研究報告書

管理された競争を通じての資本蓄積 : 企業成長のための戦略としての2段階トーナメント

jpn

比較経済研究所ワーキングペーパー

46

1

40

1995-07-13

Version of Record

This paper analyzes how a third party called the principal induces the dynamic icentives among agents through both the monetary and non-monetary incentive schemes. The Principal intervenes in the competition among agents at the end of period 1, and allots the production share in the final period. By doing so, an asymetric equilibrium favourable for the winner is generated in the competition in the subsequent subgame, which in turn crerates tournament effects through the discrete prize in the first period. This kind of intervention contributes to the growth of firms, and induces it less costly. This mechanism explains the industry competitiveness of Japan, including the efficiency of subcontracting systems．

Working Paper