story of storying – of the rewriting of the logical model of social justice into a narrative of population movements” (Spivak, 2000, p. 5, pp. 24-5, my italics). We can read the great word “birthless” (i.e. of mean *extraction*!) here, which is exactly what I would term “defective.”

Despite the logicist reading of *Capital* which criticizes the mix of historical descriptions into the *Capital* revised as *Logik*, Marx himself seeks to give a “resistance” (Derrida, 1988, p. 52; cf. Gaston, 2006, pp. 96-7) to the “very simple and contentless” *commencement* in itself. This is a project of *repetitiously* counter-positing the so-called history as founded as the *real history* against “the legend of theological original sin” as it had already been *transferred* to the economic narrative.

My question is therefore this. By this “real” does Marx try to oppose historical *facts* as cele-

brated in the chronological table against theology? This interpretation might be easy to accept, so much so that so-called historical *facts* come to be rejected by the logicist interpretation as impurities that must be logically purified. It is nonetheless wrong to consider it as a counter-positing of historical fact against theoretical purity. Marx's introjections of historical facts into the logical system do not simply amount to his emphasis on the concrete violence *vis-à-vis* the separation between direct producers and the means of production. What is crucial here is the fact that the violence [*Gewalt*] which reappears in the theory of exchange process metamorphosed as "*power-legislative effects [Kraft]*" is implicitly posited here as an auxiliary line. In other words, Marx investigates the role of the violence of "the power of the state, the concentrated and organized force of society to hasten, *as in a hothouse*, the process of transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode, and to shorten the transition," namely the process of *forçage* (Badiou, 1988; Hallward, 2003, pp. 135ff.) which is though still "economic power [ökonomische Potenz]" (C1, pp. 915-6, my italics). Thus he already questions *in its formalization* the significance of the direct violence that the third *commencement* historically exercised. This is the matter of a *new form of violence* which is necessary in order to take in its content as "property," and erase the violence in the third *commencement* which is, nevertheless, necessary for the first *commencement*.

Marx points out that capital, which desires by its nature to absolutely deterritorialize itself even more freely than "vogelfrei" laborers<sup>27</sup>, clings on to originary accumulation as the third *commencement* that is violently swallowed and annexed by the first *commencement* in the process of theologization. This incorporation of the third *commencement* into the first through the formal pacification of the violence enables a reduction of the (*Kaufmann*/merchant) deed/*Tat* as the second *commencement* into the first. This not only affirms "the social adequacy/legality [*gesellschaftlich Gültigkeit*]" (C1, p. 180) of the capitalist commodity as the first *commencement* but also inexorably invites into itself the state that is nevertheless *the very obstacle* to capital in light of the originary desire of capital to be an axiomatic system. This is, however, clearly a double bind for capital, which however can be dissolved only by subtending its "Schranke" incessantly yet "under particular circumstances." This limitless subtending becomes the second nature of capital.

Marx, in the original version of *Capital*, writes as follows concerning originary accumulation. "In themselves, money and commodities are no more capital than the means of production and subsistence. They need to be transformed into capital. But this transformation can itself only take place *under particular circumstances*." He goes on to say:

[T]he confrontation of, and the contact between two very different kinds of commodity possessors [Warenbesitzern] *must* take place; on the one hand, the owners [*Eigner*, i.e. legally qualified Persons] of money, means of production, means of subsistence, who are eager to valorize the sum of values they have appropriated by buying the labour-power of the others; on the other hand, free workers, the seller of the labour-power, and therefore the sellers of labour (C1, p. 874, my italics).

In this passage it appears that the previous pedagogic definition of originary accumulation – that is, the separation of direct producers from the means of production – seems to have been rephrased in a somewhat neutral manner. In fact, it is tacitly describing a couple of crucial points. The first point is the issue of uncertainty due to the "*particular circumstances*" that are

<sup>27</sup> Any dictionary will provide an example sentence such as "... für vogelfrei erklären ...." In this sense, Vogelfrei literally means "Homo Sacer" who is deprived of legal protection (Agamben, 1998).

supposed to stage the encounter between capital and labor.<sup>28</sup> The second point is also indispensable to the relationship with the *commencement* in the theory of the exchange process. This is the problematic of property rights *qua* that of originary accumulation, where we can see a careful wording of “commodity possessor/occupier [*Waren-besitzern*]” instead of commodity “owner [*Eigner*]” since the establishment of property rights has not yet been introduced. This is because, as Deleuze and Guattari correctly point out, the encounter between these two fundamental productive elements can only be a historical contingency which is only necessitated theoretico-retrospectively. The necessity called contingency [*Zufall-als-Schicksal!*] is guaranteed only by the violence of the institutional or forced encounter between the laborer whose only right is to dispose of his/her own [*proprius*] body and the capitalist who occupies the place where property rights are *always already* acknowledged – violently appropriated or not – over the means of production. For this encounter/contingency called *clinamen* to *be forced into* necessity, “the force of circumstances [*Zwang der Umstände*],” namely “the extra-economic force [*außerökonomische Zwang*],” has to be metamorphosed into the “peaceful” force in the market called “the silent compulsion [*stumme Zwang*]” through the reiterated process of social “deeds” (C1, p. 896, p. 899).<sup>29</sup> The premise of this logical stage (in the original version) where Marx seems to describe simply the “Fehler” of “defective circulation” in terms of their functions as laborer and capitalist is, however, totally changed in the Lachatre version. Therein a “Person,” in the Hegelian sense, which is posited instrumentally in the original version, is further specified as the subject of the property (right)/contract [*Vertrag*] relation, the subject that can tolerate [*vertragen*] the existence of the seemingly equal other (and his/her property right) via public and commercial trans-act(ion)s. This problem cannot be explained away by the claim that in the descriptive procedures of *Capital* the account of originary accumulation should be located after and outside that of exchange. This point cannot be ignored for this experiment, which tries to divide the *arché* into three *commencements* in mutual contamination. Marx in the Lachatre version writes as follows:

La rapport *officiel* entre le capitaliste et le salarié est d'un *caractère purement mercantile*. Si le premier joue le rôle de maître et le dernier le rôle de serviteur, c'est grâce à un contrat par lequel celui-ci s'est non-seulement mis au service, et partant sous la dépendance, de celui-là, mais par lequel il a renoncé à tout titre de propriété sur son *propre* produit (Marx 1967, p. 315, my italics).

This is not just evidence to justify the “Transition of the Laws of Property that Characterise Production of Commodities into Laws of Capitalist Appropriation” or the so-called “Kehr” of “Aneignung” (C1, chap. 24, § 1). It is rather an aesthetic aspect of capital’s auto-description which, by theologizing the “Fehler” in the defective circulation, shunts the “Fehler” far away into the past (i.e. that which is hopefully fully finished). With this expulsion/purification, it shelters the capitalist commodity as the first *commencement* from contaminating “Fehler” of the existence of the other two *commencements*. This is carried out by way of swallowing the “Fehler” into its own *principio* (*commencement-qua-principle*) as an axiom, which does not need, unlike a theorem, to be proven or demonstrated but is instead considered to be either self-evident or subject to a necessary decision [*Ur-teil*/originary division]). This contractual fulcrum is at once a formalization (rendering it non-violent) of property and a peaceful “Ver-kehr (communication).” At the same time, it is literally nothing short of a vicious circle that is supplemented only and barely by a description

<sup>28</sup> We shall see at the end of this text that this is the point on which Deleuze and Guattari criticize Marx(ians).

<sup>29</sup> Please note here that Marx has already used the term “Zwang” instead of “Gewalt” to describe this process.

of the establishment of such concepts as property rights and contracts (namely free trade) based in law upon state violence. This is called Civil Society where laborers are entitled to be Benthamite civilians together with capitalists, both of which are formally equal in terms of the commodity-owner (Eigentümer).

The more emphatically Marx, as if obsessed by the logic of capital which capital dreams in and with itself, seeks to narrativize the theology of original sin in order to secure the capitalist commodity *qua* the first *commencement* as the *conception immaculée* from the third, the more seriously he should face up to the fact that the state (*qua* original and external violence) is here exposed, even though it is *translated* into economic potency, made peaceful, and inscribed in the system. What is more problematic is that he signifies that the first *commencement* can annex the third only by way of the formalization of violence through economic potency. This disavowal of the supplement is truly a vicious circle.

For instance, *vis-à-vis* the issue of colonialism which seems to be foreign to the logical description of capital, especially after the many criticisms of Rosa Luxemburg, Marx mocks the political economist who “applies the notions of law and of property inherited from a pre-capitalist world, with all the more anxious zeal and all the greater unction, the more loudly the facts cry out in the face of his ideology.” This applies not only to colonies as visible exteriorities for the “ready-made [completed] world of capital” [diese fertige Welt des Kapitals] (C1, p. 931), but also to the *ad/e*-vents that have always already happened and become invisible to “la société capitaliste déjà faite” (Marx, 1967, p. 343).<sup>30</sup>

In this precise manner, the *ad/e*-vent’s *ex ante facto* and *ex post facto* are transferred [*übertragen*] to the *ad/e*-event’s exteriority and interiority respectively, then translated/over-posed [*übersetzen*] into exclusivities that are then exhibited or displayed (cf., de Man, 1979, pp. 119-26). Here, the economic potency that exists at its core comes to function not simply upon various examples of mercantile policies, but also, most importantly, at the *ad/e*-vent of the concept of property rights and contracts. Here we might recall the bourgeois revolution *qua* political event as an expression of the most intense economic potency.

Balibar says that “L’analyse de l’accumulation primitive nous met ainsi en présence de l’absence de mémoire radicale qui caractérise l’histoire,” and adds “la mémoire n’étant que la réflexion de l’histoire en certains lieux prédéterminés – l’idéologie, voire le droit – et comme telle, rien moins que fidèle” (Balibar, 1996, p. 534, original italics). When we pay more attention to “qui caractérisé l’histoire” than to Balibar’s own italics, we can see that this “absence of memory” or “forgetting” is an obsessive compulsion that originates from originary accumulation being theologized and logicalized/formalized as a memory of the capitalist commodity that arrogates the unique *commencement* to itself. Therefore, in “certains lieux prédéterminés,” what is glimpsed here is the first *commencement*. Furthermore, when it is specified as “ideology, even law,” what is indicated are property rights, backed by the bourgeois state, which clandestinely *undertake* the first *commencement qua* capitalist commodity. In the first *commencement*, everything is deemed *always already complete(d)*. Even more progressively, Althusser also says that “Dans cette accumulation originelle les idéologues du capitalisme racontaient l’histoire édifiante du capital, comme les philosophes du droit naturel racontent l’histoire de l’État.” He even calls it “l’accumulation primitive politique” (Althusser, 1977, p. 320, p. 321; cf. Montag, 1996, p. 97). Negri develops his Foucaultian perspective by connecting the issue of originary accumulation with his own notion of “constituent power.” It is the “[v]iolence” of the state that “constitutes the vehicle between accu-

<sup>30</sup> This is why there exists no outside in the Reproduction Scheme (Tableau économique Marxian) described in volume two of *Capital*.

mulation and right. It has no problem presenting in legal terms, or better, making law a subsidiary element of accumulation.” The state thus understood can accept laws-qua-its-formalization as “a machine, [...], a permanent procedure of the system,” which functions as “its constant innovation and its rigid discipline” (Negri, 1999, p. 254, p. 257). Here Negri insists on a smooth specific *segue* from expropriation to exploitation or from violence to “peace” (recall footnote 13), behind which, however, the violent “Geburtshelfer [midwife]” works hard (Marx, 1962, p.779) .

This point should not be dealt with only from a standpoint which, starting from the pre-fixed division between those who are “condemned to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow” and its opposite (C1, p. 873), develops into the Foucaultian theory of discipline (Read 2002), or from the attempt to reconsider the theory of labor-“Kultivierung/cultivation” in the theory of the Sozial Politik Schule. The fact is that the capitalist commodity being the first *commencement*, is *backed* by the social establishment of the concept of property rights and contracts that *are* scooped up on the “surface” of circulation from the “depth” of production through the exclusion of the third *commencement*. Deleuze and Guattari say:

D’où le caractère très particulier de la violence d’État: il est difficile d’assigner cette violence, puisqu’elle se présente toujours comme déjà faite. Il ne suffit même pas de dire que la violence renvoie au mode de production. Marx le remarquait pour le capitalisme: il y a une violence *qui passe nécessairement par l’État*, qui précède le mode de production capitaliste, qui constitue l’«accumulation originelle», et rend possible ce mode de production lui-même. [...] C’est une violence qui se pose comme déjà faite, bien qu’elle se refasse tous les jours. C’est le cas où jamais de dire que *la mutilation est préalable, préétablie* (Deleuze et Guattari, 1980, pp. 558-9).

Thus the “previous”ly established – if I rely on Smithian parlance – apparatus is, no matter how obsessively political economy seeks to conceal it by calling it pastoral (Perelman, 2000), the state *qua* violence, and the form the state takes, that is to say, its pacified core being the property right and contract. This “*ur*-mutilation,” as it were, is the ghostly [geistig] and dangerous supplement which the first *commencement*, a crystallization of the theology of capitalism, has to ostracize by any means. Thus, although it is unacceptable for capital, which desires itself to be “the” subtending limitlessness of an axiomatic system, the capitalist commodity as *commencement* is bound inside a specific “dementia” but, nevertheless, “works” extremely well. “C’est dément *et ça marche très bien*” (Deleuze, 2002, p. 366, my italics), so much so, in fact, that capital cannot prove to be *causa sui* without relying on the state. In order to describe this “full-nelson,” Deleuze and Guattari frequently employ phrasing such as “se rabattre sur ...” (Deleuze et Guattari, 1972: 16 *et passim*). In this sense, the third *commencement* called originary accumulation *qua* the dangerous supplement that always already haunts the capitalist commodity and contaminates it is “*p préalable, préétablie*.”

The *dispositif* by which this theology is switched into modern deism is the trading deed [*Tat*] considered the “*commencement* [*Anfang*]” *qua* the capture [*Fang*] of society through exchange (Deleuze et Guattari, 1980, pp. 592ff.). This switch allows the first *commencement* to appear as the sole “Subjekt-als-Substanz” in organizing society by giving it a social adequacy/legality [*Gültigkeit*], and this process is precisely the *ad/e*-vent of the state and of property rights. What is sought here is a description of the exchange process *as* the apparatus that sustains the “Warenwelt/world of commodities” (C1, p. 129) as a society through the unique position of the first *commencement*. This is a process of “alienation/Veräußerung” of the Hobbesian state as the equivalent form by way of social exchange (i.e. social formation) by the possessors of commodi-

ties. The process through which the theory of the exchange process mimicks the development of the theory of value-form arrives at the question of money (the equivalent form), and is depicted as a process that is co-substantive with the development of the exchange process. It is also depicted as a process through which to endow property rights with the commodity in the exchange process. Originary accumulation is nothing if not an apparatus where the establishment of property rights is implied behind the arrow in the proportional expression – exchange: society à money: state (equivalent form as the third term).

Originary accumulation is, as Marx points out correctly, a historical separation between producers and the means of production (or the *one and double ad/e-vent* of the commodification of land and labor power), but it is excluded from the logical system in order for capital to describe what is allegedly its own history (past) as always already complete(d) and purified after *re-discovering* its *ex ante facto* event as a procedural *ex post facto*, which then allowed it to function as a given for the first *commencement* to operate. It is also a retrospective perpetualization of the property rights and of the “theological original sin” *qua* the *commencement* that has to be made part of the narrative as an exquisite horror for capital.

Though it lacks a viewpoint by which to grasp the commodification of property rights *per se* elaborated as the theory of fictitious capital (see Nagahara, 2000), this process is made possible only by endowing property rights with land and labor (body), both of which are special goods in the sense that they cannot be reproduced as commodities by means of commodities., to which Marx gives the name “material substratum/*résidu* matériel” (C1, p. 133; Marx, 1967, p. 16).<sup>31</sup> Such a *commencement* as the other, after being erased by both formality/logicality and the distant place/eternity, is connected *back* to the exchange process as the second *commencement*, which Deleuze and Guattari might call the encounter of “alliance and filiation” (Deleuze et Guattari, 1972: 227ff.). The transition from the omnipresence of war to the process of the idyllically peaceful relations of economic exchange (or historically specific communication [*Verkehr*]) then becomes possible (Dumont 1983: chaps. 1 et 2). This is also the process through which labor and land as the “material substratum” that provides a breach which possibly generates the “restance” in the circle is degraded into merely being a residue [*résidu*] for the first *commencement*, under the formalization or the axiomatization of violence called commodification.

## 4. Exchange

In the *beginning* was the Word/In *principio* erat Verbum/Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος (Logos) /Im *Anfang* war die Wort (Evangelium Secundum Johannem 1:1)

These have one mind, and they give their power [*virtutem*] and authority [*potestatem*] to the beast (The Apocalypse of John 17:13).

[N]o one would be able to buy or to sell, unless he has that mark, the name of the beast or the number of his name (The Apocalypse of John 13:17)

As with originary accumulation, the *dispositif* that supplements the first *commencement* as a

<sup>31</sup> For capital, is “Substrat” the “résidu” of something that has already happened and that is then subtracted?



vanishing mediator is also assigned to the exchange process. The exchange process is presented with contradictory descriptions that are deemed confused even when seen from the aspect of logical purity. This part is divided into two. The first (a little more than three pages in the original version) is where the auto-development of the value-form is mimicked by the introduction of the desiring subject – more correctly, “*Bedürfnis/besoin*” – and its reiterated deeds [*Tat*] that *must be* summoned in order to dissolve the contradictions here. The second part (a little more than four pages in the original version) is where commodity fetishism is narrativized as the “interstices [*Intermundien*]” and the “pores [*Poren*]” (C1, p. 172) as seen from the viewpoint of the *Genesis* of capital, on the one hand, and as the externality observed *back* from the vantage point of the complete(d) form, on the other. Both are, however, narrativized *as if* they were historico-social processes. The deed and interstices or externality also systemically constitute the exchange process as the second *commencement*, namely, the very process through which the commodity, forming the “*gesellschaftlich Gültigkeit*,” is affirmed as the capitalist commodity. Marx here, who attempts both logically and procedurally to finish the theory of value-form with the judgment that, “That money as a commodity is [...] only a discovery *for those who proceed from its finished shape in order to analyze it afterwards*” (C1, p. 184, my italics), reiterates the theory of the exchange process retrospectively as both the logicalized historical, and *therefore* ahistorical, process in the theory of value-form and as a logicalized social process that corresponds to the former.

There is, however, the famous phrase in the second half, which I quote below in relation to the first half: “The direct exchange of products has the form of the simple expression of value in one respect, but not as yet in another. That form was  $x$  commodity A =  $y$  commodity B. The form of the direct exchange of products is  $x$  use-value A =  $y$  use-value B. The articles A and B in this case are *not as yet* commodities, but become [werden] so only through the deed of exchange” (C1, p. 181). We cannot ignore this Marx as one who tries to deduce the genesis of the state from the transactive circulation/alienation process which is isomorphic to that where the exchange process “sets apart (alienates [veräußern/übertragen])” (C1, p. 181) money as an equivalent form. Therefore, we have to acknowledge the following point. Only because the capitalist commodity is deemed able to represent the defective commodity under a subsumptive concept such as the “pure exchange form,” the *dispositif* that guarantees a becoming of wealth (or the thing [*Ding*], according to Marx) into commodities is considered to be – *not the commodity but* – exchange.

Thus, the first *commencement* is allowed to *be* the *commencement* not only by tolerating the “dangerous supplement” that is an exchange (social reciprocity) prior to “*being* commodity” but also by politically accepting the establishment of the equivalent form *qua* the state, which is isomorphic with money for society and which legitimates property rights. Here, Marx also says: “They become exchangeable through the mutual desire of their possessors [Willensakt ihrer *Besitzer*] to alienate them” (C1, p. 182). He goes on to say that since the “relationship of reciprocal isolation and foreignness [Verhältnis wechselseitiger Fremdheit] does not exist for the members of a primitive community of natural origin, [...] [t]he exchange of commodities begins where communities have their boundaries, at their points of contact with other communities, or with members of the latter. However, as soon as products have become commodities in the external relations of a commodity, they also, by reaction, become commodities in the internal life of the community” (C1, p. 182).<sup>32</sup> This is nothing but a rephrasing of Marx’s point concerning the constitution of the bourgeois (nation-)state – that property as an idea comes from the outside and is then internalized

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<sup>32</sup> I would regard this famous phrase not from the traditional Marxian viewpoint but from the position base on which Deleuze and Guattari describe “*L’espace troué*” (Deleuze et Guattari, 1980, § 12-14).

along with the first *commencement*, which is originally foreign to the “primitive community of natural origin.”

The viewpoint which we call the process of “osmosis of circulation into production” and the theory of the (formal/substantive) subsumption of the content/production/depth [*Tiefe*] by form/circulation/surface [*Oberfläche*] continues to be attractive for the interpretation of the genesis of capital (see Nagahara, 2000 and Backhaus, 1978). However, not only does the (capitalist) commodity have to tolerate another beginning-ness – exchange precedes the commodity – as the first *commencement*, it is also bound by a specific reflexivity in which it has to *persuade* exchange once allowed to come prior to it and persuade itself of this priority, because the capitalist commodity has to maintain for itself the “*gesellschaftlich Gültigkeit*.”

What kind of theoretical dispositif does Marx dispatch to the conundrum here? His explanation begins with the famous “watchman, guardian, custodian, and superintendent of the commodity.” In the first half, Marx, as a genuine Hegelian, depicts the theory of the exchange process as a system of *Bedürfnis/besoin* (that is to say, a civil society) and therefore of property. In this way, he sets up a content, abstracted in the sense of a historical model of the theory of value-form, which, *seemingly historically*, emerges through the simple, isolated, and accidental form of value. He begins with the following phrase:

Commodities cannot themselves go to market and perform exchanges in their own right. We *must*, therefore, have recourse to their guardians [Hütern], who are the possessors of commodities [Warenbesitzern]. Commodities are things [Dinge], and therefore lack the power to resist man [widerstandslos gegen den Menschen]. If they are unwilling [manquer de bonne volonté], he can use force [Gewalt]. In other words, he can capture/grab them [sie nehmen/s’emparer] (C1, p. 178; Marx, 1967, p. 34, my italics)

Marx exploits somewhat aggressive words like “sie nehmen,” I am tempted to refer to the commodified land and labor as well, albeit I am fully aware that such talk is an anomaly for those who would seek a logical purification of *Capital*, but here we are experimenting with a mutual contamination of three *commencements* as an *ontic (and therefore ontological) theory of the event qua value-theory* in *Capital*. They offer an indispensable problematic concerning the process of inscribing property rights into the full body and Socius (Deleuze et Guattari, 1970, chap. 3). Though I acknowledge the criticism of dislodging the theory of the exchange process from the theory of the value-form, I would repeat the theory of the value-form by transferring it to the exchange process from the vantage point of these *commencements*. Here in Marx, turning violence – “ökonomische Potenz” – into property rights by way of formalization in order to reduce it to the first *commencement* is alluded to as an axiomatization of violence (pacifying violence without any legitimacy) by capital. This is also a process through which *Bedürfnis/besoin* is transformed into desire while being captured by a relative lack (rareté) and thereby legally institutionalized and thus legitimized. If the process does not function, the capitalist commodity as the *commencement* that represents the so-called defective commodities prior to it is not allowed to circulate autonomously/independently. There is then no reason not to include the so-called special commodities like labor power and land. In fact, Marx could not have guaranteed the autonomous circulation of capital without organically subsuming-while-excluding the special things [*Ding*] called labor power and land that never become or always refuse to be complete(d) capitalist commodities, outside and inside capital in the forms of surplus populations, crises, and fictitious capital.

As far as Marx’s historico-logical standpoint and his descriptive procedures are concerned,

the “watchman, guardian, custodian, or superintendent” of the commodity *must* be distinct from “*Eigentümer*” or even “*Privateigentümer*” to make “these objects” “enter into relation with each other as commodities.” They “must [also] place themselves in relation to one another as persons whose will resides in those objects.” This is a social recognition among “private owners.” Here, “persons exist for one another merely as representatives [Repräsentanten] and hence possessors, of commodities” and “the characters who appear on the economic stage [*Charaktermasken*] are merely personifications of economic relations [...]” People confront one another as “bearers [*Träger*]” (sometimes translated symbolically as “depositories”) of economic relations. Thus Marx introduces here merely the functional or logically imaginary aspect of the establishment of property rights into the exchange process (C1, pp. 178-9).

However, in order for Marx to enable such a theoretical rendering, the first *commencement must* have been already (and perhaps always) presupposed in the exchange here, and behind the first *commencement* the third *commencement must* have been, again, already (and perhaps always) built in – or “se rabattre” – and such a logical operation *must* have been ongoing. For the “Person” with “*Charaktermasken*” or “*bonne volonté*,” it must be that the capitalist commodity *desires* in order to have its one and only social legitimacy affirmed. Only because Marx thought that it had already been built in or ongoing, is he able to approach the operation of “economic potency” via the concept of contracts and speak of it, not as the violence [*Gewalt*] of “capture,” but as an establishment of the economic relation of “volition” prior to the enactment of property laws. This “volition” is, therefore, an alias of “Zwang.”

This juridical relation [Rechtsverhältnis], whose form is the contract [Vertrag], whether as part of a developed legal system or not, is a relation between two wills which mirrors the economic relation (C1, p. 178).

Concerning the formalization of violence (expropriation) into exploitation, legal power [*Kraft*] intervenes in order for there to be the establishment of a mutual tolerance [*Vertragung*] via the contract. This phrase calls to mind, on the one hand, an *ex post facto* acknowledgement of the establishment of the state’s enactment of laws through the cumulative process of the English common law – recall the rupture in England between the Tudor Enclosures and the Parliamentary Enclosure (Renner, 1949) – and, on the other, an indifference on which the pure form of circulation relies. This passage also implies the establishment of the former disguised as a spontaneous and indigenous genesis of property rights and the emerging process of the latter which equally disguises itself in the form of a spontaneity of the emergence of the modern state due to a betweenness and an exteriority which illustrates the Hegelian distinction between the “innere Staat” and the “äußere Staat” in line with commodity exchange and the accumulation of capital (cf. Avineri, 1972). It is nothing but an alternate expression for the economic potency in originary accumulation. It is the very process of the formalization (commodification) of state violence that sustains and promulgates the “*gesellschaftlich Gültigkeit*” of the capitalist commodity as a *commencement* by way of a socially lawful reciprocity based upon property and legal contracts.

Marx once said that “[C]ommodities *must* be realized as values before they can be realized as use-values. On the other hand, they *must* stand the test as use-values before they can be realized as values [Die Waren *müssen* sich daher als Werte realisieren, bevor sie sich als Werte realisieren können. Andererseits *müssen* sie sich als Gebrauchswerte bewähren, bevor sie sich als Werte realisieren können]” (C1, p. 179; Marx, 1962, p. 100, my italics). Here the overcoming of a contradiction is spoken of as if waiting for the social approval of the “*gesellschaftlich Gültigkeit*” of money. This quasi-contradiction might be a reiteration of the “becom[ing commodity] only through the

deed of exchange” in terms of the theory of value. And here, I almost misread the German word «bewähren», which lexically means an actual proof of truth, as another German word «bewahren» that signifies “to watch” or “to guard,” and yet this misreading should be etymologically sound. Behind the “actual proof” of “truth” what is implied is the *ad/e*-vent of the “Nachtwächterstaat (night watchman state)” as an equivalent value form which is distilled/alienated collectively, like money as the third term, as the one and only *Gewalt-als-Kraft* whose only task is precisely to *guard* private property invisibly, this being made possible via “*gültig*” social exchange. Hence the second *commencement* is spoken of as follows:

In their difficulties our commodity-possessors [Warenbesitzer/échangistes] think like Faust: “In the beginning was the deed/Im Anfang war die Tat.” They have therefore already acted [handeln/agir/act (and therefore, *trans*-act)] before thinking. The law of the nature of the commodity has performatively acted in the natural instinct of the possessors of commodities [Die Gesetze der Warennatur betätigten sich im Naturinstinkt der Warenbesitzer] (C1, p. 180, translation modified; Marx, 1967, p. 35)

The “commodity-possessors” in the original version of *Capital* is rendered as the “échangistes” in the Lachatre version. However, Deleuze and Guattari say that “La société n’est pas échangiste, le socius est *inscripteur*: non pas échanger, mais marquer les corps, qui sont de la terre” (Deleuze et Guattari, 1972, p. 218, my italics). I have to refrain myself from going deeper into an interesting problematic that contains a difference between possession and inscription. But, there is one thing at least that I have to quickly mention here. For instance, Marx says as follows: “Men have often made man himself into the primitive material of money [ursprünglichen Geldmaterial], in the shape of the slave, but they have never done this with the land and soil [Grund und Boden]. Such an idea could only arise in a bourgeois society” (C1, p. 183). This statement, which seems rather abrupt in light of the context and tainted with a slight mistake seen from the point of view of history, implies the modern significance of the commodification (separation) of labor power and land in the exchange process. Still, this dictum is crucial and this “inscription” is nothing but a means of capture [*Fang*] that is consistent through possession/property. For Marx argues that the “échangistes” mutually act their “Anfang” deed as commerce according to “Naturinstinkt.” Here, although “deed” is regarded as the “*commencement*,” it is no longer so except that the problematic of property rights is dissolved in the course of the exchange process. Whereas Marx, interpellating Faust (it is also Faust-qua-clenched fist) who pretends to be at a loss with these contradictions in order to dissolve them, invokes the “Anfang,” this “Anfang” is always and already degraded and tarnished as merely a contaminating or heterogeneous *commencement* waiting while being *worn away*<sup>33</sup> to be reduced and annexed to “Besitz” (always and already about to become “Eigentum/property”) which tacitly mortgages the capitalist commodity. In this respect, the second *commencement* is given a position that dangerously supplements the first, while being clandestinely supplemented by the third.

We, still after Marx, have to look into how the plural “Anfang” works. Here, devices are deployed which are expected to actually prove/watch [bewähren/bewahren] that the capitalist commodity, based upon the deed of exchange, *is* the only proper/lawful [*gültig*] *commencement*. Goethe, and Marx, describes in the following order the bewilderment of Faust who *pretends* to be

<sup>33</sup> When I exploit such an expression as “worn away,” I always have in mind the Derridian understanding of the word “usurier” (Derrida, 1972) and Spivakian interpretation of it (Spivak, 1993) in relation to fictitious capital which is defined as the capital written “im Lapidarstil” — “M – M” — or capital in its finished form such as “money which begets (more) money” (C1, pp. 256-7; Marx, 1962, pp. 169-70).

perplexed and is advised to “descend” by Mephistopheles. Here, I would argue for a secret metamorphosis or transfer of the *coup*/Faust of the “Anfang” in *Faust*. But why should Marx resort to Goethe, even rhetorically? The metamorphosis of the “Anfang” (or a pilgrimage of the instituted “bewilderment” qua *aporia*) is firstly the word [*Wort*], secondly meaning/mind [*Sinn*], thirdly power [*Kraft*], and lastly the deed [*Tat*].

In *Faust*, we read:

Geschrieben steht: »Im Anfang war das Wort!«

Hier stock ich schon! Wer hilft mir weiter fort?

Ich kann das Wort so hoch unmöglich schätzen,

Ich muß es anders übersetzen, Wenn ich vom Geiste recht erleuchtet bin.

Geschrieben steht: Im Anfang war der *Sinn*.

Bedenke wohl die erste Zeile,

Daß deine Feder sich nicht übereile!

Ist es der *Sinn*, der alles wirkt und schafft?

Es sollte stehn: Im Anfang war die *Kraft*!

Doch, auch indem ich dieses niederschreibe, Schon warnt mich was, daß ich dabei nicht bleibe.

Mir hilft der Geist! Auf einmal seh ich Rat Und schreibe getrost: Im Anfang war die *Tat*!

As is well-known, it was Martin Luther who translated the first phrase of *Evangelium Secundum Johannem* written in Greek “Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος” as “Im Anfang war die Wort,” which provokes this passage in *Faust*. What is remarkable is that the metamorphosing sequence from “Logos” to “Wort,” “Wort” to “Sinn,” “Sinn” to “Kraft,” and “Kraft” to “Tat” is an impregnable return in the name of the *commencement*. In other words, it is the Hegelian “Vorwärtsschreiten/Rückwärtsgehen” and the Marxian “Reise wieder rückwärts” (see Marx, 1976b, pp. 21ff.). In the capitalist system it is the return to “logos/*ratio*[nality]”<sup>34</sup> as money/state qua equivalent form through exchange.<sup>35</sup>

In the translation [*Übertragung*] from logos [λόγος] to word [*Wort*], there *seems* to be no essential change in terms of meaning, but from word [*Wort*] to meaning/mind [*Sinn*, that which is understood], translation or overpositing [*Übersetzung*] is employed in an attempt to build a layer of meaning over the word and rewrite it as a stream of metonymy. Then power [*Kraft*], and, finally, deed [*Tat*] emerge. Marx defines this last “deed [*Tat*]” as the commercial deed, namely, exchange. By way of unsheathing (Spivak, 1977) the palimpsests of contradictions he himself had posited, he insists on his ability to dissolve this difficulty by saying that this deed is every time and everywhere. It is a deed of decomposing the logos/*principio* as money (*ratio*[nality] qua integer) into the elements of “Warensprache”/human-meaning/mind [*Wort-Sinn*]. The commodity exchange is institutionalized by legal rights (property rights) [*Kraft*] *discrete* from violence [Gewalt] and derived from “*Wort-Sinn*.” Herein the word/meaning *forwardly* [vorwärts] *retrogresses* to the exchange or deed in order to sanction the first *commencement*. The establishment of a sociality (civil society) backed not by violence but by legal rights is described as the problematic of state/property rights. So it is that in a phrase that follows the “Anfang,” Marx connects this deed to money as the equivalent form that social reciprocity alienates in the end, and says:

<sup>34</sup> For the geometrical “tort” in connexion with “ratio,” see Rancière (1995).

<sup>35</sup> It is well known that Hegel not only admired Adam Smith (cf. Priddat, 1990) but also compared Luther with Smith.

The social action of all other commodities, therefore, sets apart [schließen (i.e., shuts/squeezes out)] the particular commodity in which they all represent their values. The natural form of this commodity thereby becomes the socially recognized [gesellschaftlich gültig] equivalent form. Through the agency of the social process it becomes the specific social function of the commodity which has been set apart to be the universal equivalent. It thus becomes – money (C1, p. 180-81).

At last we are given the “universal equivalent.” Now the capitalist commodity is allowed to organize society, *by the deed*, as the sole “Subjekt-als-Substanz” or as the “universal” being not only based upon reciprocity but also because of a bestowed legality. It is allowed to be the commodity as *commencement* that buttresses money as the One (being always and already anticipated to transform into another One, capital) arrogated to have a unique social function. Therefore Marx, quoting the *Apocalypse of John*, calls it the “beast [*bestiae*]” and gives it a name “number [*numeren*];” which implies that society (the *socius*) is a place/cause/relation/power/violence [*An-Fang*] captured by the exchange/deed that formally supports the capitalist commodity, namely, the *Anfang*. The second *commencement* that emerges in the process of exchange is annexed to the first as an *ad/e*-vent that has always already been realized/*deeded*, and therefore crossed out and vanished. This certain *ad/e*-vent, which occurred at and as the *Anfang*, thus returns to the first *commencement*, a pilgrimage [Rückwärtsbewegung] from the first *commencement* to the other two, step by step – from logos to word, from word to meaning, and from meaning to power/the legal rights concomitant with deed/commerce. This is the deed/capture through a superficial conjunction of the “*forme vide*” (Deleuze et Guattari, 1972, p. 220). Here, while the state comes *ex nihilo* to occupy the empty form, the capitalist commodity seeks to close the circle by describing this coming as a deed indigenous to it with no outside(s).

## 5. We, the Defective Commodity-Beings

The tragic wonder will then be greater than if they happened of themselves or by accident; for even coincidences are most striking when they have an air of design (Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1452a)

The Messiah will come only when he is no longer necessary; he will come only on the day after his arrival; he will come, not on the last day, but on the very last (Kafka, *The Coming of the Messiah*)

The first epigraph coincides with the Marx who speaks of the persuasiveness of the plural commencement. Commencements are the most surprising “ad hominem” when they are created as contingencies *under* a certain aura of design, thus they are called the Messiah (Publius Vergilius Maro) since their return is (pre-supposed to be) always already complete(d)/finished in the sense that it always already remains in the commencement and carries on and on there. Therefore the Kafka offers hope to us defective commodity-beings who *are* and collectively *is* ostracized and swallowed as contentless form. For, inasmuch as the return always already remains in the *commencement*, we, the defective beings in the names of commodities and capital are always already arrived as a literally ontic *commencement*, which therefore requires of us an ontological investigation.

Upon shifting from money’s transformation into capital to the production of surplus-value,

Marx writes a famous passage, which depicts how «we, the defective commodity-beings» continue(s) to haunt the superficial circulation in production, from the negative side, as *the unreason* prior to a capitalist *factice* of the dichotomy of rationality and irrationality, to which Deleuze gives a clear image.

Marx comes first:

The sphere of circulation or commodity exchange, within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. It is the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, let us say of labour-power, are determined only by their own free will. Their contract is the final result in which their joint will finds a common legal expression. Equality, because each enters into relation with the other, as with a simple owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, because each looks only to what is his own. And Bentham, because each looks only to his own advantage (C1, p. 280).

Deleuze follows:

Nous n'employons pas les terms «normal», «abnormal». Toutes les sociétés sont à la fois rationnelles et irrationnelles. Elles sont forcément rationnelle par leurs mécanismes, leurs rouages, leurs systèmes de liaison, et même par la place qu'elles assignent à l'irrationnel. Pourtant tout cela présuppose des codes ou des axiomes qui ne sont pas le produit du hasard, mais qui n'ont pas davantage une rationalité intrinsèque. C'est comme dans la théologie: tout est tout à fait rationnel si l'on se donne le péché, l'immaculée conception, l'incarnation. La raison, c'est toujours une région taillée dans l'irrationnel. Pas du tout à l'abri de l'irrationnel, mais une région traversée par l'irrationnel, et seulement définie par un certain type de rapports entre facteurs irrationnels. Au fond de toute raison, le délire, la dérive. Tout est rationnel dans le capitalisme, sauf le capital ou le capitalisme. Un mécanisme bousier, c'est tout à fait rationnel, on peut le comprendre, l'apprendre, les capitalistes savent s'en servir, et pourtant c'est complètement délirant, c'est dément. C'est en ce sens que nous disons: le rationnel, c'est toujours la rationalité d'un irrationnel. Il y a quelque chose qu'on n'a pas assez remarqué dans *Le Capital* de Marx: à quel point il est fasciné par les mécanismes capitalistes, précisément parce que, à la fois, c'est dément et ça marche très bien (Deleuze, 2002, pp. 365-6)

The Benthamite paradise is the genuine world of the first *commencement*, which is not just a “Warenwelt” but an already and always “Kapitalwelt” from the outset. The state is already and inextricably at work there. The *commencement* called the capitalist commodity is given ostensible autonomy by the single and double commodification of labor power and land, yet in Bentham it is always suffering from the other two defective *commencements* that continue to return as a ghost [Geist], which I would call *ontic* class consciousness. Why in Bentham? Because we, the *forced* owners of commodified labor power, can *proudly* continue to be the ontic as well as ontological “Fehler” to the *commencement* called the capitalist commodity. «We, the defective commodity-beings» collectively become ghost [Geist] and always already or cyclically return to haunt the paradise of Bentham. Those who boast of being in a unique *commencement* are well aware of this but merely strive to cross it out in moments called cyclical crises. Therefore, «we, the defective commodity-beings» (hand in hand with the land that now turns out to be fictitious capital) have to donate memory to the nightmare – and this from the porous space that is absolutely deterritorial-

ized (made into smooth space) and escapes reterritorialization (logicalization).

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