Coming Way Far-Away from Would-Be Ecomonics : The Outsidedness of Logics : French Theory and the Outside of Philosophy : Lacan's Desiring Machines

WATSON, Janell

(出版者 / Publisher)
Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University / 法政大学比較経済研究所
(雑誌名 / Journal or Publication Title)
比較経済研究所ワーキングペーパー / 比較経済研究所ワーキングペーパー
(巻 / Volume)
145
(開始ページ / Start Page)
1
(終了ページ / End Page)
33
(発行年 / Year)
2009-02-20

知としての経済学理論の脱構築－理論の外部－ シリーズ No.1

Coming Way Far-Away From Would-Be Economics : The Outsidedness of Logics

Nagahara Research Project

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CONTENTS

Introduction & Acknowledgements

1　本論集は、法政大学比較経済研究所の補助（2007 年度法政大学競争的資金獲得研究助成金）によって、2007 年 12 月 13 日から 14 日に法政大学ボアソナード・タワーで開催された〈The Outsides of What looks like an Elegant Circle: Economics and Its Residue〉と題された Workshop で読まれた論攷を集めたものである。またこの論集には、Workshop には参加されなかった Timothy Murphy 氏が、本プロジェクトへの共感を示され、論攷を寄せてくださった。
2　Workshop では、Tomiko Yoda (Duke University)が佐藤良一教授（法政大学経済学部）とともに司会の労を執ってくださるとともに、Mark Driscoll (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)が Kenneth Surin 教授への Discussant として参加してくださった。
3　〈経済学理論の外部〉を探るという本論集に込められた企図は、2008 年度法政大学競争的資金獲得研究助成金の補助によってより深化され、2009 年 1 月に行われた Robert Brenner (UCLA)および Duncan Foley (New School for Social Research)へのインタビューへと繋がれている（両氏のインタビューは現在編集中であり、比較経済研究所のサイトへアップする予定である）。
末尾になるが、比較経済研究所の前所長・菊池道樹教授および現所長・絵所秀紀教授に感謝する。両氏の助力がなければ本論集は完成し得なかった。また比較経済研究所の家村真名氏と山家歩さん（法政大学社会学部）には煩瑣な依頼に快く応えていただいた。感謝する。

Chapter 1 French Theory and the Outside of Philosophy: Lacan's Desiring Machines

Janell Watson

French philosophers remain divided over the status of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*. Is it a work of philosophy, or the result of a true philosopher (Deleuze) being led astray by a mad militant (Guattari)? Eric Alliez has argued that "*Anti-Oedipus* determines... *the constitutive relationship of contemporary philosophy to non-philosophy*.... The *Pensée-68*, 1968-thought... instigates the becoming non-philosopher of the philosopher."[2] If Alliez is correct, then contemporary French philosophy depends on its outside, an enabling outside which Guattari helped Deleuze discover. The very title *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* evokes two of French philosophy's outsides: political economy and psychiatry. Guattari came from these two domains, and was only marginally involved in philosophy. Deleuze came from the domain of philosophy, and was only marginally involved in political economics and psychiatry. *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*'s philosophical and political roots have been more amply explored than its psychiatric foundations.[3] In this paper, I would like to focus on this third angle, by tracing Guattari's intellectual path from Lacan to Deleuze.[4] My paper begins with Guattari's early career in Institutional Psychotherapy (also called Institutional Analysis), which was simultaneous with a training analysis under Lacan. These were the clinical origins of his theories of transversality and the desiring machine. In 1969 the appeal of these ideas led Deleuze to invite Guattari to write with him, to the surprise and chagrin of the French philosophy establishment.

1. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

Throughout his adult life, Guattari worked as a professional psychotherapist at the La Borde clinic, an experimental psychiatric institution located in France's Loire Valley. La Borde was founded in 1953 by psychiatrist Jean Oury, and was allied with the post-world-war-II French psychiatric reform movement[5] which, as Guattari put it, pioneered "a new attitude, a new militant approach to mental illness," resulting in a "revolution both practical and theoretical." Guattari's predecessors in this reform movement first learned about the inner workings of institutions from their experiences in the Scouts, youth hostels, Communist youth parties, and (as counter-model) Nazi concentration camps.[6] Guattari himself was involved in the youth wing of the French Communist Party, the youth hostel movement, and the student social security movement.[7] "Institutional analysis" was a term that Guattari and his colleagues in institutional psychotherapy used to identify an analytic framework loosely shared by institutional psychotherapy, institutional pedagogy, and other emancipatory social movements.[8]

The re-politicization of mental healthcare was from the beginning a fundamental aim of the "institutional psychotherapy" or "institutional analysis" practiced at La Borde. Guattari's views on institutional analysis were largely shared by his colleagues. He voiced a concern for psychiatric workers, comparing the relationship between nurses and doctors to that between workers and bosses in factories.[9] He defined "the school of institutional psychotherapy" in terms of its "determination never to isolate the study of mental illness from its social and institutional context."[10] Institutional analysis thus implicated all social and political institutions, including left-wing political parties and workers' unions. Guattari adopted the broad definition of "institution" advocated by the movement's founder, François Tosquelles, who observes that all of us, ill or healthy, move among several institutions, from school to the family to the neighborhood and beyond.[11] Guattari came to see the psychiatric institution as much more than a space where individual doctors analyze patients. Rather, and this constitutes the essence of institutional analysis, he and his colleagues believed that the institution itself should be an object of analysis, as well as a collective analyzing agent comprised of procedures, infrastructures, and multiple interpersonal encounters.[12] As reflected in his writings throughout the 1960s, Guattari participated actively in this project of critical analysis, which was

simultaneously theoretical, practical, and socio-political. He described institutional analysis as "a virtual enlargement of the institutional practice of subjectivity-production" to include "urban areas, schools, hospitals, prisons, etc."[13] Even as he insisted that analysis in and of institutions should include social and political dimensions, he advised radical political movements to pay more attention to matters of the psyche, especially desire and subjectivity.[14] He envisioned a revolution of the institution within the much broader "framework of a revolutionary transformation of society."[15]

A key aspect of the post-war psychiatric militants' proposed reforms was the reintroduction of psychoanalysis into the psychiatric setting.[16] Psychiatry and psychoanalysis had long before evolved into separate domains, to the point that it is too easy today to forget that Lacan was himself trained as a psychiatrist, and that he always called himself a psychiatrist, not a psychoanalyst.[17] From its beginnings, institutional psychotherapy had been Lacanian in orientation. Treatment at La Borde included Freudian and Lacanian methods, which at the time were rarely practiced in hospitals.[18] One Labordian analyst recalls that "When I first arrived at La Borde one didn't have the right to speak if one had not gone over Lacan with a fine tooth comb."[19] As Guattari put it, "we do not think it impossible to use Freudian techniques inside a hospital."[20] La Borde founder Oury was in analysis with Lacan from 1955 until 1980, and he convinced Guattari to join him in attending Lacan's weekly seminars in Paris. Guattari began a training analysis with Lacan in 1962, and was present in 1964 for the founding of Lacan's new school, of which he remained a life-long member.

Never having completed a university degree, Guattari received the bulk of his intellectual formation in this mental health arena. From the outset, institutional psychotherapy attracted French intellectuals—surrealists, doctors interested in Freud, militant Marxists, writers, and university professors.[21] Guattari also read a great deal on his own, including works of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and literature.[22] In the early 1950s Guattari did attend some philosophy classes at the Sorbonne, but he much preferred Lacan's seminars, to the point that his fellow philosophy students nicknamed him "Lacan" because of his new-found obsession with the latter's ideas.[23] At the same time, Lacan was introducing philosophy into psychoanalysis, as evidenced, for example, in his use of Plato and Hegel in his early seminars, which were attended by the prominent philosopher Jean Hyppolite (the translator into French of Hegel's *Phenomenology*).

However, institutional psychotherapy was perhaps never Freudo-Lacanian in any orthodox way. Guattari and his colleagues set themselves the challenge of adapting psychoanalysis to the psychiatric institution's twin challenges of psychosis and collective life. While *AntiOedipus* made it clear that Guattari found mainstream psychoanalysis too orientated toward neurosis, during the 1960s he was perhaps even more focused on rethinking Freud's clinical legacy from the point of view of the collective nature of care in the institutional setting, where numerous patients constantly interact with various staff members performing round-the-clock services, including dining and hygiene. The collective nature of life at the clinic was made into an object of reflection and critique at La Borde, where Guattari was originally hired to create a "club" which brought together patients and staff.[24] From that point forward, he was constantly creating, dissolving, and re-creating clubs and committees whose function was not only to promote social interaction, but also to help guard against institutional dangers such as the rigidifying of hierarchies among the personnel and the segregation of patients from staff or from each other. As an additional safeguard against institutional sclerosis, Guattari was also charged with maintaining a "grid" of rotating duties that changed at least weekly. The grid enacted La Borde's policy that "required all service personnel work to be integrated with the medical work, and that, reciprocally, medical staff be drafted for material tasks such as cleaning, cooking, dishwashing, maintenance, etc."[25] The constant struggle against hierarchies was both political and therapeutic.[26]

Guattari found the collective nature of the institution therapeutically necessary to the treatment of psychosis. He therefore became increasingly concerned by the tendency of psychoanalysis to focus on the one-on-one therapy session, with the analyst-analysand duo enclosed together in the private consulting room, barricaded behind the doors of a cozy office. Even though Lacan had begun his career in a psychiatric hospital, in his seminars he promoted analytic techniques which presumed one-on-one treatment. Although Guattari's critical writings prior to the very late 1960s did not directly target Lacan or even the Lacanians, Guattari was one of a number of institutional psychotherapists who urged Lacan to include a psychiatric internship as part of the training of analysts at his École Freudienne.[27] Guattari was frustrated with the way analysts were being trained, writing that "the training of therapists is at present conceived of from a strictly

individual perspective, which hardly predisposes them toward a future of team work."[28] He thought that both their classical therapeutic methods and their conceptual framework would need to be modified, to the point that "A traditionally-trained psychoanalyst would not be able to undertake treatment in a hospital ward without radically modifying not only her technique, but also her theoretical aims in regard to psychopathological matters."[29] He insisted that "access to neurosis, psychosis, and perversion requires other routes than this type of dual relation." He adds that "Psychosis can show its true face only in a collective life developed around it within appropriate institutions."[30] I will return to this point in the following section.

Guattari found psychoanalysis to be limited not only therapeutically, but also politically. He observed that his fellow psychoanalysts preferred to ignore politics, which they could easily do, ensconced safely within the confines of their private offices. In contrast, the institutional psychotherapist must confront on a daily basis political and social issues brought inevitably into the institution's doors by the large staff, the state health-care system, and the psychotic patients who "hallucinate History."[31] Politics and the socius are harder to ignore from within the institution, which cannot provide the barricaded shelter of the private office. Guattari mocked the de-politicization of psychoanalysis, and what he saw as the prevailing attitude among private clinicians that "Reality must remain at the door of the consulting room."[32]

To summarize my argument up to this point, the practitioners of institutional analysis found a need to collectivize psychoanalytic treatment, to adapt it for use with psychotics, and to recognize its social and political stakes. Though he shared these goals with his colleagues in institutional psychotherapy, Guattari went the furthest in developing a sophisticated theoretical approach to these problems.

2. SARTRE AND TRANSVERSALITY

As noted above, Guattari and his colleagues expanded the concept of "institution" beyond the mental health arena to include schools, research groups, trade unions, political parties, and militant organizations—to name but a few examples. This extension of analysis into domains far beyond the walls of the psychiatric hospital "implied that the analysis of formations of the unconscious did not

only concern the two protagonists of classical psychoanalysis, but could encompass other, more ample social segments."[33] Guattari finds that all institutions are prone to the problems of rigid hierarchization, segregation, and inertia. These frustrations led him to seek a solution both therapeutic and theoretical, which he found in a notion of his own invention, a strategy that he called "transversality." As Gary Genosko has shown, this term takes on many new dimensions and uses in Guattari's subsequent writings, but here I will focus on its earliest formulation, as originally developed in relation to the classic psychoanalytic notion of transference.[34]

With "transversality" Guattari tackled the twin pillars of psychoanalytic treatment, transference and language,[35] seeking an institutional alternative to Lacan's "individual treatment" which works through the "'symbolic order' by transcendent routes of interpretation and transference."[36] To interpret is to put symptoms and desires into language. However, as Lacan himself taught, mere verbalization, especially that offered by the analyst, will not necessarily advance the treatment. Transference at its most basic refers to the study of the analytical situation, examining the complexities of the interpersonal relation between analyst and analysand. Lacan devoted his 1960-61 seminar to transference, which was also one of the "four fundamental concepts" of the 1963-64 seminar.[37]

Guattari asks how transference works in the institutional setting, then decides that a new notion is needed, presenting his conclusions in two 1964 papers, "Transference" and "Transversality," both addressed to his peers in professional psychotherapy.[38] These two essays include many references to other types of collectivity, such as militant political groups. Since Guattari conceived of therapy within the institution as implicating multiple collectivities, both essays rely heavily on his notion of the group. For example, in institutional psychotherapy there are groups of patients, nurses, interns, administrators, doctors, cooks, other caretakers, and visitors. Guattari develops the typology of groups (see below) because, in his view, merely collectivizing care does not eliminate the problems of identificatory transference, individualism, elitism, and the therapists' tendency to retreat from politics because, unfortunately, the psychiatric institution's therapeutic collective tends to be hierarchized, which causes its own clinical and political problems.[39] Guattari therefore urges his fellow militants in psychiatric reform to join him in the search for "new relationships between patients

and caregivers, nurses and doctors, doctors and patients' families, etc." He warns that existing caste-like hierarchies within the institution can mirror and even transmit class oppression in society at large.[40]

In theorizing collective formations, Guattari draws on Freud's group psychology with its anthropological totems and history of civilization, and on Sartre's grand universal history of collective human existence as laid out in his *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (1960).[41] As Guattari would write in 1972, defying the then-fashionable pronouncements about the end of the reign of existentialism, "Sartre is a man of history and real engagement."[42] It is the dimensions of history and engagement that Guattari seeks to insert into—or rather, around and beyond—Lacan's elegantly simple triangular model of analyst-analysand-signifier. Whereas Lacan taught that one-on-one analysis consists in the management of transference, Guattari defined institutional analysis as the management of transversality within and between groups.

Even for Lacan, transference is not always positive. Taking issue with the psychoanalytic mainstream, Lacan describes what he considered to be the "crudest" use of transference in practice, namely the approach of making "transference into the succession or sum total of positive or negative feelings the patient has for the analyst."[43] This happens when analysts bring everything back to themselves, as person or as ego. As one recent commentator succinctly explains, glossing Lacan, that this amounts to "collapsing the symbolic transference into the imaginary. Such analysts appeal to the 'healthy part of the ego'... which Lacan sarcastically refers to as 'the part that thinks like us.' They try to get part of the patient's ego to model itself on their own ego, a notion that Lacan critiques extensively. Analysts engage here in a narcissistic project of self-duplication."[44] Lacan objects to this sort of analytic dwelling in the imaginary because it blocks the analysis by shutting down the analysand's production of new signifiers. To dwell on feelings or to engage in identification is to remain stuck in an imaginary relation, whereas for him it is essential that analysis foster the play of the signifier in the structural relations among subjects and their others.[45] This is precisely what he formulates with his famous L-schema (figure 2, below).[46]

Guattari too objects to this sort of imaginary transference in the form of analysts setting themselves up as models for their analysands, but his complaint is primarily socio-political. He

explains that in the private practitioner's office, analysts holding one-on-one sessions can "take refuge in their office and hide behind transference so that the treatment unfolds in isolation, so that nothing from the outside creeps in."[47] On the other hand, he finds that even as mainstream analysts bar politics from the consulting room by hiding behind transference, this same mechanism produces an opening through which politics can return. As he says in his own essay on transference,

> Regardless of the particular psychoanalytic curriculum, a reference to a pre-determined model of normality remains implicit within its framework. The analyst, of course, does not in principle expect that this normalization is the product of a pure and simple identification of the analysand with the analyst, but it works no less, and even despite him... as a process of identification of the analysand with a human profile that is compatible with the existing social order.[48]

Whereas Lacan saw an improperly managed transference as working through imaginary identification to stifle the production of new signifiers, Guattari sees in identificatory transference a conservative reproduction of the status quo, given that the analyst, necessarily though often unwittingly, transmits the social norms of the existing dominant order.[49] It could be said that for Guattari, an analyst-analysand pair stuck in identification transfer to each other not so much affect toward the big other, but, more concretely, they transfer behaviors, expectations, and values which lead to real social and political outcomes. The couch thus (re)produces bourgeois individuals ready to take their places as cogs in the gargantuan machinery of contemporary consumer capitalism.[50] Thus conceived the couch's reinforcement of the status quo through individualizing identification goes hand in hand with psychoanalysts' aristocratic snobbery and their class loyalties toward their self-selecting bourgeois clients, private psychoanalysis being in effect limited to fairly well-off patients who can afford to pay for and who have time for multiple sessions per week, hence its mostly neurotic, inevitably docile patients.[51]

For Lacan, as well as for the Guattari of 1964, speech is the key to transforming a bad analysis into a good one. First Lacan. While acknowledging that transference certainly does involve the affects as well as imaginary effects in the analytic relationship, Lacan insists that the analyst should always deal with transference in the Symbolic register. He takes as his example Freud's

famous case study of Dora, who, he says, identifies with her mother's impotent lover (Herr K.) and with her analyst (Freud), manifesting aggressive feelings toward both men, and without being able articulate in speech her true lesbian desire for Frau K.[52] Noting Freud's admitted failures in the Dora analysis, Lacan warns that if transference is allowed to remain in the imaginary realm, getting stuck in identification and affect, then the "direction of the treatment" will be impeded.[53] Of course, with Dora and many other hysterics, this type of imaginary transference does involve speech, but it is "empty speech," or "the call of emptiness itself, in the ambiguous gap of an attempted seduction of the other by means in which the subject manifests indulgence, and on which he stakes the monument of his narcissism." The analyst must not fall into such seductive traps, and must always resist filling in the gaps, remaining silent if necessary.[54] Lacan suggests that this interpersonal dialectic is implicated in every speech act, even outside the consulting room. "In its essence, the efficacious transference which we're considering is quite simply the speech act. Each time a man speaks to another in an authentic and full manner, there is, in the true sense, transference, symbolic transference—something takes place which changes the nature of the two beings present."[55] The difference between full and empty speech is not so much that one expresses the truth and the other not, for the whole point of analysis is to pinpoint the latent truth manifested in empty speech. Therefore for Lacan, "full speech" is not necessarily speech which utters the truth, but rather "speech which performs."[56] The truth of the interpretation proves to be much less important than its role in advancing (or not advancing) the analysis, by transforming imaginary transference into Symbolic transference.

In adapting Lacan's teachings for use in the institutional setting, Guattari borrows the distinction between full and empty speech in order to differentiate between two kinds of groups: subject groups and subjugated groups.[57] What follows is a paraphrased summary of Guattari's theory of social collectivities. He suggests that, unfortunately, most institutions are dominated by *subjugated groups*, resulting in bad transferences which cause all sorts of problems. The subjugated group belongs to Sartre's "practico-inert," which is to say that it incarnates the sedimentation of previous praxis, because such a group is "conceived according to rigid schemas, according to a ritualization of the quotidian, a regular and terminal hierarchization of responsibility."[58] These rituals and hierarchies allow the group's members to avoid nothingness, to evade the ultimate meaning of their engagements,

and to defend against solitude or anything bearing the mark of the transcendental. To put it in psychoanalytic terms, one belongs to the subjugated group in order to hide from desire and death, engaging in collective neurotic obsession. The subjugated group cultivates its symptoms with rituals. Combining Sartre with Lacan by way of the dialectic, Guattari finds that such groups are at once subjects and objects of their own statements. The group's non-meaning, or in other words its death, comes from the outside, since such a group receives its law from the exterior, and its group fantasies function as false windows onto the exterior. Alienated from other groups, it endures its hierarchization as it adjusts itself to the other groups. The subjugated group is incapable of articulating its desires. Alienated from discourse, it will not risk facing non-meaning, and takes comfort by putting on a show of rationality, hiding behind slogans. In Lacanian terms, the subjugated group remains stuck in empty speech.

In "Transversality," Guattari describes a typical subjugated group, of the sort which tends to dominate psychiatric institutions. This passage is perhaps as interesting for its vocabulary (see italicized phrases) as for what it actually says:

> As expression of a *death drive*, the *unconscious desire* of a group (for instance, that of a dominant group in a traditional hospital) will probably *not be such as can be stated in speech*, and will instead produce a whole range of *symptoms*. Though these symptoms may be '*articulated like a language*' and describable in a structural context, to the extent that they tend to obscure the *institution as subject* they will never succeed in expressing themselves otherwise than in incoherent terms from which one will still be left to decipher *the object (totem and taboo)* erected at the very point at which the emergence of *true speech* in the group becomes an impossibility.[59]

There is something of Sartre's practico-inert in Freud's "death drive," as well as in the Lacanian impossibility of "true speech," as the ineffable unspeakability of unconscious desire. The subjugated group constructs a totemic object to block any articulation of its desire, thus circumventing true (or full) speech. There is nothing more Freudian than unexpressed desires—which are often repressed desires—emerging as symptoms. As unconscious emanations, symptoms could be conceived as "articulated like a language," as in Lacan. Guattari has not yet developed his own language for

analyzing social formations, such as "machines" or the "assemblage." His basic problematic, though, is already evident: how to free up blockages that prevent the unleashing of transformative productive creativity leading to positive social engagement.

The *subject group*, in contrast, is brave, efficacious, and self-directed, boldly taking the floor to speak (*prend la parole*), because it lucidly accept the finality of dealing with other groups, as well as its own finitude, dispersal, and death. To continue my paraphrasing of Guattari, this lucidity comes with a price, however, since opening onto other groups creates vulnerabilities. Subject groups therefore offer their members less reassurance, less protection. This is a very Sartrean vision, recalling the existentialist account of the heavy responsibility that comes with freedom, as compared to the easy route of *mauvaise foi*, or self-deception. Subject-groups are produced by "bringing forward the sort of activities that favor an assumption of collective responsibility and yet are founded on a re-singularization of the relation to work... and personal existence."[60] The subject group therefore bravely assumes its own nonsense, but in so doing, opens up the possibility of expressing its unconscious desire, of taking the risk of making its object of desire clear. In other words, the subject-group acknowledges the above-mentioned indecipherable totemic object which was erected at the very spot where full, or true, speech becomes impossible. The gap occupied by the ineffable object is precisely where the group's creativity could spring up, and therefore the nonsense of empty speech must be assumed by the group in order for it to produce effective statements. The very formation of such a group is singular because one belongs to it owing to a particular, transitory problem (and not out of an eternal anxiety or death drive). The subject group—articulate, communicative, responsible, effective—is one which has managed to organize itself according to the structure of *transversality*. Guattari invented transversality as a tool to foster the development of subject groups, which means warding off of the subjugation of the group. A subject group can always emerge out of a subjugated group, thinks Guattari, just as a subject group can always relapse into relations of subjugation.

Whereas Lacan wholeheartedly advocates the use of a properly handled transference in psychoanalysis, Guattari rejects all use of transference in the institution. Guattari found out through experience that "Psychotic transference can really lead to disaster sometimes."[61] In the typical mental facility staff and staff-patient hierarchies constitute "an obligatory, predetermined, 'territorialized'

transference onto a particular role or stereotype," with the doctors at the top and patients near the bottom. Guattari finds this social transference more nefarious to treatment "than a resistance to analysis."[62] As he describes the situation metaphorically, hierarchies "blinder" (like horses) the institution's staff and patients, blocking interaction and communication among them, because the blinders prevent their awareness of each other. The blinders stifle the voices and creativity of those at the bottom of the hierarchy.[63] Guattari finds that as a result, the psychiatric institution often misses out on therapeutic opportunities by overlooking the ongoing, close interactions between patients and nurses, and even more so ignores relations between patients and hospital attendants or cleaning staff or fellow patients.[64] Transversality explains why institutional psychotherapy is defined as a collective undertaking, actively involving every person in the institution, including the other patients.[65]

In describing the fostering of transversalized interpersonal relations in the psychiatric institution, Guattari raises two kinds of issues related to speech: the nature of psychotic disturbances and the importance of communication among staff. As for the first type of speech problem, psychosis is marked by extreme difficulty with social intercourse, making any interpersonal interaction with a psychotic patient significant, lending added importance to any speech they produced, even if it is merely an exchange of banalities or nonsense with the person making the bed. Guattari observes that in the institution, which is by definition "a network of verbal exchange," nothing is ever in fact exchanged. However, even though the clinic is in the end a "machine of empty words," such arbitrary non-exchanges of non-sense help the patients escape from themselves, and to make themselves recognized and understood.[66] This is another example of empty speech whose efficaciousness transforms it into performative or full speech. With in-patients this kind of collectively-administered therapy can happen 24 hours a day, and not just during the occasional patient-doctor sessions.[67] As Guattari points out, the idiot of the ward can supply the efficacious interpretation.[68] As for the second aspect of speech in the institution, communication among all staff members takes on an added importance precisely because absolutely any interaction with severely impaired patients matters. It is therefore crucial that those engaged in all patient-care functions and on all shifts meet to discuss the patients in their care. Transversality aims to foster maximum communication among different levels of the hospital hierarchy, and can be defined as a "principle of questioning and re-defining roles."[69]

3. LACAN AND DESIRING MACHINES

Guattari will continue thinking about social collectivities throughout his life, even though he will abandon the idea of subject- and subjugated groups.[70] His first reformulation of the notion of the group is the "desiring machine." As early as 1957, he had characterized a patient-staff organizing committee at La Borde as an "enormous socio-therapeutic verbal machine."[71] Near the end of his life, he remarks in passing that Lacan had originally "initiated" (*a amorcé*—started up, fired up, primed) the theory of desiring machines.[72] This comment is to say the least striking, given that the desiring machine is an anchoring concept of *Anti-Oedipus*. My aim in this section is to show how Guattari teased the desiring machine out of Lacan while writing two essays, "D'un signe à l'autre" (1961, 1966) and in "Machine and Structure" (1969), both of which were initially addressed to Lacan. Even while he was developing the notions of institutional analysis and transversality as alternative versions to standard Lacanian practice, Guattari was simultaneously hard at work raising difficult questions about Lacanian theory, starting with the core ideas of the sign and of structure. Neither of these two texts specifically written for Lacan ever truly reached its intended destination, since Lacan showed no particular interest in them, and did not give Guattari the encouragement he seems to have expected.

"D'un signe à l'autre" (From One Sign to the Other) began as an actual letter sent to Lacan in December 1961. It was published in the journal *Recherches* in 1966, and is only partially reproduced in *Psychanalyse et transversalité*.[73] It has not to my knowledge been translated into English, perhaps because of its poetic density. Guattari explains that he wrote this letter/article in response to Lacan's April 26, 1955 "Seminar on the 'Purloined Letter.'"[74] Interestingly, he discusses not Lacan's famous reading of the Edgar Allen Poe short story, but rather an introduction which presents a series of mathematical combinatory sequences inspired by the children's game of even and odds, as well as by Freud's *fort-da* game. Oury recalls that he and Guattari happened to love inventing and playing these types of combinatory games, and that together they made their own even-odd game based on this Lacan lecture.[75] I suspect that Guattari also draws on several other sessions of Lacan's 1954-55 seminar devoted to Freud's *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. Lacan ends this year-long seminar with a lecture on cybernetics, the science of modern machines. Whereas Lacan's other commentators have

been more interested in Poe's misplaced letter, Guattari much preferred the mathematical game and the cybernetic machine.

Lacan first turned to cybernetics earlier in the seminar year, while constructing a "little model"—an "image"—in order to help explain his ideas about the nature of repetition automatism, the compulsion to repeat that inspired Freud's hypothesis of the death drive as the beyond of the seeking of pleasure. The model that he chooses is the adding machine, which he claims is "an essentially symbolic creation."[76] He notes that Freud had already conceived of the organism as a machine, and discovered that "the brain is a dream machine."[77] The machine model, for Lacan, shows "the meaning of man's need for repetition. It's all to with the intrusion of the symbolic register."[78] The subsequent lecture on *The Purloined Letter* was part of his demonstration, which is based on the idea that "the machine embodies the most radical symbolic activity of man."[79] At issue in this demonstration of the machinic nature of the Symbolic order is man's freedom to choose, versus his being caught up in an external determinism. "It would be very easy to prove to you that the machine is much freer than the animal. The animal is a jammed machine."[80] Psychoanalytic treatment is premised upon and made possible by the external determinism to which man is subject. "What is the nature of the determinism that lies at the root of the analytic technique?," Lacan asks. He replies that analysts "try to get the subject to make available to us, without any intention, *his thoughts*, as we say, his comments, his discourse, in other words that he should intentionally get as close as possible to chance."[81] And of course, as we now know very well in the age of pervasive computerization, even a simple adding machine has a memory.[82] Memory allows machines—not only those of the 1950s but also Blaise Pascal's 17th-century algebraic machines—to play games of chance. "To understand what cybernetics is about, one must look for its origin in the theme, so crucial for us, of the signification of chance."[83]

These principles are demonstrated not only in the determining displacements of Edgar Allen Poe's stolen letter, but also in the game of even and odds that his fictitious detective Dupin explains to the tale's narrator. Dupin tells the story of a schoolboy who always wins at guessing the number of marbles (two or three) in his opponent's hand through a technique of identification, a psychic mechanism which belongs to the imaginary order. The winning boy adopts the facial expression of his

opponent, and then notes the corresponding thoughts and sentiments, and finds that he is thus able to correctly imitate the other boy's even/odd choice. Lacan notes that this identificatory technique



Figure 1. From Lacan's "Seminar on the 'Purloined Letter'"

would not be available to a machine capable of playing even and odds, and that thus the machine plays the game entirely on the level of the Symbolic.[83] Even/odd, presence/absence, *fort/da*, the on/off of an electronic circuit, the 0/1 of computerized messages, Pascal's gambling calculus—cybernetics is the science of machines which play this schoolboy's guessing game strictly by manipulating serialized symbols. "Everything, in the symbolic order, can be represented with the aid of such a series."[85] Lacan drafts two members of his seminar audience to play even and odds, then records, transcribes, and transcodes the results, according to a set of combinatory rules of his own devising (Figure 1). He first notes the even/odd guesses as pluses and minuses, which he groups into threes. He then transcodes these patterns twice more, first into 1s, 2s, and 3s, then into Greek letters, all according to a set of strict transformational rules. He points out that the resulting patterns are determined by a mathematically limited number of combinational possibilities. He connects the dots to show the restricted trajectory of the symbols which have been subjected to the rules of his game. The short but complicated demonstration is meant to illustrate the mechanistic way that the signifier determines interpersonal relations among subjects. He notes the "similarity" between this demonstration and his famous "L-Schema" which shows the relations between a subject and its O/others (Figure 2).[86]



Figure 2. Lacan's L-schema.

Both humans and machines can play games of chance, because both can remember and repeat, reasons Lacan. Remembering and repeating are not thinking, however, as Freud had already amply demonstrated. "We are very well aware that this machine doesn't think," adds Lacan. "But if the machine doesn't think, it is obvious that we don't think either when we are performing an operation. We follow the very same procedures as the machine. The important thing here is to realise that the chain of possible combinations of the encounter can be studied as such, as an order which subsists in its rigour, independently of all subjectivity."[87] This rigorous "order" which subsists independently of subjectivity is the Symbolic order itself. "The passage of man from the order of nature to the order of culture follows the same mathematical combinations which will be used to classify and explain." He adds that Claude Lévi-Strauss calls these "mathematical combinations" the elementary structures of kinship. "Man is engaged with all his being in the procession of numbers, in a primitive symbolism which is distinct from imaginary representations."[88] Humans—even "primitive" humans—can function like cybernetic machines.

In 1954-55, Lacan's sign is much more playful, open, and interesting than it will later seem, once his structuralism subjects it to the matheme and algebraic topology. Guattari's letter-turned-essay was inspired by this earlier sign, about which Lacan writes in regard the symbol-transmitting, game-playing cybernetic machine:

> Freud is the first to notice that a number drawn from the hat will quickly bring out things which will lead the subject to that moment when he slept with his little sister, even to the year he failed his baccalaureat because that morning he had masturbated. If we acknowledge such

> experiences, we will be obliged to postulate that chance does not exist. While the subject doesn't think about it, the symbols continue to mount one another, to copulate, to proliferate, to fertilise each other, to jump on each other, to tear each other apart.[89]

Guattari recognized that even though these ciphers and symbols have the power to pull along pieces of repressed affect and memories, they are not yet signifiers. The machinic combinatory which governs these copulating, combative, enumerated signs does not preclude the involvement of libidinal desire. These polymorphously perverse proto-signs are not at all sterilized by their being caught up in a strict logic.

In "D'un signe à l'autre," Guattari develops a related hypothesis of sexually reproducing signs, which he then models with a playful series of dots, letters, pluses and minuses. His game becomes an ambitious genetic search for "a prototype sign which, all by itself, can account for all of creation."[90] His aspirations, then, far exceed those of the Lacanian project: whereas Lacan merely seeks to demonstrate the constitution of a subject grounded in language, Guattari is looking for the origins of the universe. Guattari begins his essay by breaking down the sign down into constituent parts, and in so doing borrows from Lacan's June 1961 lecture on Freud's *einen einzigen Zug*, or the *trait unaire*, translated into English variously as "unbroken line," "single-stroke," or "unary trait."[91] This lecture was part of Lacan's 1960-1961 seminar on transference, during which he painstakingly schematized the intersubjective relations involved in one-on-one analytic treatment. Lacan redefines Freud's *trait unaire* as a "minimal sign" which is not yet a signifier. Freud had introduced the *trait unaire* (*einen einzigen Zug*) in his discussion of the partial identifications of love and rivalry. He hypothesized that a subject caught up in a relation of love or rivalry may identify with a "single trait" of someone else, as for example when someone adopts another's symptom. Since Lacan reclassifies love and rivalry as imaginary identifications, and since for him Symbolic identification consists in an identification with a signifier, he concludes that imaginary identification consists in the introjection of only a partial signifier, the *trait unaire*.[92]

The value of this *trait unaire* for Guattari lies in its "primordial" status in relation to the full-fledged sign.[93] However, the *trait unaire* is not primordial enough for him. He wonders at what moment the minimal sign is actually born, noting that a splotch (or blob), a bar, a mark, or a point do

not become "signifying material" until "they are used in another system." Between the almost accidental creation of a splotch and yet prior to the development of Lacan's minimal sign, or *trait-unaire*, Guattari defines a "sign-point" or "point-sign" (*point-signe*) as unique, undividable, and "engendered by two mother splotches processed by the void." Splotches do not yet signify, but they do mate and produce offspring. Guattari then decomposes the newborn sign-point by hypothesizing that is has a false interior and several false parts, a cavity and anti-cavities. This strange sign-point is the "raw material of the sign, and not a signifier in itself."[94] Sign-points can, however, form chains. When, in turn, two sign-points mate, they engender the *trait-unaire*, Lacan's "primordial symbolic term." This genesis of the sign is what Guattari models in his essay. Three sign-points make up a "basic sign" (*signe de base*), and an enchaining of basic signs according to strict rules yields a variety of patterns which can be transcribed with pluses and minuses (Figure 3). Guattari is thus borrowing some elements from Lacan's even/odd game, but he does not seem interested in questions of identification or of chance. His manipulations of patterns, which he also winds up linking with geometric lines, eventually lead him back to the sign-point, which he breaks down again, this time into elementary particles charged negatively or positively.



Figure 3. From Guattari's "From One Sign to the Other"

After several pages of tedious combinatories, Guattari turns to concrete applications. He finds binary enchainment at work in poetry, phonetics, and musical notation. One segment of his game-playing involves a binary encoding based on phonetics, in order to show that a "mechanism" of transcription into pluses and minuses can "articulate" into binary chains "any type of ambiguity regarding rhythms, accentuations, intonations, letters, phonemes, morphemes, semantemes, etc."[95] He gives a musical example, suggesting that a good musician would be able to recognize the title and

composer of a symphony, solely by studying an amateur listener's careful notation of the sounds produced by the bass drum, cymbals, and triangle during the performance—contingent of course on the listener transcribing enough information. Guattari then connects this semiotic problem of "transcription" and "codification" to the far-reaching consequences of "machinic" processes in contemporary technological society. Lacan was most interested in cybernetics as a model for the Symbolic order, although he does mention in passing that technological progress is radically changing the very idea of the machine and its relationship to humans.[96] Guattari, in contrast, devotes significant passages of his essay to the historical transformations being brought about by growing interconnections between machines and signification. He speaks of the insertion of machinic processes into capitalist production and mass consumption, and the potential effects on human subjectivity, finding that "signifying rationality" has taken hold especially in the commodified domains of mass consumption. In regard to production, he suggests that machines are rapidly replacing the human gesturality of assembly-line work with signifying articulation. Summing up the woes of contemporary historical conditions, he argues that the problem lies not with technical progress in itself, but with the social order's incapacity to effectively deal with subjects and subjectivity.[97]

Guattari thus breaks down Lacan's *trait unaire* only to enlarge its sphere of relevance far beyond the interpersonal relationship between analyst and analysand. Guattari wants to build a bigger, better model than Lacan's cybernetic version of the L-schema. Thus the disciple is taking apart his master's model, and scattering the parts all over the place. The tiniest pieces intrigue him the most. In order to better understand them, the disciple looks beyond his master's cybernetics, citing the latest discoveries in theoretical physics. Guattari observes that physicists machinically manipulate Symbolic material in order to produce and reproduce not just symbols, but physical elementary particles. This observation leads him to propose a semiotic theory of the atomic and cosmic universe:

> The collective enunciation of theoretical physics... continuously composes and recomposes a gigantic signifying machine in which machines themselves and the signifier are indissolubly intertwined. This signifying machine is capable of intercepting and interpreting all theoretically aberrant manifestations of elementary particles. These particles not only reveal

an inability to plausibly explain their behavior, but, in the most recent cases, it seems that their coming into existence depends on the technical-theoretic enterprise itself.[98]

In short, with the physicist's elementary particles, theoretical enunciation precedes material existence, an idea that will resurface in Guattari's writings of the 1970s.

Within the much more limited scope of Lacanian theory, the sign is important only for its subjugating effects on the subject, although the latter's deviousness is nonetheless well-known to psychoanalysts. However, Guattari insists up front that the subject is never completely imprisoned by signifying chains, thereby deviating from at least some interpretations of Lacan.[99] Guattari finds that the subject is "fundamentally perverse" and that "signs hold a grudge against the subject because the later does not conform to them unreservedly." The dialectic itself "plays on the futilities, accidents, and pustules of nonsense" which emerge from "a big body of signifying determinations of all sorts."[100] Lacan's subject is likewise perversely disobedient, but Guattari seems much more drawn to its nonconformist side. While he does not dispute the "signifying determinations" that Lacan discovered by playing even and odds, Guattari shows much more interest in contingencies, nonsense, and the geopolities of technology.

The relationship between subjectivity and the machine would not be explored again until Guattari's 1969 text destined for Lacan, "Machine and Structure," in which Guattari first introduced the idea of "desiring machines." It has been reported that Lacan himself solicited "Machine and Structure" for his journal *Scilicet*, having wanted Guattari to write a response to Deleuze's most recent books. Lacan never published it, so Guattari took it to Deleuze.[101] According to a mutual friend of theirs, these are the circumstances under which the philosopher and the militant analyst first met.[102] Guattari does not deny the existence and functioning of structure, but rather argues for supplementing the notion of structure with its reverse-side, the machine.[103] He insists that machine and structure are inseparable because dependent on one another. The human being is caught where machine and structure meet.[104] This essay, which was written for Lacan and not against him, demonstrates that Lacan was not only an expert on structure, but that he also knew something about machines. This familiarity with machines had already been demonstrated in Lacan's discussions of cybernetics (cited above), but Guattari reveals a machinic side of Lacan's major theories of the unconscious. He declares

object petit "a" "breaks into the structural equilibrium of the individual like some infernal machine."[105] Guattari equates "desiring machines" with "*objets petit 'a'* returning to the surface of the phantasy body."[106] The *objet 'a'* is itself a desiring machine. Hence the statement that Lacan "initiated" the desiring machine, as cited at the beginning of this section.[107]

In this same essay, Guattari also finds machines in Deleuze, whom he had not yet met, and who had just published *Logic of Sense* (1968) and *Difference and Repetition* (1969). In a footnote of "Machine and Structure," Guattari offers a bold reworking of Deleuze's thinking, mapping his two new books onto his own machine/structure distinction.[108] Interestingly enough, Guattari does not comment on Deleuze's lengthy discussion of the psychoanalytic theory of psychic repetition,[109] but goes straight to the heart of Deleuze's theory of repetition. Guattari recognizes his own machine in Deleuze's "repetition" of *singularities* for which there can be no exchange or substitution. Likewise, Guattari sees his own category of structure as equivalent to Deleuze's "generality," defined as the domain of the exchange or substitution of *particulars*.[110] Having thus swallowed up an essential thesis of *Difference and Repetition* in one sentence, in the same footnote, Guattari goes on to take issue with the characterization of "structure" in *Logic of Sense*, in effect correcting Deleuze. He agrees with Deleuze that the "minimum conditions determining structure in general" include the presence of two heterogeneous series (condition one of structure) whose terms exist only in relation to each other (condition two).[111] However, the militant psychoanalyst reclassifies the philosopher's third condition of structure, writing that the "'two heterogeneous series converging upon a paradoxical element that acts so as to differentiate them,' relates, on the contrary, exclusively to the order of the machine."[112] Like Lacan, Deleuze understood quite a lot about machines, in Guattari's view. Unlike Lacan, Deleuze was fascinated by Guattari's notion of the machine, did not mind it being used to revise his own major theories, and was willing to incorporate these revisions into his own thinking. Deleuze was thus open to an "outside" of philosophy. Lacan was not open to an "outside" of the analytic relation—and even less open to an "outside" of his own teachings.

Deleuze was attracted not only to Guattari's desiring machines, but also to his critique of psychoanalysis. He latter explained to an interviewer that "Oddly enough, it wasn't me who rescued Félix from psychoanalysis; he rescued me."[113] Deleuze had commented extensively on various aspects

of Freud and Lacan in *Difference and Repetition*, *Logic of Sense*, and his study of masochism, but he did not necessarily follow the 20th-century intellectual mainstream in his approach to the unconscious, which was arguably as indebted to Leibniz, Janet, Bergson, and Jung as to Freud.[114] Although Deleuze credits Guattari with the departure from Lacanian orthodoxy, the former's pre-1969 writings are not particularly Freudian or Lacanian, or even psychoanalytic. Still, neither did he show any motivation to dismantle Freudian or Lacanian theory, until he met Guattari.[115]

Meanwhile, even as Guattari was slowly moving away from Lacan's teachings by following the path of the machine which led him to Deleuze, Lacan was moving away from psychiatry and from the treatment of psychosis. It should not be forgotten that Lacan's own teaching, practice, and theorizing were still evolving at the time, becoming increasingly distant from his earliest work on criminal paranoïa, and moving toward impossible *jouissance* and the topographical demonstrations which came to dominate his final seminars. Although he had written and published a doctoral thesis on paranoïa (1932) and had devoted a year of his seminar to the psychoses (1955-56), Lacan on the whole provided very little guidance on the psychoanalytic treatment of psychotics.[116] Between 1964 and 1969 Lacan's shift in interests paralleled the changing composition of his seminar audience. Having lost access to the lecture room at the Saint-Anne psychiatric hospital, he began lecturing at the prestigious École Normale Supérieure, at the invitation of Louis Althusser. There, Lacan was drawn to Althusser's philosophically trained students. It has been said that these young, well-funded students seduced Lacan and led him astray, because they had time to read books, unlike the busy professional clinicians who had made up the audience of Lacan's early seminars.[117] In 1969 Lacan was obliged to move his seminar again, this time to the law school lecture hall across from the Panthéon in the heart of the Latin Quarter, where his audience further grew in size and diversity. He was now a star on the lively Paris intellectual scene. His lectures became markedly more formulaic and mathematical after 1969-70, the year his seminar focused on the "four discourses," which are based on algebraic combinatorics and which he insists exhaust the possibilities for mapping intersubjective relations among speaking subjects.[118] Mathematical concepts were already present in Lacan's work from the earliest pre-war period, but it was not until 1971 that he introduced the notion of the "matheme," a conception of the unconscious which troubled Guattari.[119] Lacan first presented the Borromean knot

in 1972 and grew increasingly fascinated with this and other topological figures, to the dismay of many of his followers.[120] Lacan thus chose structure, although his little machines do reappear from time to time, which make him still worth reading.

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Psychoanalysis, then, was an influential "outside" to philosophy for those caught up in "1968-thought." Lacan brought this form of non-philosophy first to Hyppolite, then to Althusser and his students. Guattari likewise brought non-philosophy to Deleuze, but his contribution was a politicized, institutional form of psychoanalysis. These "political" and "institutional" outsides were those that Lacan chose to ignore.

Notes

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[1] One of the characteristics of Guattari's writing, especially from the 1970s onward, is the proliferation of drawings, tables, schemas, and diagrams. Deleuze once said of Guattari that "His ideas are drawings, or even diagrams." Deleuze with his concept-oriented thought was strangely attracted to Guattari's constant production of new diagram-like ideas. "Between Félix with his diagrams and me with my articulated concepts, we wanted to work together." (Gilles Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness: Text and Interviews 1975-1995* (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006), 238).

What does it mean to have ideas which are drawings—to think in diagrams? And why does Guattari include so many drawings in his most theoretical single-authored writing? What draws Deleuze to this thinking? And what debt does Guattari owe to his teacher Lacan, the great inventor of numerous psychoanalytic graphs, mathemes, and topologies?

[2] Eric Alliez, "*Anti-Oedipus* - Thirty Years On," *Radical Philosophy* 124 (March-April, 2004): 11.

[3] Exemplary among these studies are Paul Patton, *Deleuze and the Political* (London: Routledge, 2000); Eugene W. Holland, *Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis* (London: Routledge, 1999); Nicholas Thoburn, *Deleuze, Marx and politics* (London: Routledge, 2003).

[4] One excellent study of Deleuze and the psyche has recently been published; see Christian Kerslake, *Deleuze and the Unconscious* (London: Continuum, 2007).

[5] This movement was pioneered by François Tosquelles at the Saint-Alban hospital. The La Borde clinic was founded by psychiatrist Jean Oury in 1953, and has just over 100 beds for inpatients, with some outpatient services available as well. It is still located in a Loire Valley chateau in the village of Cour Cheverny, France. From the early 1950s until the time of his death in 1992, Guattari worked at the La Borde with Oury, who convinced him to give up his pharmacy studies to pursue psychiatric work. Oury made him second in command at the clinic despite his total lack of formal training at that time. (Gary Genosko, in Félix Guattari, *The Guattari Reader*, ed. Gary Genosko (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1996), 9; hereafter abbreviated GR; Jean Oury and Marie Depussé, *À quelle heure passe le train... Conversations sur la folie* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2003), 198, 204).

[6] Félix Guattari, *Psychanalyse et transversalité: Essais d'analyse institutionnelle* (Paris: Maspero, 1972), 40, 68; hereafter abbreviated PT.

[7] Gary Genosko, *Félix Guattari: An Aberrant Introduction* (London: Continuum, 2002), 4-11; Oury and Depussé, *À quelle heure passe le train*, 193-207; Jean Oury, " La psychothérapie institutionnelle de Saint-Alban a Laborde " La Borde Clinic, http://perso.orange.fr/cliniquedelaborde/la%20clinique/Presentation/texte2.htm, accessed September 25, 2007.

[8] GR 121 or Félix Guattari, *Soft Subversions*, ed. Sylvère Lotringer (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), 268; Jean Oury, Félix Guattari, and François Tosquelles, *Pratique de l'institutionnel et politique*, ed. Jacques Pain (interviewer) (Vigneux, France: Matrice, 1985), 47.

On the conceptual framework of institutional psychotherapy, see Oury, Guattari, and Tosquelles, *Pratique de l'institutionnel et politique*. On pedagogy, see Aïda Vasquez and Fernand Oury, *Vers une pédagogie institutionnelle* (Paris: Maspero, 1967).

Guattari complains that the term "institutional analysis" has been hijacked and put to unintended uses (GR 122).

[9] PT 7-8.

[10] Félix Guattari, *Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics*, trans. Rosemary Sheed (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1984), 208/PT 230.

[11] Oury, Guattari, and Tosquelles, *Pratique de l'institutionnel et politique*, 132-133.

[12] PT 40, 46, 63, 87.

[13] Félix Guattari, *Chaosophy*, ed. Sylvère Lotringer (New York: Semiotext(e), 1995), 193-194; hereafter abbreviated CY.

[14] PT 47, 91; MR 208/PT 230; MR 184/PT 183.

[15] PT 65, 66, 91.

[16] PT 39-40.

[17] Jean Oury, Pierre Babin, and Jean Pierre Lebrun, *Il, donc* (Paris: Union générale d'éditions, 1978), 40.

[18] PT 60.

It has been said that François Tosquelles arrived at the Saint-Alban hospital with a copy of Lacan's doctoral thesis on psychosis under his arm (Jean Oury, David Reggio, and Mauricio Novello, "The Hospital is Ill: An Interview with Jean Oury," *Radical Philosophy* 143 (May/June, 2007): 35).

[19] Polack in Félix Guattari et al., "La Borde: Un lieu psychiatrique pas comme les autres," *Quinzaine Littéraire* 250, 1977): 21; cited by Gary Genosko in GR 9.

[20] PT 87.

[21] PT 39.

One of Guattari's colleagues describes him as a "libertarian autodidact" (Jean-Claude Polack, "Félix Ante Félix," in *Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari et le politique*, ed. Manola Antonioli, Pierre-Antoine Chardel, and Hervé Regnauld (Paris: Sandre, 2007), 131).

[22] Jean Oury in Oury, Babin, and Lebrun, *Il, donc*, 27; Oury and Depussé, *À quelle heure passe le train*, 198.

[23] Guattari during an interview, in Charles J. Stivale, *The Two-Fold Thought of Deleuze and Guattari: Intersections and Animations* (New York: Guilford Press, 1998), 203; François Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari: Biographie croisée* (Paris: Découverte, 2007), 51.

[24] Oury, Babin, and Lebrun, *Il, donc*, 13; Oury and Depussé, *À quelle heure passe le train*, 205.

[25] CY 190.

[26] In his work of the early 1990s, Guattari is still citing these methods of constant institutional readjustment as an instance of socio-therapeutic "metamodeling" (Félix Guattari, *Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm*, trans. Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 69-71/*Chaosmose* (Paris: Galilée, 1992), 99-101).

The grid at La Borde was subject to a great deal of discussion and renegotiation, as problems continually cropped up. "This constant activity of calling things into question seems pointless and confusing... and yet it is through this activity alone that individual and collective assumptions of responsibility can be instituted, the only remedy to bureaucratic routine and passivity generated by traditional hierarchical systems" (CY 191).

[27] Oury and Depussé, *À quelle heure passe le train*, 252-253.

[28] PT 62.

[29] PT 87; see also PT 60, 89.

[30] CY 204, 188-189 This remark primarily targets the then-typical psychiatric hospital which the psychiatry reformers saw as organized like a prison, with patients dressed in uniform pajamas and isolated in their own rooms, discouraging circulation and social interaction.

[31] PT 155.

[32] CY 217/Félix Guattari, *La révolution moléculaire*, 1st ed. (Fontenay-sous-Bois: Recherches, 1977), 23; hereafter abbreviated RM. See also MR 257.

Guattari further accused mainstream analysts of limiting their practice to "a certain category of neurotics," almost to the point of wishing to treat not the mentally ill, but only bureaucrats—or better yet, to psychoanalyze only their fellow psychoanalysts. He found this sort of analyst woefully out of place in the psychiatric institution. "Grabbing a psychoanalyst by the collar and putting him in an asylum would be like taking a medieval priest and putting him in a factory, or in a swimming pool!" (PT 49). In the end, he would find that the Freudian and Lacanian model of the psyche served as its primary purpose the protection of private practice, writing that "All this sordid paraphernalia"—such as splitting of the ego, lack, castration, name of the father, accession to the Symbolic order—"is there only to safeguard the comfort of the couch" (CY 216/ RM 22; see also MR 257).

[33] CY 195; CY 27-29/Félix Guattari, *Les années d'hiver, 1980-1985* (Paris: Barrault, 1986), 80-81.

[34] Genosko, *Félix Guattari*, 66-121.

[35] Joël Dor, *Introduction to the Reading of Lacan: The Unconscious Structured Like a Language*, ed. Judith Feher Gurewich and Susan Fairfield (New York: Other Press, 1998), 2.

[36] CY 204.

[37] Jacques Lacan, *Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan*, vol. 8, *Le transfert, 1960-1961*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Seuil, 1991), 123-200, hereafter abbreviated S8; Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977).

[38] These essays can be read as a formal theoretical presentation of principles of therapeutic practice at La Borde, a view held by La Borde founder Jean Oury who, even while fully recognizing Guattari as the author of the transversality essay, says that at the same time he feels as if they co-wrote it, because it so reflects their clinical work together. (Oury and Depussé, *À quelle heure passe le train*, 230).

[39] PT 40-41, 47, 61-64; Félix Guattari, *The Anti-Oedipus Papers*, ed. Stéphane Nadaud, trans. Kélina Gotman (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006), 90/*Écrits pour l'Anti-Oedipe*, ed. Stéphane Naudaud (Paris: Lignes et Manifeste, 2004), 135.

[40] PT 40, 64-65.

[41] Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, trans. James Strachey (New York: Bantam Books, 1971); Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and its discontents*, ed. Peter Gay, trans. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989); Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement Between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics*, trans. James Strachey (London: Routledge, 2001); Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, trans. Jonathan Rée (London: Verso, 1982).

[42] GR 40; see also CY 168.

[43] Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006, 2002), 503.

[44] Bruce Fink, *Lacan to the Letter: Reading Écrits Closely* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 8; citing Lacan, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, 494.

[45] Lacan, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, 184.

[46] Jacques-Alain Miller in Ibid., 859.

[47] GR 78/RM 285.

[48] GR 65-66/PT 56-57.

[49] In both "Transference" and "Transversality," Guattari references Belgian psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Jacques Schotte, whose essay on transference was published in the same journal issue as Guattari's. Schotte situates Freud's notion of transference within the context of the scientific thought of his time, and notes two threads of meaning which eventually meld into one. The second, larger meaning is that of the *affective relation*, especially between analyst and analysand. Guattari here draws primarily on its first, more literal meaning, that of *transport, translocation, or displacement*. The transfer of values was one meaning of the term during Freud's time. Freud finally settles on the term *Uebertragung* to describe the phenomenon he was grappling with. Schotte notes a number of meanings and associations for the German *Uebertragung*: transport, transmission, transposition, gift, tradition, translation, metaphor, contract, pact, agreement. (Jacques Schotte, "Le Transfert dit fondamental de Freud pour poser le problème: psychanalyse et institution," *Revue de psychothérapie institutionelle* 1 (1965), http://www.balat.fr/article.php3?id_article=356, accessed 22 September 2007.)

[50] MR 85/RM 245-246.

[51] PT 60, 83.

[52] Lacan, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, 181, 183-184.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid., 206, 207.

[55] Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan*, vol. 1, *Freud's papers on technique, 1953-1954*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. John Forrester (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988), 109.

[56] The concept of the performative in full speech is taken from J. L. Austin, *How To Do Things With Words* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962). Cited in Lacan, *Seminar 1*, 107 n. 1.

[57] Guattari's typology of groups is in fact developed over time in several different essays, which I will summarize in the following paragraphs at the risk of giving the group typology a coherence that Guattari never quite supplied (PT 42-45; GR 61-68/PT 52-58; MR 14-17/PT 76-79; CY 191-193).

[58] CY 191-3.

[59] MR 15-16/PT 77; translation modified, my emphasis.

[60] CY 191-193.

[61] MR 17/PT 79.

In the end Guattari finds the term transference too "ambiguous." (Guattari in Guattari et al., "La Borde: Un lieu psychiatrique pas comme les autres," 21.)

[62] MR 17/PT 79.

Note that Guattari is already using the idea of territorialization, five years before he meets Deleuze.

[63] MR 16-17/PT 78-79.

[64] Polack, "Félix Ante Félix," 133; Jean Oury, "La psychothérapie institutionnelle de Saint-Alban a Laborde," La Borde Clinic, http://perso.orange.fr/cliniquedelaborde/la%20clinique/Presentation/texte2.htm, accessed September 25, 2007, 2007.

[65] PT 89.

[66] PT 37.

The S.C.A.J. (The Sub-Commission for Daily Activities) included many of the most socially and verbally challenged patients at the clinic. Its meetings sometimes accomplished very little in terms of tasks, but they were attended by about half of the patients, and were very good at generating interaction and social contact (PT 35-38).

[67] What's more, severely mentally ill in-patients do not recognize social distinctions among those around them. Schizophrenics pay absolutely no attention to fancy diplomas, observes Oury (Oury and Depussé, *À quelle heure passe le train*, 172).

In Lacanian terms, for psychotics the paternal structure has been foreclosed. Whereas neurotics can often be overly attuned to matters of authority and hierarchy (hence the efficacy of transference for Lacanian analysts), psychotics are not, since by Lacanian definition, they know no big Other. By the 1970s, Guattari has abandoned this theory of psychosis, referring to it disparagingly with the shorthand phrase "name of the father."

[68] MR 17/PT 79.

[69] MR 18/PT 80; MR 21/PT 83.

[70] "Deleuze, carefully, with a light touch, broke down a kind of myth about groups that I had had," Guattari wrote in 1985 (CY 30/Guattari, *Les années d'hiver, 1980-1985*, 87).

[71] PT 35.

[72] Guattari, *Chaosmosis*, 95/*Chaosmose*, 132.

[73] Félix Guattari, "D'un signe à l'autre," *Recherches* 2 (1966); hereafter abbreviated DS. See also PT 131-150.

[74] DS 33 n. 1.

The lecture on *The Purloined Letter* has been published several times. For the first published French version, see Jacques Lacan, "Le séminaire sur "La lettre volée"," *Psychanalyse* 2, 1957). In English, see Lacan, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, 6-48; Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan*, vol. 2, *The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-1955*, ed. Jacques Alain Miller and John Forrester, trans. Sylvana Tomaselli (New York: Norton, 1988), 191-205, hereafter abbreviated as S2. See also the reproduction of the text along with many commentaries on it, including an essay by Jacques Derrida, in John P. Muller and William J. Richardson, eds., *The Purloined Poe: Lacan, Derrida & psychoanalytic reading* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).

My assumption is that Guattari and Oury attended the original lectures in which Lacan spoke of the game then of the Poe tale. They would have had notes from the lectures, then probably had a copy of the journal where the seminar was published in 1957.

[75] Oury and Depussé, *À quelle heure passe le train*, 199, 203.

[76] S2 88.

[77] S2 79, 76.

[78] S2 88.

[79] S2 74.

[80] S2 31.

[81] S2 296.

[82] S2 88.

[83] S2 296.

[84] S2 180, 181.

[85] S2 185.

[86] Lacan, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, 31, 39-41.

[87] S2 304.

[88] S2 307.

[89] S2 184-185.

[90] DS 38.

[91] Guattari does not explicitly cite this lecture, but he does refer to Lacan's *trait unaire*, and this chapter provides the most extended discussion of it that I have found (S8 405-422).

On the translation of the term into English, see Dylan Evans, *An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis* (London, New York: Routledge, 1996), 81.

[92] S8 417-418.

[93] S8 418.

[94] DS 33, 35, 43.

[95] DS 50.

[96] S2 31-32.

[97] DS 50-53.

[98] DS 53.

[99] DS 58.

[100] DS 54, 61, 51-52.

[101] "Félix had talked to me about what he was already calling 'desiring machines': he had a whole theoretical and practical conception of the unconscious as a machine, of the schizophrenic unconscious." Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations, 1972-1990*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 13-14.

[102] "Machine and Structure" was given as a paper at Lacan's École Freudienne de Paris in 1969 (PT 240 n. 1). Deleuze and Guattari's mutual friend Jean-Pierre Faye recounts that Lacan asked Guattari to write the paper for his journal *Scilicet*. Faye eventually published the text in his own journal, *Change*. Jean-Pierre Faye, "Philosophe le plus ironique," in *Tombeau de Gilles Deleuze*, ed. Yannick Beaubatie (Tulle, France: Mille sources, 2000), 92, 97. Historian François Dosse tells a slightly different story, involving a first promise of the article to Roland Barthes for his journal *Communications*, followed by Lacan demanding the article for *Scilicet*, but then never publishing it. In both Dosse's and Faye's versions, the text winds up being sent to Deleuze, and serving as a point of departure for their first conversations. Dosse, *Biographie croisée*, 92, 268-269.

[103] MR 111-119, PT 240-248.

[104] MR 114/PT 243.

[105] MR 115/PT 244.

[106] MR 116/PT 245.

[107] In 1969 Guattari's vocabulary and theoretical support remained Lacanian, as when he writes that "this unconscious subjectivity as a split which is overcome in a signifying chain, is being transferred away from individuals and human groups toward the world of machines," or when he transforms Lacan's formula of a signifier representing the subject for another signifier: "It is a signifier detached from the unconscious structural chain that will act as a *representative* to represent the machine." This, he says, is the essence of the machine. (MR 113, 114/PT 242, 243; MR 114/PT 243).

[108] MR 111 n. 1/PT 240 n. 1.

[109] Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 96-115.

[110] Ibid., 1.

[111] Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 48.

[112] MR 111 n. 1/PT 240 n. 1.

[113] Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 144. See also Guattari, in Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 15. Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 13.

[114] Kerslake, *Deleuze and the Unconscious*.

[115] Alain Roger, "Gilles Deleuze et l'amitié," in *Tombeau de Gilles Deleuze*, ed. Yannick Beaubatie (Tulle, France: Mille sources, 2000), 44; Kerslake, *Deleuze and the Unconscious*.

[116] Dany Nobus, *Jacques Lacan and the Freudian Practice of Psychoanalysis* (London: Routledge, 2000), 140-143.

[117] Oury and Depussé, *À quelle heure passe le train*, 250, 253.

[118] Jacques Lacan, *Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan*, vol. 17, *L'envers de la psychanalyse*, ed. Jacques Alain Miller (Paris: Seuil, 1991).

For a contextualized overview of the development of these concepts over time, see Marcelle Marini, *Jacques Lacan: The French Context* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 62-70.

[119] Bernard Burgoyne, "From the Letter to the Matheme: Lacan's Scientific Methods," in *The Cambridge Companion to Lacan*, ed. Jean-Michel Rabaté (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 81, 82; Alain Cochet, *Lacan géomètre* (Paris: Anthropos, 1998).

[120] Catherine Clément, *The Lives and Legends of Jacques Lacan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 33; Stuart Schneiderman, *Jacques Lacan: The Death of an Intellectual Hero* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983); Alain Vanier, *Lacan* (New York: Other Press, 2000), 73.

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