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ファイル出力

アイテムタイプ	研究報告書
タイトル	Incomplete Contracts, Collusion and Authority Delegation in Hierarchical Agency
著者	著者名 SUZUKI, Yutaka
言語	eng
出版者	Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University
	法政大学比較経済研究所
雑誌名	比較経済研究所ワーキングペーパー
巻	54
開始ページ	1
終了ページ	57
発行年	1996-07
著者版フラグ	Version of Record
キーワード	Hierarchial Agency
	Task Assignment problem
	Information structure
	Externality
	Collusive (Group) Behaviour
	Collusion-Proof incentive schemes
	Equilibrium with Vertical Collusion
	Equilibrium with Lateral Collusion
	Pooling Contract with cross subsidization
	Centralized vs Decentralized Firm
抄録	We introduce the possibility of collusion and study the optimal organizational Job design in a three-tier hierarchy. We consider the incomplete grand contract situation and show that in one case, the pooling contract with cross subsidization may emerge as a second best solution to the political activities of some group, and in the other case, soft (unverifiable) supervisory information may make equilibrium side transfers optimal. This is a new way of distinguishing two types of organizations in terms of allowing collusion or deterring collusion. Considering the implications of this model, we see that this model deals with the problem of centralization versus decentralization of the firm and explains the source of firm competitiveness in terms of the organization structure.
資源タイプ	Working Paper
インデックス	資料タイプ別 ＞ 研究調査報告書 ＞ 比較経済研究所ワーキングペーパー [Working Paper]
	201 比較経済研究所 ＞ 研究調査報告書 ＞ 比較経済研究所ワーキングペーパー [Working Paper] ＞ 54

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