紀要論文

ヨーロッパの金融危機対応戦略と金融市場の脆弱性

European Crisis Resolution and its Financial Market Vulnerability

jpn

00229741

https://doi.org/10.15002/00006014

法政大学経済学部学会

77

3

173

217

2010-03-15

Version of Record

特集 金融危機 : 原因と対策

Europeans tend to interpret the financial panic of 2007-08 as a US problem or a collapse of the Anglo-Saxon model, but the facts suggest otherwise. The ultimate origin of the crisis was the progress of European financial market integration and the birth of the euro in the late 1990s, stimulating vigorous cross-border financial services in Europe. In an attempt to catch up with Europe, the US found itself obliged in 1999 to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibited affiliations between commercial and investment banks. Subsequently, in the pursuit of further financial market deregulation, transatlantic competition intensified and ultimately ran out of control. Moreover, the current economic turmoil in Europe has been exacerbated by institutional and economic vulnerability in the euro zone economies. The euro lacks, unlike the US dollar or the yen, an integration of fiscal policy and the financial regulatory system, and several countries including the UK, Spain and Ireland have suffered seriously from their own housing bubble bursts, and European universal banks have leverage ratios in securitised derivative business much higher than even American investments banks. From this viewpoint, the author examines the scope and sources of the crisis resolution policies adopted by the European Union and the European Central Bank, clarifies European financial market vulnerability and analyses the current “Exit Strategy” in the form of regulatory and supervisory reforms and action plans for business stimulus.

Article

AN00071028