

Rational Peasants and Village Community

長原, 豊 / NAGAHARA, Yutaka

(出版者 / Publisher)

法政大学比較経済研究所 / Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University

(雑誌名 / Journal or Publication Title)

比較経済研究所ワーキングペーパー

(巻 / Volume)

21

(開始ページ / Start Page)

1

(終了ページ / End Page)

48

(発行年 / Year)

1991-01-31

Hosei University
Ireland-Japan Papers
Number 3

ICES
HOSEI UNIV.

Rational Peasants and Village Community

NAGAHARA Yutaka

Institute of Comparative Economic Studies
Hosei University
4342 Aihara-cho, Machida-shi
Tokyo, 194-02 Japan
TEL.0427-83-2330

Rational Peasants and Village Community *

NAGAHARA Yutaka **

I. Introduction

II. Norms of the State and Norms of the Village Community.

1. *Village Community and Village Union.*

2. Thrusts and Parries in the Court.

3. *Village common sense and Village territoriality.*

1). Common sense about land.

2). *Village territoriality* and Outsiders.

3). Fundamental directions of the central union during the earlier days.

III. Rational Peasants Within Moral Economy.

* I would like to thank Prof. T.Matsuo(Hosei University) for his encouragement and considerations. I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness for valuable comments on previous drafts of this essay to Prof. L.M.Cullen(Trinity College, University of Dublin). Any remaining shortcomings, as a matter of course, are my responsibility.

** Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Chiba, Matsudo, Chiba, Japan.

I. Introduction.

Not surprisingly, the *emperor system-cum-Japanese fascism* was, and still is, more or less, the touch-stone for Japanese historians. It is a controversial and sensitive subject not only for students of modern Japanese history, but for medievalists as well, so much so that we still lack a framework within which to interpret it consistently. Indeed, the term emperor system to specify the Japanese monarchy was coined by prewar left-wingers (especially by communists) [Kan(1975)] who devoted themselves to a militant but vain attempt to abolish it. Hence, the emperor system was a symbolic term, a sort of slogan, as it were, under the umbrella of which a great number of political documents and scholarly works were written which, implicitly or explicitly, dealt with the emperor without having any shared frame of reference.

Paradoxical as it may sound, analysis of the emperor system has been a massive industry in this country just because of such methodological confusion. Thus, it must be noted that the so-called *debate on Japanese capitalism* and subsequent controversies after the Second World War [Itoh(1980) and Hoston(1986)] have produced a great deal of fact-finding which still awaits systematic use in interpretation of the emperor system.

However numerous the methodological issues have been, we can discover a sole specific point featuring in all these analyses. Peasant problems and tenancy disputes were and are the main agenda with which Japanese social scientists start their arguments. Thus, those who attempt to explore the emperor system cannot avoid subjecting peasant problems during the 1920s and 1930s to scrutiny. To talk about the emperor system, therefore, is nothing more than to talk about the peasantry in particular, as far as Japanese historians are concerned.

What the peasantry really were or are, however, forms another grand and

embarrassing issue with which many social scientists have grappled[Moore(1966), Shanin(1973 & 1987), Migdal(1974), Scott(1976), Popkin(1979), and Skocpol(1979 & 1982)]. This is not the place to go deep into the ongoing problems as to how to define peasants or whether, seen from the point of view of methodological individualism, they are passive factors(risk-averters) within the moral economy or decisive rational actors(rational risk-takers)[Elster(1985)]. However what we can say at least here is that the definition of peasants in general remains open to criticism[Moore (1972)]. It seems too rigid to see peasants as simply one of two categories.

In this short essay we would like to review the controversies mentioned above by deciphering the collective actions of Japanese peasants over tenancy problems (tenancy disputes) during the interwar period, especially in the 1920s, which might in turn uncover the *Janus*-like characteristics of the peasantry. In so doing, we try to elucidate the feature of *mentalité* specific to communal village peasants, bearing the arguments of rational-choice theory in mind[Olson(1965) and Elster(1985)]. In other words, having based ourselves on the “limited rationality” ⁽¹⁾ of peasants, we endeavour, through observing, or interpreting their non-everyday life as it emerges in tenancy disputes, to disentangle the ‘unwritten popular code’[Thompson(1968): 64], or “common sense” ⁽²⁾ amongst peasants in their everyday life[See Scott(1985) and Abercrombie et al.(1980 & 1986)]. Just as peasants have *Janus*-like characteristics, so have our arguments.

The focal point on which we would finally shed light is either the ‘attachment to community and tradition[Taylor(1988) and Calhoun(1982 & 1988)]’ or ‘the tradition of the oppressed[Callinicos(1987)].’ We call this the ‘*Peasant World*,’ albeit ephemeral, which is extraneous to the ‘*Capital World*’ though closely linked to it. This could be expected to act as a threshold leading not only to an exhaustive understanding of the idiosyncratic structure of consensus-building processes which enabled the emperor system to exist as the legitimate state[Habermas(1976) and Nagahara(1989)], but to an illumination of the general properties amid diversity of

peasantry across the world.

To approach these grand domains, we have to narrow the subject matter further. First of all we would like to reconstitute the "village union" in accordance with the tenant farmers' usual view in those days which might distinguish between it and the "(central) peasants' union." Secondly, examination of the thrusts and parries between tenant farmers and landlords in the courts will demonstrate the common sense of tenant farmers as expressed in opposition to the state norms (the Civil Code). Thirdly, the consciousness towards land embedded in their common sense will be scrutinized, and then the village's territoriality (land as defined by boundaries) which enables the common sense of villagers to function "economically" will be discussed. Lastly, through the examination of village tenant farmers' unions we shall examine the fundamental directions of the central peasants' unions.

It will be stressed through these arguments that out of a consciousness of village territoriality based on the lands which were the exclusive property of the village community, village tenant farmers could acquire the collective sense or solidarity embodied in village union. Such a collective consciousness, or mentality (*mentalité collective*) embedded in tenant farmers as that of an identifiable village community can be identified precisely through 'happenings [Thompson (1968): 939],' i.e. tenancy disputes as collective actions of village tenant farmers.

II. Norms of the State and Norms of the Village Community.

1. *Village Community and Village Union.*

Two points at issue about tenant farmers' unions will be taken in succession. In

the first place, the peasants' unions in prewar Japan whose representative body was the Japanese Peasants' Union established in 1922(hereafter, JPU)⁽³⁾ were obliged to play a political role on behalf of political parties and groups which suffered on the one hand from the restraining legislation, and repressive measures of government and on the other from political splits due to ideological strife inside the leftist and liberalist camps. It means that in the absence of political parties peasants' unions were frequently expected to be substitutes for them. In this essay we would like to turn aside from peasants' unions-cum-political parties themselves, and devote attention to the activities of village unions of tenant farmers formed spontaneously from below as community organizations. Such village tenant farmers' unions were, by and large, organized to promote the economic interests of tenant farmers in the process of individual tenancy disputes.

In the second place, we are concerned to dwell on the significance of tenant farmers' everyday feelings. While partly influenced by theoretical and systematic policies put forward by the central peasants' unions-cum-political parties, contrariwise they could powerfully influence from below the direction of the central unions' political activities[For everyday feelings seen from the phenomenological sociology, see *Berger and Luckmann(1966)*].

One activist of the early days of tenancy disputes said about the specific difference between politicised peasants' union and the more spontaneous tenant farmers' union that;

[Tenant farmers' unions] are the organizations seeking simply(*un sich*) to promote the economic advantages of tenant farmers, while [(central) peasants' unions] recognize exhaustively that the pauperization of tenant farmers resulted from the specific systems of modern capitalism, and that there is no alternative but to reform the system of capitalism totally in order to emancipate tenant farmers. Consequently, they can put forth all the lines of *für sich*

policies of their organizations according to their ultimate political aims/[Shobara (1927):55].

Table 1
Territory of Tenant Farmers' Unions and Landlords' Associations (in percent)

	militant union				conciliatory union			landlords' association		
	1920	1927	1932	1937	1927	1932	1937	1927	1932	1937
less than 1 old village	4.3	7.4	4.0	4.1	8.7	8.5	↗ 38.8	1.5	1.4	1.2
1 old village(aza).....	<u>64.6</u>	↘ <u>64.2</u>	↗ <u>63.3</u>	↘ <u>60.9</u>	<u>72.1</u>	↘ <u>67.2</u>	↘ <u>45.0</u>	<u>25.5</u>	<u>27.5</u>	<u>26.7</u>
several old villages....	7.0	9.4	7.4	6.2	4.3	4.4	2.7	3.7	4.4	3.5
1 new village.....	<u>17.9</u>	↘ <u>14.1</u>	↗ <u>18.8</u>	↗ <u>23.0</u>	<u>11.8</u>	↘ <u>16.1</u>	10.9	<u>54.2</u>	<u>48.2</u>	<u>48.2</u>
several new villages....	.4	3.1	3.0	2.4	2.2	2.4	1.5	14.8	7.9	17.5
1 county.....		.6	.7	.9	.3	.2	.2	6.3	5.0	5.3
several counties.....		.3	.6	.3	.1	.2	.1	1.2	1.9	1.8
1 prefecture.....		.9	1.1	1.3				1.4	1.6	1.2
several prefectures....		.1		.1						
national centre.....		.1	.1	.1				.1	.2	
others.....	5.8	.2	1.0	.3	.5	1.4	1.5	.3	2.2	2.9
Total (numbers).....	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	229	4,498	4,595	3,867	1,689	2,067	2,825	730	643	487

Source: Noshomusho(1922) & Norinsho(1926-40).

It is absolutely true from Table 1 that we must not neglect the fact that the organizational areas of tenant farmers' unions were, from start to end, delimited by old villages(Oaza), which were either wholly or largely communal.⁴ Shobara went on to testify that;

[A tenant farmers' union] is not recognized by tenant farmers as doing anything in particular in the absence of tenancy disputes or troubles. It is a place like a saloon where union members sometimes come by, gather, chatter, gossip, and so on. . . . Although it is true that an agreement existed, it scarcely deserves the name. It is nothing more than an arbitrary mutual understanding among union members. Moreover, almost all the leaders of the union are elected either from members of the village assembly, men of high repute, or from big figures in old

villages(*Oaza*). . . . For rank and file members of the union always confined themselves to their microcosms, they can neither develop their knowledge to enlighten themselves nor break the conservative ethos which chains them to their old ways[*Ibid.*:62-3].

Tenant farmers' unions were, as was mentioned above, *village unions* based on communal old villages. In this manner, tenant farmers used to join the unions 'as a refuge or last resort whereby they could consult barristers and union activists,' who had been dispatched from the central peasants' unions, and were enthusiastic young *Narodnichestvo*-like intelligentsia[*Smith(1972) and Kensetsusha domei(1979)*]. They joined 'to settle all their troubles only when they were convinced that they could not manage quarrels over tenancy problems by themselves alone; that is to say, finally they rushed into the office of the union after landlords had brought legal suits against them[*Onishi(1930):50*].' Village tenant farmers' unions, in fact, were the last line of defence available to tenant farmers.

The village tenant farmers' union, therefore, existed as something which was invisible except for a rainy day, and hence, in everyday life it was part of the communal old village itself. Only when non-everyday life events involving conflict occurred('happenings' in the sense used by E.P.Thompson), did unions become visible in the sphere of the village and could later be remembered in the role of union.⁶⁵ Thus central peasants' unions were regarded as absolutely distinct from village unions; they either appeared as a mere symbolic national centre on the one hand or on the other were embodied in individual organizers.

This could be shown in Table 2, which demonstrates that almost all the earlier tenancy disputes broke out within the limited sphere of the communal old village. In the village unions, close to or familiar with tenant farmers' everyday lives, and which made every possible effort to reduce farm rent and to prevent tenants losing their holdings, systematic and theoretical lines of policy proposed by central

peasants' unions could come only from organizers and newspapers(leaflets) dispatched from the central unions or from progressive resident activists in villages. In this context, we venture to say, although policies they represented were regarded as useful if they bore fruit, they were seen as mere *ideologies injected from outside*, since they offered neither quick remedies nor a panacea for tenant farmers' troubles.

Table 2
Tenancy Disputes Classified by its Area

	1 old village (aza)	1 new village	several new villages	Total
Ibaraki...	5(71.4)	2		7
Gunma.....	13(86.7)	2		15
Saitama...	10(76.9)	3		13
Kanagawa..	17(81.0)	4		21
Ishikawa..	8(80.0)	2		10
Fukui.....	4(80.0)	1		5
Yamanashi	20(67.0)	9		29
Nagano.....	6(54.5)	4	1	11
Gifu.....	155(76.4)	51	2	208
Tottori...	67(98.5)	1		68
Hiroshima	4(57.1)	3		7
Yamaguchi	3(100.0)			3
Tokushima	7(87.5)	1		8
Kochi.....	4(66.7)	2		6
Fukuoka...	6(85.7)		1	7
Oita.....	5(62.5)	1	2	8

Source: Saito(1989).


Original Source: Noshomusho(1922).

Note:1. The date of the survey is unidentified, but around 1920.

2. Number of tenancy disputes does not coincide with that of Norinsho(1926-40).

2. Thrusts and Parries in the Court.

Tenancy disputes increased in mushroom fashion during the interwar period in a pattern of upsurges and setbacks. They emerged in the 1920s as if tenant farmers were waiting for the establishment of the JPU which could bestow symbolic justice (as fairness) on tenant farmers. In Japan the 1920s were the epochal decade characterized by a distinctive increase in tenancy disputes, which in turn went hand in hand with the spontaneous establishment of individual village tenant farmers' union everywhere. Figure 1 demonstrates the process eloquently.



Source: Nomin Kumiai Shi Kankokai(1964), Appendix.

Figure 1 Tenancy Disputes and Unions

Nakazawa Benjiro, who was an agricultural economist sympathetic to peasant movements and who was himself in earlier days an union activist in *Gifu Pref.*,

explained the causes of endogenous outbursts of tenancy disputes-cum-social problems as follows;

Our society at last could discover the class of tenant farmers as such. . . . [Such a societal recognition] was at the same time augmented by the emerging outbursts of tenant farmers' movements[Nakazawa(1924b):118].

In this sense, tenant farmers, through being discovered societally, could discover the contradictions of land-ownership. This in turn was also the social process of discovering themselves; *Who and what exactly are we in this society?* This mutual intercourse between tenant farmers and society implied that they rejected the clientelism[For clientelism, see *Eisenstadt & Roniger(1984)*] which hitherto dominated the behaviour of tenant farmers and on which landlords relied heavily to syphon a huge rent out of tenants' farms. Tenant farmers became aware of the fact that landlords were masters not simply because landlords saw themselves as masters but because tenant farmers themselves looked up to landlords as such.

To put it in other words, it meant that landlords were no longer able to offer *merciful* support on the basis of a patron-client relationship. Landlords could no longer be legitimate sponsors for tenant farmers. They were simply better-off persons who neither fulfilled what tenant farmers expected nor conformed to village rules(customs) as a whole.

Once tenant farmers acquired an identity, they were under a necessity to establish an equal relationship with landlords over the rights to farm land. In such new conditions, the first difficulty that tenant farmers had to confront was legal action by landlords. The court where both parties met became the arena where the rights of tenant farmers and those of landlords clashed. In the court the modern legal system required the tenant farmer to be a rationally legal modern subject as an absolute entity.

Yet tenant farmers' attitudes towards the court were multi-faceted or ambivalent. We address ourselves to the legal tactics employed by tenant farmers as a means of revealing their naïve though powerful mentalities.

The first and most usual instance was a demand for farm rent made aggressively by landlords, usually for rent arrears on which a reduction had been sought. In this case, tenant farmers normally advanced, first of all, the excuse that;

[Tenant farmers] held a specific right to cultivate the farm land in question permanently (the so-called permanent tenant right or the perpetual lease). This routine procedure at the harvest season was exercised not to confirm their permanent tenant right *per se* but both to make their adversary prove that the contract pending between them was based on a lease and to prolong the examination by the court for a sufficiently long time to exhaust landlords. It was dubbed "starvation tactics." And at the last stage, when the lease contract was proved, they made every possible effort to negotiate with landlords to reduce the amount of farm rent itself [Mizutani(1926):42].

Tenant farmers presented their opinion in the following terms about the contract of lease, and the notion "leasehold" itself;

However [this contract of lease] may seem *prima facie* to be the appropriate and lawful one *pro forma*, it actually is nothing less than the 'order-submission' relationship between landlord and tenant farmers. Consequently, it does not make any sense at all to accuse tenant farmers of a breach of contract or of default in obligations. . . . So, [it is unlawful] that landlords profess that there is an implied contract in the absence of a contract, and therefore, [it is ridiculous] that they thereby are free to blame tenant farmers for their alleged violation of contracts in a situation where no contract whatsoever exists [Ibid.: 86-7].

Tenant farmers pointed out the social unfairness of the contract itself on the ground that it was against public order and morals, and hence, against their social consensus which was derived from their moral principles and their intrinsic everyday life feelings.

On the problem of the reduction of farm rent(*Genmen*), they emphasized, amongst other things, the existence of traditional practices and customs handed down for generations by insisting that 'it was clearly evident that there had been existing and still existed the custom of rent reduction not only in the district under the jurisdiction of this court but everywhere else as well[*Ibid.:19*].'

It was a usual procedure for the judge in this case to put to tenant farmers who justified themselves on the strength of traditional practices of rent reduction, such questions as this;

'Is it just only you who was given a rent reduction, or did anyone else receive it?[*Fuse(1931):133*]' This question meant that judges resorted to an expedient of trying to convert the dispute from a point of law regarding custom to an individual issue for the purpose of driving a wedge into the solidarity of tenant farmers. The attempt was very one of divide-and-conquer.

In response, having taken the judge's interrogations into account, the barrister on the tenant farmers' side rebutted the judge's approach in this fashion;

'You know, everybody's got that, haven't they?[*Ibid.*]' Barristers, by getting statements from tenant farmers to the effect that all the tenant farmers in the village enjoyed a right to rent reductions as a custom, did their best to give a definite impression to the judge that it was the custom and, at the same time, the specific duty of landlords to reduce rent. In this way, the most important agenda in the court converged on the question as to whether or not there existed a traditional practice

of reducing farm rent.

Such attempts by tenant farmers, wholly based upon customary rules, appeared incomprehensible, or to be more precise, ridiculous to landlords as they did to one large scale absentee landlord in *Miyagi Pref.* who insisted as follows;

People in these days are unreasonably apt to think of landlords as someone like a *Daimyo*(feudal lord) in the past. So, tenant farmers are inclined to think it natural to require landlords to relieve tenant farmers in a year of crop failure. It is some sort of misunderstanding stemming from a failure to realise the essential character of the relations between landlord and tenant farmer. . . . A landlord has no duty towards tenant farmers at all except for the basic one of mutual contract. Charitable works from the viewpoint of humanity are entirely another thing [*Nakamura(1968):324-5*].

It is obvious from this statement that landlords reacted as proponents of modern property rights, and hence of modernity against tenant farmers. Whereas landlords put an emphasis on the individuality of contract 'on the pretext of the Civil Code [*Sugiyama(1926):44*], 'tenant farmers' response relied absolutely upon the actual custom at work immediately behind the Civil Code.

These exchanges between landlords and tenant farmers resulted from the fact that contracts in those days were generally oral(verbal contracts). One tenant farmer said the following about the contract(deed);

What a damnable contract! I know well that I've exchanged a contract with my landlord, but I've never *listened to* its content. This is my first opportunity to know the content in detail. . . . If my landlord had *read* its content to me at length, I would never have taken the tenancy of the farm. Never ever, even if I would have died of starvation [*Nishina:25 May 1922*].

Of the contract in such situations, Fuse Tatsuji, famous for his militancy as a barrister on the tenants' side, said that 'whatever the contents of the contract document, it reflects not the realities but the shadow of the situations. If it differs much from the actual circumstances, and also if it is a kind of unilateral contract on this point, we can win the conflict by setting forth the realities of our engagement in cultivation.' He went on to declare that the contract, despite appearances to the contrary, was a mere 'phantasm', 'silhouette', or 'phantom' [Fuse(1931):70-3].

This meant that Fuse in orthodox fashion, in order to show that the landlord's title in land was defective, made use of the legal maxims; *Ambiguitas verborum latens verificatione suppletur; nam quod ex facto oritur ambiguum verificatione facti tollitur* (A latent ambiguity may be supplied by evidence; for an ambiguity which arises out of a fact may be removed by proof of the fact.). In addition, he, along with many barristers of those days, not only emphasized that *In contractibus, tacite insunt quae sunt moris et consuetudinis* (In contracts, those things which are of custom and usage are tacitly implied.) but also stressed that *Consuetudo praescripta et legitima vincit legem* (A prescriptive and lawful custom overrides the law.).

In the case of an eviction suit where the question as to whether there existed a permanent tenant right was the focal point at stake in the court, however, the Civil Code was a massive and explicit obstacle to tenant farmers. The 177th article of the Civil Code prescribed that the acquisition of a right to real estate, or its loss, or any change in it required a deed of registration. Without such registration, an occupier was not qualified to cope with a third party challenge to his title. It meant that permanent tenant right must be distinguished by virtue of registration from leasehold, which was called 'usual' tenant farming in the Civil Code. Accordingly, under the situation where 'it was normal for tenant farmers not to register [Mizutanai(1926):57], 'tenant farmers could not manage to avert facing 'tough situations[Ibid.]' The difficulty was paramount.

Even in this case, tenant farmers were as insistent as in the case of rent reduction. They made a habit of presenting an excuse by pointing out at first that to them the so-called permanent tenant right meant 'tenant right for generations without any specific terms.' They went on to expound its lawfulness by asserting that;

Without any explicit registration at all, since the letting out of the land was based on an intent relying on custom, or on obvious situations which enabled the tenant farmers involved to substantiate their claim that there is such an intent, or a promise to farm the land as long as the tenant could pay rent, the continuation of an existing and implicit accord between both parties could be conjectured; the implicit accord was deemed to rest on the permanent residence of tenant farmers (or *animus manendi*) or the historical records [*Ibid.:68*].

Thus, from the very viewpoint of custom, tenant farmers negated totally the differentiation between the usual tenant right and the permanent tenant right ordained in the Civil Code, and then integrated the two categories, though separated in the Civil Code, on the ground that 'the tenant right for generations without any specific terms' meant the firm and stable real right for tenant farmers to continue to hold the farm.

Drawing on the struggles of village unions during the 1920s, the central peasants' unions proposed a united front against the government Tenancy Bill that was about to be brought before the Diet. As is well known, the priority of the tenant right over the property right provided for in the government Tenancy Bill was emasculated, and the Bill itself proved abortive because of the interference of landed interests in the agrarian sector [For the Tenancy Bills and its doom, see *Matsuo(1989)*]. And finally an official endorsement was given to the necessity to register ordained in the Civil Code. Even under such negative condition, their arguments were the following:

If a tenant farmer's right to specific farm land is not readily observable by everyone, it is necessary to register to secure protection of the rights of third parties. But if the relation between the tenant farmer and the farm land is a matter of common, public knowledge, and is evident to village people, and if even a third party is able to know it without any effort, then there is no need at all to register, quite apart from the fact that registration requires the consent of the landlords concerned[Mizutani(1926):109].

Tenant farmers insisted on their right to continue to work on the farm land without any formal(legal) registration, relying on the common sense of the village which all the villagers could readily acknowledge within the small world of face-to-face relationships within a communal old village. That is to say, the village unions tried to stand against the act of parliament on the pretext of the well known village common sense and rural moral principles.

The common sense of villages like these depended upon the interpretations of the existing Registration Act(1886). It was normally recognized as having its basis in historical continuity from the feudal notarial system of the Tokugawa Shogunate régime during which public registers of lands were administered either by villages as such or by village masters who affixed sealings to attest right(*myoshu-kain*). This common sense has been recognised by leading figures in the village as 'the living registers (*Das lebendige Grundbuch*)[Nakada(1985):538],' constituting total consent of all the resident villagers.

During the Land Reform immediately after the Second World War, it was reported that 'the real cadastre was administered by the delegate of the communal old village, and the cadastre that the village office held was no more than a copy of old villages' originals[Kondo et al.(1953):10]. ' Moreover, at that time, there was few register offices, the procedures took much time, or involved expensive charges, or were complex, and functionaries were arrogant[Fukushima(1986):77-8]. Under such

conditions it was the common sense of villagers; ' who went to the registry to observe the necessary procedures for setting up a tenancy? [Mizutani(1926):58]. '

Thus, the most important focal points were formulated as follows;

[First], ' a conveyance of a stable tenancy of the hereditary land to the descendants could never be assured by the temporal contract [Mizutani(1926): 110]. ' [Second], ' a clearly evident fact of having been a tenant farmer from the past, regardless of whether there is the written statement referred to in the recent Civil Code, indicates that both the will to conclude the permanent contract and the binding forces of custom in the relations between tenant farmers and landlord existed [Ibid.:90]. '

In this manner, for tenant farmers, the historical realities represented by ' the unwritten popular code ' i.e., the common sense of the village, were not the formal acquisition as such of land but either the stable cultivation of tenant land for generations, or residence on it. They confronted the supremacy of modern property rights prescribed by the state norms by emphasizing village common sense as rural norms, moral principles, and fairness. Moreover they saw such rural norms as resting not in leasehold in the Civil Code sense but in the fact of following the plough in order to survive, i.e. the norms rested on a right to live. So, in the courts, tenant farmers strove to confirm the two points mentioned below as self-evident proof, even if the evidence itself should be slight, which would convince the court;

[First of all], the most important and basic thing is to specify on which farm land tenant farmers have been working. . . . [In the second place], the indispensable procedure is to make clear the origins of the existing tenancy; for example, by showing that the existing tenant had assumed the right of cultivation of land reclaimed by his ancestors, or by identifying the previous tenant farmer, or by giving convincing proof of the distribution of the tenant right from the head house (*honke*) when a new branch family was set up (*bunke*), etc., etc. [Fuse

(1931):117,120-1]

Nakazawa has emphasized that a specific right to cultivate should be regarded as 'the right offered to those settled on the land to work permanently,' which was very different from leasehold as defined by the Civil Code[Nakazawa(1924a):4-5]. When Fuse emphatically stressed that 'tenancy disputes should be settled eventually according to social common ideas[Fuse(1931):21], ' he tried to demonstrate the powerfulness of village common sense as the weapon of the weak [See Scott(1985)] in diametric opposition to the state norms.

Therefore, for the tenant farmers whose only support lay in custom, a maxim like *quia in consuetudinis, non diuturnitas temporis, sed soliditas rationis est consideranda* (it is not the length of time, but solidity of reason, that is to be considered.) was less an obstacle than a lever which could be operated to affirm their "rationality," as their tenant farming and life on the land they occupied compared favourably as rational behaviour with that of parasitic landlords who produced nothing.

Even the agricultural administration of those days could not avoid saying positively that 'it was by no means easy to apply a uniformly standardized legislation to tenancy relations in all circumstances, since there were remarkable differences of local circumstances[Norinsho(1927):56]. ' What they pointed out as general technical difficulties coincided with the *soliditas rationis* in the common sense of village(rs).

In the ' [d]iscrepancies between social norms, i.e., the criterion for differentiating good from bad in social life, and the state norms, i.e., the measures for distinguishing between rational and irrational in the courts of justice as part of the state apparatus[Suehiro(1977):205-6], ' in other words, in the discrepancies between the village common sense(moral principle) and the Civil Code, tenant farmers

discovered the contradictions existing in land-ownership, i.e., so-called landlordism. What was the land *per se* seen as, to such tenant farmers? It is the next point to deal with in proceeding to a deeper understanding of tenant farmers' mentalité.

3. *Village common sense and Village territoriality.*

1). Common sense about land.

The tenant farmer's right both to follow the plough and to live from the tenant land, as was mentioned above, rested on the village land as such which was specified, strip by strip, parcel by parcel, in terms of the personal names of tenant farmers, or more precisely, household (*ie*) names. It was not sufficient, therefore, for their rights to be written down formally in the registration rolls. It must be a matter of common knowledge as to which person or which "*ie*" worked on what tenant land put out to lease by who, when, why, and how. The names of tenant farmers' and/or of the *ie* remained attached to the land.

The relations on such tenant lands were so intricate that it was difficult for outsiders to comprehend them, but for resident villagers they were as visible as if the air was coloured. Tenant farmers as well as owner farmers in the village needed exact information about holdings of land to coordinate production on rice fields which were irrigated on a village basis [See *Kitamura(1950 & 1973)*, *Kelly(1982)*, and *Bray(1986)* for details]. The production-processes for every parcel of village land were determined by its place in the general pattern of irrigation management. Every parcel of village land belonged to the village as a whole. The affiliation of each plot of land to the village community derived from the village common sense, or we may say, the cumulative memories from the past. Hence land-ownership by landlords (landlordism), as upheld by the modern state norms, appeared to be lacking in

common sense(production rules) for tenant farmers. To such tenant farmers and their mentalités, land presented itself in these terms;

The subsoil belongs to the Emperor, and the middle layer, *Nigatsuchi*(bitter soil), to the landlord. But the surface of the earth, *Amatsuchi*(sweet soil), is ours. *Amatsuchi* was increased last year by our covering paddy fields with mud from the irrigation pond(as manure)[*Yonemura(1930):31*].⁶⁰

Such a recognition was far from unique within the area where so-called permanent tenant right was traditionally established. We can find many examples of such distinctions at that time[*Ono(1931):273-4*. See also *Furushima(1953)*]. We can instance more explicit statements of farmers' perceptions of lands in the written petitions in the early Meiji era.

To be sure, although peasants seem to own lands freely, the paddy field is not privately but publicly owned. . . . Although people seem to own paddy fields individually, the paddy field, which originally descended from Heaven(the Emperor) and is influenced by Nature, has been the common facility for nourishing all the nation. Just as people, whether rich or poor, cannot avoid experiencing the round of seasons, so even the rich cannot occupy the paddy fields for their self-interest alone[*Norinsho(1957):1165,1169*].

Deep in the peasants' mentality there existed a sense of a unity linking cultivation with labour, labour with land, and land with nature. It indicated that the unity of human beings and nature originated in an implicit recognition that land was temporarily gifted from Heaven. In this sense, as the old farmer said, nature is neither more nor less than the Emperor. Peasants believed that land offered to Heaven was, and should be, redistributed among them and utilized reciprocally[See *Polanyi(1957)*].

Ironical though it may appear, at a time when the Land Tax Reform (*Chiso kaisei*) policy of 1873 to 1880 sought to determine definite rights in land, and the new land register entered into effect, such a recognition resulted in the notion that what counted was not the property right in land itself but the maintenance of a livelihood on the land confirmed in the consent of both the old village *per se* and the villagers. When the new land register was launched to designate 'not only the village section but the lot number as well (lands could have its own names as if peasants who hitherto were prohibited to have their own names were permitted to give their own names.) [*Fukushima(1986):13*],' tenant farmers were convinced that 'for poor tenant farmers, registration of title was not a long-term theoretical purpose but simply a contingency to confirm the right to live from the land [*Ota(1925):162*].'

Therefore 'if the right of labouring farmers is protected on the basis of a right to live, half of the aim of peasant movements is accomplished [*Ibid.:271*].' Such a standpoint was shared by either the central peasants' unions or by village tenant farmers' unions during the first half of the 1920s.

2). *Village territoriality* and Outsiders.

In this way, for the sake of re-confirmation of the right, known to everyone in the village, strip by strip, to live from the tenant land, solidarity of tenant farmers enhanced by collective action was inevitable. Needless to say, collective action was taken through the village tenant farmers' union. In turn, it was taken for granted by the union-cum-village that it had the right to punish not only defectors from or opponents of the rural norms, but those who stood to gain by tenant farmers' campaign without participating in the struggle, whether landlords or tenant farmers. Blackballing or social ostracism served as a self-regulating and institutionalized force in creating solidarity or maintaining collective action. It is the so-called *Murahachibu* [*Nakazawa(1923):157ff.*, *Kimura(1932):59ff.*, *Smith(1967):246-55*,

Smethurst(1974:53-5 & 1986:287-8,397-401), and Saito(1989):Chaps.8-9]. In this context, collective action or solidarity is seen as neither more nor less than the collective good or public good.⁽⁷⁾

One landlord in *Gifu Pref.*, blackballed by villagers in a tenancy dispute, was reported as asking with streaming eyes his family to break away from the stubborn landlords' association. He muttered;

Thus far I got on well with my tenant farmers. Nevertheless! What a bloody shame! I am blackballed simply because of my rejecting the offer of rent reduction. Besides, their demand was no more than a reduction of one or two *ta*.⁽⁸⁾ Now look! This is my dearest wish to all my family. Please accede to the tenant farmers' demands [*Sugiyama(1926):162*].

This poor landlord had to break with his "comrade" landlords and their adamant association which, through stiffened resistance by the villagers, failed to become rooted in the village. He had no choice but to end his relations with the association of landlords in order to get on with the villagers. Blackballing, and weaker or stronger versions of it in the form of 'foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so on [*Scott (1985):xvi*]' were the strongest weapon of the weak against landlords. In this respect, however, social ostracism and the likes could bear full fruit only if the landlord resided in the village within which his lands were located.

As to the social ostracism of their (old) comrades by union members, on the other hand, an explicit clause in the covenant of the union, provided that 'in case of violation of the covenant, the union can claim the right to levy a fine of one hundred *yen* and terminate acquaintance.' This was also sometimes copper-fastened by a notarial deed in order to defeat legal actions by blackballed tenant farmers, mostly instigated by landlords in an attempt to undermine solidarity by a policy of

divide-and-conquer. Thus, the *murahachibu* as the weapon of the weak was not only a sinister measure directed at both landlords and tenant farmers but, at the same time, a seemingly traditional(non-rational) though economically rational measure to prevent union members from either defecting or "free-riding" [Olson(1965), Hardin (1982), and Elster(1985)].

Moreover we have another causal force for the solidarity among tenant farmers to point out. That is, tenant farmers, organized as a union-cum-village community, enhanced the force of the common sense, rural norms and moral principles by the success of their collective actions, and resisted the state norms, relying mainly on a specific feeling of incompatibility to "commodified" land and, therefore, to absentee landlords. A question which it is impossible to avoid is to what extent land was recognized as a salable "goods" by peasants[See Nagahara(1990)]. Whatever the extent of that acceptance, for tenant farmers at least, land was a distinctive commodity in the sense that no one could carry it away.

For example if land is something movable, and if land can be carried away to another village or county in case of tenant farmers' grumbling over the rent, 'the situation of tenant farmers is fragile. . . . [But] since land can never be carried away, the landlord who owns this land has to rely on resident tenant farmers to cultivate it[Ono(1925):100].

Tenant farmers had a firm belief that they would gain the upper hand over landlords, because 'land can not give out light at all without tenant farmers[Ibid.: 101].' Their confidence was grounded on the distinctiveness of land as a commodity ("goods").

Nishina Yuichi, a radical activist in the peasant movement from its outset, talked about the exodus of landlords from the countryside (an increasing number of absentee landlords) and made much of tenant farmers' persistence in both

production and livelihood, by stating that 'so far as there remained the fields, paddy, and woods within the village, neither can the villagers experience starvation nor can the (tax) burden of the landlord be alleviated.' Nishina goes on to paraphrase the situation straightforwardly;

Now look! my landlords. You have everything your own way as if paddy fields were born between your wives' legs. But you'd better think for a while anyway. We tenant farmers know well. The land has been cultivated since my father's days, nay, since my grand father's and forefathers' days. It's a long long time ago! Even if you make vain efforts to announce that it's your own land, you can never stow away lands in your granary. You can stow away only if we tenant farmers foster rice, and make rice by farming land. Otherwise, the land belongs to the village anyhow [Nishina:25 July 1923].

In this respect, a village document found in *Yamagata* Pref. is very intriguing. This was named the " *Hondate Mura Oaza Toyohara Kosakuda Joyaku* (Agreements over Tenant Land of Oaza Toyohara in Hondate Village) " which is composed of the four following items [in *Isobe*(1978):725-6];

Section 1 No one can tenant any paddy field of oaza Toyohara, in disregard of the consent of others.

Section 2 In case of transfer of tenant land uninterruptedly tenanted for a long time, deliberation and investigation of the case by all the villagers should be necessary.

Section 3 No tenancy proposal from another oaza can be accepted without the consent of villagers.

Section 4 To accomplish the purposes of sections 1, 2 and 3, a mutual agreement of villagers concerning all the tenanted land in the village should be made.

To confirm the above items for the long term, we all the villagers sign

and seal.

In this manner, even the landlord who in terms of the modern legal code owned the land could not change the tenant farmer without the unanimous consent of villagers. Moreover, villagers never permitted would-be tenants from other village to occupy land located within the territory of the village. In this way, the modern property right in land was powerfully restricted, and its commodity value was impaired and narrowly fragmented by both village territoriality and village common sense; in turn that meant that the land market was dysfunctional[For the fragmentation of market, see *Bardhan & Rudra(1986)*, and *Rao(1988)*]. In fact land was an asset or endowment of the village, and of the villagers as a whole.

Yanagita Kunio, founder of folklore in Japan who based his work closely on field study, reported that 'everywhere there remains the specific thought from former times that village land belongs to the village as such[in *Fujii(1975):42*].' He also emphasized that 'the thought on historical grounds that village land must be utilized by the village continues to be more persistent than might be usually imagined[*Yanagita(1969):15*].' These were the real and substantive impressions of Yanagita, the most capable observer as well as storyteller of the era.

Tenant farmers, in this way, stood against landlords and their modern backing(the state norms) by the formation of a naïve yet substantively real consciousness enhanced by the centripetal and cohesive forces of the village. Sugiyama Motojiro, a coherent activist in peasant movements throughout prewar Japan, said that 'lands still remained in our village even after [landlords] had disposed of their land [*Sugiyama:11 Nov. 1924*].' Nishina Yuichi also said that '[w]e need nobody who came to our village to collect rice for rent. [w]e would never go anywhere before "eating up" paddy fields[*Nishina:25 Feb. 1923*].' It should be stressed again that these arguments, more than they are agitations or propagandas, are a decisive manifestation of tenant farmers' amorphous consciousness deep-rooted in the village

common sense. Thus, tenant right, which rested not on the institutionalized registration system but on collective action and the organization(village union) to express it, was absolutely identical with the collective consciousness of tenant farmers, i.e. village common sense(village unwritten popular code), village territoriality, and permanent residence.

One jurist within the Marxian tradition said positively that 'tenant farmers' continued residence in the village and their acceptance of plain clothes and food eloquently proved how attached they were to village traditionality[Nara(1928):55]. Even Marxists, at that time the determined modernizers and the most radical opponents of the so-called semi-feudal Japanese capitalism, had to fall back on the anti-modern traditionality of village and on tenant farmers' attachments to it.

Table 3
Old Villages and Territories (in percent)

Boundaries \ Districts	(in percent)		
	Tohoku	Kinki	Ave.
boundaries identified by arable lands	77.0	90.7	82.6
boundaries identified by wastes & woods	57.9	69.4	57.9
boundaries identified by both	71.9	84.3	79.4

Source: Norinsho(1971).

Note:1. [Tohoku]: Northeastern Six Prefs. (Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Akita, Yamagata, and Fukushima).

[Kinki]: Southwestern Six Prefs. (Shiga, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Nara, Wakayama).

2. [Average] excludes Hokkaido.

Table 3 apparently describes that communal old villages in prewar Japan had, and possibly still to a lesser degree have, visible territories(boundaries) as their bases. Thanks to such territoriality, the right to work on the farm was guaranteed. Village territoriality as such was also reinforced by the fact that 'The more remote landlord residence is from the land he owned, the stronger tenant right becomes[Nakazawa

(1924a):6-7].'

In a certain village of *Kyoto* under the war régime in 1944, such consciousness took shape in a recommendation made in the name of the village headman to absentee landlords with the advice that;

(. . . .) [We] cannot help aspiring to the total release of the lands owned by absentee landlords. [w]e are very sorry to trouble the honourable family as well as successive family members to ask such a gracious thing, but we desire you to liberate without fail the land that you own in our village. Properly speaking, I the village headman have to show you every courtesy by visiting you by myself, but I am leading the tenant farmers concerned who will visit you personally. Please do them the favour of giving kind consideration. . . .[*Noda(1989):122*].

This recommendation seems very polite, but it was so only in the style. The circumlocution could not conceal the rigorous claim which landlords were unable to decline. Though even made under the special atmosphere of the war régime, it was a seemingly reasonable request to which nobody could object.

As a report said, 'whenever villagers talked about the *mura(oaza)*, it denoted exactly the communal old village. The administrative village created or 'invented' artificially during the Meiji era was simply called by villagers the "village office" [*Kondo et al.(1953):10*].' This report also pointed out that 'landlords who reside in another old village are treated as absentee landlords, even if the village where they reside belongs to the same administrative village[*Ibid.:62*].' This demonstrates that the village territory was narrow enough for villagers to know one another, which enabled them to form face-to-face relationships with confidence. It was also the basis of the close relations among villagers who observed one another without effort and thereby prevented defection from their collective action.

3). Fundamental directions of the central union.

The direction of the peasant movements during the earlier days, coloured to a great degree by the right to the whole produce of labour originating with the so-called Ricardian socialists[See Nagahara(1989) and Mengar(1962)] and the concomitant co-operative management of village land like *le phalanstère*(F.-M.-C. Fourier) or the Proudhonists, could be expressed in the following affirmation;

Let land be liberated from landlords(sic) who never cultivate, and be transferred to us who actually cultivate. Let all the produce that we produce be ours! [Iwauchi,25 March 1922, see also Kagawa,27 Jan. 1922]

This is the very fundamental of the land policy that the peasant movement proposed to tenant farmers. The so-called *socialization of land* which was the popular slogan among tenant farmers in those days, therefore, was nothing less than the emphasis placed upon passwords such as 'Let land be distributed to those who cultivate[Tachikawa,25 Dec. 1922],' which might in turn purport societally to establish the *village ownership of land*. This basic land policy of the union led to intense criticisms of parasitic absentee landlords as spongers on tenant farmers and to a simultaneous attempt to prohibit encroachment on village land(territory) by non-resident absentee landlords as outsiders. ⁽⁹⁾

We have to be, however, quick to add that the strategic inclination of unions revealed the problems posed by resident landlords, and the consequent shortcomings in building up general intra-village solidarity within the union. This was inescapably disclosed in the 1930s during which almost all tenancy disputes occurred between tenant farmers and small resident landlords. Small resident landlords were in a vulnerable situation, and in danger of declining to the level of the "reserve army" of owner farmers. Hence, these tenancy disputes during the 1930s were fought as bloody struggles among members of the same old village, and

consequently brought about the disruption of the villages themselves. They undermined the solidarity on which village unions had heavily relied thus far.

To return from the closely related digression above in the discussions of the detailed strategy of the *socialization of land* as the land policy at the annual conference of the JPU in 1925, three concrete directions were proposed: (1)nationalization of land; (2)village ownership; (3)co-operative ownership. Eventually, the following proposal by the representative delegated from *Okayama Pref.* were declared; 'Let all the land to be nationalized, and let the right to manage it to be entrusted to the co-operatives of peasants [*Koiwai, 24 Jan. 1925*].' It must be noted, however, that the realization of nationalization depended on future political processes connoting a revolutionary overthrow of State power. Therefore in the interval the strategy of managing village lands under the hegemony of village unions should be the first step for the final goal.

The tone of earlier arguments of the JPU at that time, as far as the land policy was concerned, stipulated the following;

Once the amount of rent is reduced substantially, tenancy problems as such could be automatically cleared off and tenancy disputes, seen from the point of view of the "thought problem", could be resolved as well [*Sakamoto, 25 Jan. 1922*].'

We can get a view of the straight road from tenant farmers to owner farmers by restricting profits gained by both capitalists and highhanded landlords. To do so, we have to reduce exorbitant and unfair rent to a reasonable level, which might in turn reduce the skyrocketing price of land to a vanishing point [*Gyosei, 25 June 1922*].'

We need not be obsessed with procuring land in order to become owner farmers who after all face ruin. We do not mind being tenant farmers. We, among all, have to keep on trying to reduce rent. It is the pressing task. When the

price of land at last falls, and if we are convinced it is better to buy land than to tenant it in respect of profitability, we might as well purchase lands[Sugiyama, 25 Feb. 1924].'

Such a standpoint was finally summed up in the following slogan;

This year, ten percent reduction!

The coming year, twenty!

Finally, we get all the produce we produce!

To be sure, here, the perspective of becoming an owner farmer as well as the general question of the ownership of land was discussed. Notwithstanding, it was neither an overarching strategy nor an urgent project. As to the owner farmers during those days, it was kept in mind that '[e]ven to be an owner farmer was by no means regarded as a paying business[Nishina, 25 Sept. 1922].' In line with this standpoint, it was argued that '[t]he era when tenant farmers yearn after the possession of paddy fields has already passed. . . . [t]enant farmers have to be protected by the very fact that they do cultivate[Yoshida, 24 Feb. 1925].' And therefore it was stressed that 'it was the best way for tenant farmers to keep on cultivation[Unidentified, 10 May 1925].' It was the general conviction that 'to be an owner farmer was in no way identical with liberation from poverty, illiteracy, and helplessness. [e]ven if we have the ownership of land, we tenant farmers would be able to have a firm foundation for our livelihood only in the case of our maintaining the power to follow the plough[Unidentified, 6 Nov. 1925].'

The JPU, in line with the consciousness of tenant farmers expressed above, propounded that 'at this conjuncture, our union did not endeavour to pursue property rights in land in general. [w]e preferred to try to establish the right to work on the farm[Unidentified, 24 Jan. 1927].' At the fourth annual conference of the JPU, by accepting the proposition of the committee for land policy, an urgent motion

from Kagawa Pref. was passed without any objection, which proposed embarkation on the project of building up a 《The League for Not-Buying Land》, based on a declaration of resolve to the effect that ‘on the assumption that land be nationalized, we union members will never acquire any parcel of land[*Proceedings of the 4th Conference of JPU(1925)* in *Aoki(1976):191-2*].’

This policy was reflected symbolically in a pledge referring to ‘those who, labouring to become owner farmers, acted as the black sheep of the village[*Nishina, 25 May 1922*].’ It is undeniable that envy of or antipathy to owner farmers partly motivated the land policy of peasants’ unions in prewar Japan, but, at the same time, such sentiments(or resentments) also functioned as a measure of checking defection from collective action[For peasants’ envy, see *Foster(1962)* with caution].

Thus, the kernel of the land policy proposed by the JPU in the earlier stage was a grasp of the strategic importance of management or control of the village land, relying on the village union’s solidarity, based on collective action and the common sense of the village. In consequence, in the wake of victories in the 1920s, their substantive *social* institutionalization of rural norms was achieved solely by appeal to their own village-based solidarity.

Accordingly, the aim of spurring the government to hasten tenancy legislation was behind aggressive village struggles. The immediate focal point at issue was concentrated not on the realization of a Tenancy Bill as such but on the establishment of the right of unity, the right to strike, and the right to conclude trade agreements, which would make possible the expansion of tenant farmers’ unions[*Mizutani(1926):83ff.*].

We cannot agree to nip all the tenancy disputes in the bud. . . . Tenancy dispute is the effective factor in the improvement of the tenancy system. . . . Without those, it might be impossible to improve tenurial circumstances. . . .

Tenancy disputes are not such horrid happenings as are usually imagined. . . .
It is therefore nonsensical to halt all tenancy disputes[Norinsho(1935):150].

These are the utterances by the tenancy official of *Osaka* to the official of the Ministry of Home Affairs under the control of which the notorious security police brought pressure upon every social movements[For details about the security police in prewar Japan, see *Mitchell(1976)*].⁽¹⁰⁾ Yukawa Motoi, the head of agricultural policy in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry(Norinsho), also said that;

The main duties of tenancy officials are to improve the tenancy customs as well as the conditions of tenancy. It should not be forgotten [that]. . . . [i]f tenancy disputes are swept away, we will be in difficulty because of the loss of opportunities to improve tenancy customs through tenancy disputes[*ibid.:158*].

These statements by officials of Norinsho, who had cautiously tried to avoid quarrels with the Ministry of Home Affairs, stressed the societally objective functions which had characterized tenant farmers' unions(village unions) from its beginning. They also implied that such societal functions of village unions became dysfunctional because of the decline of socio-political power(*sozial Macht!*) during the 1930s as a result of oppression from above and of the disruption within villages already described.

Thus village tenant farmers sought after 'not the burning of villages to ashes(*sic*) but their resurrection at all costs by means of union movements of tenant farmers[Nishina, 25 May 1922].' It was emphatically declared at the same time that such movements were 'based on the villagers' lands where tenant farmers reside permanently. [i]t was tenant farmers' responsibility not only to guarantee but also to manage their lives, village assets and endowments completely by such tenant farmers' movements[Nakamiya branch member(1923) in *Aoki:109*].' Village unions were 'neither ideological nor political as a matter of course but an economic

organization' which tried to realize specific goals such as 'Let land be distributed to those who cultivate so as to fill up villages with villagers who actually cultivate [Maekawa(1924) in Aoki:143].'

This is the basic position of the peasant movement during the last quarter of the Taisho era(1912-25), the prime mover of which was tenant farmers' unions based not only on the common sense of villagers but also on collective action, which was in turn restricted by village territoriality. A certain progressive civil servant-cum- scholar, who was the member of the so-called "annex of the tenancy section" in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, where a great deal of effort has been spent in vain in promoting the enactment of Tenancy Bills, aptly though circumlocutiously pointed out that;

Thus country gentlemen as owners of lands can secure not only a measurable economic value from land but also something seen as intangible but durable by villagers. Such intangible value, i.e. social value, monopolized by landlords gave them a great deal of pleasure. Whereas the economic value of land as a first principle stemmed from intercourse between human beings and lands, social value was secondary in the sense that it was created from the interactions among people and attached to the economic value of land. In other words, while economic value of land is, as it were, an estimation of the results accumulated by those working on farm land, social value is derived from the meta-economic criticism by villagers of the result of economic activities[Ono(1925):202-3].

It is an abstruse expression, but if we understand that 'social value' and the concomitant social dignity and prestige enjoyed by landlords also signified ironical attitudes by tenant farmers towards landlords who never actually worked on the farm to produce economic values, and whose presence therefore made no sense to tenant farmers, then 'meta-economic criticism' signifies here not only the activities of production *per se* but tenancy disputes themselves. In this sense, the economic

values of what tenant farmers produce on the land itself was seen as identical with tenancy disputes[For further arguments about the social value of land, see *Macfarlane(1978):Chap.1*]. Indeed, for tenant farmers, to produce was to struggle.

III. Rational Peasants Within Moral Economy.

So far we have examined collective action by tenant farmers and their collective consciousness especially during the first quarter of the 1920s. In this examination, we repeatedly reminded ourselves that the first objective of tenant farmers' movements was the establishment of village unions to cope with landlords. It should be noted that the challenge to landlords relied heavily upon village common sense which was strongly imbued with pre- or anti-modern opposition to modern property right of land as prescribed in the state norms. In this respect, landlords appeared as modern subjects by comparison with tenant farmers whose specific behaviour was accounted for by the territoriality of village land. Furthermore we remarked that by their very nature such tenant farmers' movements had little, if any, ability to cope with small resident landlords.

It is therefore likely that appraisals should emerge such as one to the effect that ' [t]enancy dispute was in part but incompletely the restoration movement of the village community [*Saito(1989):276*]. ' We can agree with it, only on condition that it is compared to the evolutionistic modernists' arguments that have represented the relations between landlords and tenant farmers as (semi-)feudal. For modernists having such syllogisms, tenancy disputes were the modernizing factor, and hence tenant farmers were modernizers opposing to pre-modern landlords, just because the relations between landlords and tenant farmers were (semi-)feudal[For their representative arguments, see *Nishida(1975 & 1978)*].

Modernists concepts apart, Saito's argument is brilliant but somewhat misleading. His shortcomings become apparent when he describes the specific relation between tenancy disputes in the 1930s and the emperor system-cum-Japanese fascism. Saito noted that 'the very fact that the restoration movement of the village community, as a tenancy dispute seeking to amend the modern legal rules of the Civil Code, took the same direction as Japanese fascism[Saito(1989):252].' He simply asserts here that tenant farmers were irrational(non-rational) agents for the sole reason that tenancy disputes had a reactionary side which happened to prove favourable to the establishment of the hegemony of Japanese fascists' movements. It is not a heuristic but a functional explanation from the vantage point of the present. On this point he has gone too far.

As has been stressed in this essay and elsewhere, 'one sees a peasant as a man who is in effective control of a piece of land to which he has long been attached by ties of tradition and sentiment[Redfield(1989):19]' and, at the same time, '[a] farm. . . . bears its name. . . . [l]and is a unique value. . . . [a] social rather than an economic value[Thomas & Znaniecki(1918):161, 190].' No one can deny the proposition that land is 'loaded with symbolic values[Wolf(1966):15].' In this sense, tenancy disputes were a tiger's leap into the past with their attachments to the past, which were undoubtedly a powerful 'meta-economic' criticism of the idea of modern property right. In fact, it is undeniable that tenancy disputes were non-modern and their position in a general sense looked backwards[See Calhoun(1982 & 1988)].

However, it does not necessarily mean that they were absolutely irrational or non-rational in an economic sense. It is because, seen from the point of view of methodological individualism, collective action was, for tenant farmers, the provision of public or collective goods by overcoming the so-called "Prisoner's Dilemma" and "Free-Rider Problems" [See Olson(1965) in general and Hayami(1980) in particular]. They could economize both the initial and transaction costs of organizing their union-cum-political entrepreneur[Frohlich & Oppenheimer(1978)] by virtue of an

already existing organization, i.e. the village community. Whereas their behaviours for the improvement of their tenurial conditions were economically rational seen from the point of view of the so-called "cost-benefit" calculation, the measures available to them to provide collective actions were obviously pre-modern, therefore, non-rational. Indeed, tenant farmers carried their collective actions into execution with "limited rationality," which meant that their movements had the *Janus*-like characteristics of two faces, *modernity* and its reverse *pre-modernity* exactly derived from the former[See "the reactionary radicals" and the self-criticism in *Calhoun(1982 & 1988)*].

The oft-cited passages of Marx's analysis of Bonapartism described peasantry as 'potatoes in a sack [which] fill sackfuls of potatoes[*Marx(1979):187*].' And he insisted that '[t]hey cannot represent themselves, they must be represented. [t]heir representative must appear at the same time as their master, as an authority over them[*Ibid.:187-8*].' Although Marx's analysis is helpful, it is so as 'the mid-19th century model of the peasantry[*Hobsbawm(1973):4*. See also *Alavi(1973)*].' Proceeding beyond Marx's argument, Eric Hobsbawm emphasized the solidarity of peasants; 'A full class consciousness is conceivable here, insofar as differentiation within the peasantry is secondary to common characteristics of all peasants, and their common interests against other groups is sufficiently clear[*Ibid.:7*].' From yet another perspective, E.P.Thompson stressed that 'class itself is not a thing, it is a happening' on the ground that 'if we stop history at a given point, then there are no classes, but simply a multitude of individuals with a multitude of experiences [Thompson(1968):939,1].'

Village common sense or 'the unwritten popular code', in the above mentioned sense, is a 'negative class consciousness[*Hilton(1973):130*. For the strong version of Hilton's, see *Elster(1985):346-7*]' collectively discovered by tenant farmers themselves through tenancy disputes(happenings). As Robert Michels pointed out in his seminal work, 'It is not the simple *existence* of oppressive conditions, but it is

the *recognition of these conditions by the oppressed*, which in the course of history has constituted the prime factor of class struggles[*Michels(1962):228*, his italics]. ' We have to emphasize, in this respect, not that peasants could not ' represent themselves ' but that peasants *did* represent themselves through the village community. Therefore, what we have to interpret is the social mechanisms which compelled peasants to be represented despite and independently of the intentions contained in their village common sense. To put it in other words, the processes by which peasants, organized as a village community, represented themselves politically, are, *at the same time*, identical with the processes in which that they were organized as a village community, and led to their being represented by someone or something alien from peasants, i.e. their master, an authority, and *our emperor*[See *Nagahara(1989)*].

Last but by no means least, as is well known, fascism as also other forms of modern capitalism to a lesser degree, to legitimize itself, has tried to appease the rank and file within the nation. Because tenant farmers were organized as a village community in support of claims against landlords and against the state, the emperor system-cum-Japanese fascism paid a great deal of attention to the tenant farmers' way of integrating the villages in organizing themselves. The emperor system devised a social mechanism for the government recruiting the consensus of tenant farmers exactly on the lines of tenant farmers combination against landlords. In this respect, the replaced plebeian village common sense was the common sense of the emperor system-cum-Japanese fascism. This device was the cheapest way available to the emperor system.

Japanese fascism in fact took control of pre-modern villages at large, economizing both the initial and transaction costs of organizing the peasantry, with the result that village common sense, once shorn of its ability to criticize the state, was finally incorporated into the state common sense(the state norm). To realize the Japanese road to a fascist régime by means of such a peculiar consensus-building, a sweeping

structural transformation of the public sphere[See *Habermas(1989)*] was synchronized with a concomitant turnabout in social movements in the Showa era(1926-) in which the emergence of new bargaining politics replaced plebeian village common sense[See *Przeworski(1985)*].

To advance this argument further, we have to elucidate the 'Peasant World' in the context of the 'Capital World,' because, as Marx has pointed out in the preface to the first edition of *Das Kapital*, '*Le mort saisit le vif!*'

【NOTES】

- (1). "Limited rationality" in this essay is not necessarily identical with the concepts coined in rational-choice theory such as "satisficing", "bounded rationality", and the likes. To avoid jargon-ridden ambiguities, by "limited rationality", we would like purport to mean the strategically analytic notion which denotes rational behaviour being contingent upon historico-circumstantial constraints. In this respect, although we should have discussed so-called altruistic behaviours, social norms, and failure of rationality in general, we dissuaded ourselves from going deep into these topics for the simplicity of this essay. For the details of these arguments, see *Simon(1955 & 1956)*, *Elster(1979 & 1989)*, and *March(1978)*.
- (2). "Common sense", in a dictionary sense, is the 'The endowment of natural intelligence possessed by rational beings; ordinary, normal or average understanding; the plain wisdom which is every man's inheritance[*The Oxford English Dictionary, 1970 edition*].' In the light of the definition above, "common sense" in this essay is not a mature term to denote what follows for the interpretation of peasants' feelings. Yet, for the time being, we would like to use this term in order to signify the palpably shared everyday feelings or sentiments which are endogenously generated and historically accumulated among people. Moreover we venture to say that it belongs to the dominant ideology derived from "inter-subjectivity" [See *Abercrombie et al.*]. See also note (7) below.
- (3). The JPU announced the declaration, three-point program, and twenty-one claims in 1922. The first paragraph of the declaration stated that 'Agriculture is the basis of the state, and the peasant is the treasure of the state.' And the three programs were the following; (1) We seek after the accomplishment(*sic*) of rural culture by virtue of developing knowledge, improving skill, fostering moral character, and enjoying rural life. (2) We, by virtue of mutual love and mutual

help, believe in each other and proceed together, and thereby seek after the betterment of rural life. (3) We seek after the common ideals by virtue of sound, steady, rational, and legal measures [*Nomin kumiai shi kankokai(1964):153-4*]. The declaration, as well as the three-point program, was coloured with Agrarianism. Such agrarianism was rejected, and then disappeared in the 1930s as the Marxian thought dominated and radicalized the fundamental directions of the central unions.

- (4). The old village was called *Oaza*, which was a communal entity far different from the new village created by the Meiji government as an administrative device to govern nations. That is not to say that the old villages were not created artificially. They were created in the middle of the 17th century by medieval seigneurs to collect the feudal land tax and corvée [See *Oshima(1977)* and *Steiner(1965)*]. But having acknowledged that traditions were invented in Hobsbawm's sense [*Hobsbawm(1983)*], old villages were invented, and came to be identified as communal entities embracing the villagers. Hereafter, we use the term old village (*oaza*) as a village community.
- (5). As was declared in the program of the JPU, the union aimed at association for the improvement of agricultural skill(technology). Hence, the union was not merely the negotiation body for the tenurial conditions but the organization in which peasants could exchange information about husbandry for the improvement of production skills.
- (6). *Nigatsuchi* means "bitter soil" in Japanese, while *Amatsuchi* means "sweet soil." The former is a local name for property rights as such and the latter represents the so-called usufruct.
- (7). Within the so-called methodological individualism, it is economically natural for a rational peasant – self-interested maximizer, "hedonistic" social agent, or Homo Economicus – to try to gain from collective action without contribution to collective action. Hence, it is likely that a rational agent fails to provide collective action. This is known as the "Prisoner's Dilemma" and "Free-Rider Problems" in rational-choice theory.

To overcome such difficulty, both institutional and non-rational factors are mobilized. Blackballing or social ostracism is only one of them. In this sense, by limited rationality at the outset of this essay, we mean the specific situation of rational choice (decision making); to avoid the failure to provide collective action, rational peasants mobilize the non-rational "resources" such as pre-modern institution, sentiment (common sense), traditionality, and so forth. See *Olson (1965), Hardin (1982) and Little (1989)*.

- (8). To is 18.039 litre.
- (9). Those who had no identifiable kinship with resident villagers and those who temporarily stayed in the village were regarded as outsiders. They sometimes were called travelers or townsmen.
- (10). The tenancy official system was based on the Tenancy Arbitration Law (1924), which was devised to function as an amalgamation of administrative and legal measure to alleviate tenancy disputes in the absence of the passage of the tenancy bill into legislation. A tenancy official was the executive official whose appointment and dismissal were administered by the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, but whose offices were set up in the prefectural offices. For details of the system, see [*Saito (1989)*].

【 REFERENCES 】

- ABERCROMBIE, N. *et al.*, 1980. *The Dominant Ideology Thesis*, London: Allen and Unwin.
- ALAVI, H., 1973. "Peasant Classes and Primordial Loyalties," *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol.1, No.1.
- AOKI, K., 1976. *Nihon nomin undo shi shiryō shusei* (Collected Documents of Japanese Peasant Movements), Vol.1, Tokyo: San'ichi shobo.
- BARDHAN, P. and A. RUDRA, 1986. "Labour Mobility and the Boundaries of the Village

- Moral Economy," *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol.13, No.3.
- BERGER,P. and T.LUCKMANN,1966. *The Social Construction of Reality*, London: Pelican.
- BRAY,F.,1986. *The Rice Economies*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- CALHOUN,C.J.,1982. *The Question of Class Struggle*, Oxford: University of Chicago Press.
- ,1988. "The radicalism of tradition and the question of class struggle," in TAYLOR,M.(ed.).
- CALLINICOS,A.,1987. *Making History*, Oxford: Polity.
- EISENSTADT,S.N. and L.RONIGER,1984, *Patrons, clients and friends*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ELSTER,J.,1979. *Ulyssese and Sirens*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ,1985. *Making Sense of Marx*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ,1989. *Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- FOSTER,G.M.,1962. *Traditional Cultures and the Impact of Technological Change*, New York: Harper and Brothers.
- FROHLICH,N. & J.A.OPPENHEIMER,1978. *Modern Political Economy*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- FUJII,T.,1975. *Yanagita Kunio nosei ronshu*(Collected Works of Yanagita Kunio on Agricultural Political Economy), Tokyo: Hosei daigaku shuppan kyoku.
- FUKUSHIMA,M.,1986(originally issued in 1939). "Kyu toki ho no seitei to sono igi" (The Enactment of Old Registration Act and Its Significance), in Nihon Shihoshoshi Rengokai(ed.), *Fudosan toki seido no rekishi to tenbo*(History and Perspective of Registration Systems), Tokyo: Yuhikaku.
- FURUSHIMA,T.,1953. *Warichi seido to nochi kaikaku*(Systems of Repartition and Land Reform), Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppan kai.
- FUSE,T.,1931. *Kosaku sogi ni taisuru horitsu senjutsu*(Legal Tactics for Tenancy Disputes), Tokyo: Asano shoten.
- GYOSEI,C.,1922. "Shinkoni hyakusho o sukuu michi ha nanika?" (What is the exact way to relieve peasants?), *Tochi to Jiyu*(Land and Freedom), No.6, 25 June. *Tochi*

- to Jiyu* is the newspaper issued from Nihon Nomin Kumiai(Japan Peasants' Union). Hereafter cited as *TJ*.
- HABERMAS,J.,1976. *Legitimation Crisis*, Cambridge:Polity.
- — —,1989(first published 1962). *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, transl. by T.Burger, Mass.:MIT Press.
- HARDIN,R.,1982. *Collective Action*, Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press.
- HAYAMI,Y.,1980. "Economic Approach to Village Community and Institution," *Journal of Rural Development*, No.3.
- HILTON,R.,1973. *Bond Men Made Free*, London:Methuen.
- HOBSBAWM,E.,1973. "Peasants and Politics," *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol.1, No.1, Oct.
- — —,1983. "Inventing Traditions," in HOBSBAWM,E. and T.RANGER(eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
- HOSTON,G.A.,1986. *Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan*, New Jersey:Princeton University Press.
- ISOBE,T.,1978. " 'Toyohara tochi' hensei no kento" (Explorations on the Formation of 'Land of Toyohara'), in Toyohara Kenkyu kai(ed.), *Toyohara mura*, Tokyo: Nogyo sogo kenkyusho.
- ITOH,M.,1980. *Value and Crisis*, New York:Monthly Review Press.
- IWAUCHI,Z.1922. "Waga kuni nomin undo no hoko" (Some Directions of Peasant Movements in our Country), *TJ*, No.3, 25 May.
- KAGAWA,T.1922. "Tochi to jiyu" (Land and Freedom), *TJ*, No.1, 27 Jan.
- KAN,T.,1975. *Tenno ron noto*(Notes on Issues of Emperor), Tokyo:Tabata shoten.
- KELLY,W.W.,1982. *Irrigation Management in Japan*, Ithaca:Cornell University East Asian Papers No.30.
- KENSETTSUSHA DOMEI SHI KANKO IINKAI,1979. *Waseda daigaku kensetsusha domei no rekishi*(The History of Waseda University Kensetsusha League), Tokyo:Nihon shakaito kikanshikyoku.
- KIMURA,S.,1932. *Gendai nomin undo no tenbo*(Perspectives of Contemporary Peasant Movements), Tokyo:Hakuyo sha.

- KITAMURA,T.,1950 & 1973. *Nihon kangai suiri kanko no shiteki kenkyu*(Historical Studies of Customary Rules on the Utilization of Irrigation water in Japan), 2 vols., Tokyo:Iwanami shoten.
- KOIWAI,J.,1925. "Tochi kokuyū no mondai" (The Problem of Nationalization of Land), *TJ*, No.37, 24 Jan.
- KONDO,Y.,*et al.*,1953. *Kanko kosaku ken no seiritsu to doyo*(The Formation of Customary Rights of Tenancy and Its Destablizations), Tokyo:mimeo.
- LITTLE,D.,1989. *Understanding Peasant China:Case Studies in the Philosophy of Social Science*, New Haven:Yale University Press.
- MACFARLANE,A.,1978. *The Origins of English Individualism*, Oxford:Basil Blackwell.
- MAEKAWA,S.,1924. "(Dai san kai Nichino taikai) taikai kanso" (Impressions on the Third National Meeting of Japan Peasants' Union), in AOKI.
- MATSUO,T.,1989. "Peasant Movements and Traditional Solidarities in Rural Communities" (1)(2), *Keizai shirin*, Vol.56, No.4 and Vol.57, No.2.
- MARCH,J.G.,1986(first appeared in 1978). "Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice," in ELSTER,J.(ed.),1986. *Rational Choice*, Oxford:Basil Blackwell.
- MARX,K.,1979. *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, in *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels:Collected Works*, Vol.11, Moscow:Progress Publishers.
- MENGAR,A.,1962(first published in 1904). *The Right to the Whole Produce of Labour*, transl.by M.E.Tanner, New York:Kelly.
- MICHELS,R.,1962. *Political Parties*, New York:Free Press.
- MIGDAL,J.S.,1974. *Peasant, Politics, and Revolution*, New Jersey:Princeton University Press.
- MICHELL,R.H.,1976. *Thought Control in Prewar Japan*, Ithaca:Cornell University Press.
- MIZUTANI,C.,1926. *Hotei ni okeru kosaku sogi*(Tenancy Disputes in the Court), Tokyo:Dojin sha.
- MOORE,B.Jr.,1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, London:Penguin.
- MOORE,M.,1972. "On Not Defining Peasants," *Peasant Studies Newsletter*, Vol.1, No.4.

- NAKADA,K.,1985(first published in 1926). "Tokugawa jidai no fudosan tanpo ho"
(Mortgage Law in Tokugawa régime), in do., *Hosei shi ronshu*(Collected Articles on
History of Jurisprudence), Vol.2, Tokyo:Iwanami shoten.
- NAKAMIYA BRANCH,1923. "Kosakunin no tachiba kara" (From the Standpoint of
Tenant Farmers), in AOKI.
- NAKAMURA,K.,1968, *Miyagi ken nomin undo shi*(The History of Peasant Movements of
Miyagi Prefecture), Nihon hyoron sha.
- NAKAZAWA,B.,1923. *Gifu ken ni okeru kosaku mondai no kenkyu*(Studies on Tenancy
Problems in Gifu Prefecture), Tokyo:Ganshodo.
- ,1924a. *Kosaku mondai no shin tenkai*(The New Phase of Tenancy Problems),
Tokyo:Waseda Taibun sha.
- ,1924b. *Nomin seikatsu to kosaku mondai*(Peasant Life and Tenancy Problems),
Tokyo:Ganshodo.
- NAGAHARA,Y.,1989. *Tennosei kokka to nomin*(The Emperor System and Peasants),
Tokyo:Nihon keizai hyoron sha.
- ,1990. "Shijo to kishosei no boryoku" (Market and Violence of Scarcity),
Studies in Market History, No.8.
- NARA,M.,1928. *Kosaku hoan no gensei hihan*(Strict Critiques of the Tenancy Bill),
Tokyo:Sobunkaku.
- NISHIDA,Y.,1975. "Nomin undo no hatten to jinushisei" (The Development of Peasant
Movements and the Landlordism), in *Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi*(Symposium on
Japanese History), Vol.18, Tokyo:Iwanami shoten.
- ,1978. "Showa kyokoki ni okeru nomin undo no tokushitsu" (The Specific
Properties of the Peasant Movements during the Showa Crisis), in Tokyo daigaku
shakai kagaku kenkyusho(ed.), *Showa Kyoko*(Showa Crisis), Vol.1 of *Fashizumuki
no kokka to shakai*(The State and Society Under Fascism), Tokyo:Tokyo daigaku
shuppan kai.
- NISHINA,Y.,1922. "Nomin shokun to yuku" (Together with Peasants), *TJ*, No.3, 25
March.
- ,1922. "Shibu meguri" (On Visiting Branches), *TJ*, No.5, 25 May.

- ,1922. "Kosaku sogi ni tsuiteno kanso" (Impressions on Tenancy Disputes), *TJ*, No.5, 25 May.
- ,1922. "Kosakunin mondai no konpon ha ikan" (Where is the Essential Problems of Tenant Farmers?), *TJ*, No.9, 25 Sept.
- ,1922. "Kosaku ken no shucho" (Claims for Tenant Right), *TJ*, No.11, 25 Nov.
- ,1923. "Dai jinushi no tokai kyoju ni tsuite" (On the Big Landlords living in the City), *TJ*, No.16, 25 Feb.
- ,1923. "Jinushi ha kokuzoku ka" (Landlords are the Enemies against our Country, Aren't They?), *TJ*, No.19, 25 July.
- NOMIN KUMIAI SHI KANKOKAI,1964. *Nomin kumiai undo shi*(The History of Peasant Movements), revised and enlarged edition, Tokyo:Nihon minsei chosakai.
- NORINSHO,1926. *Honpo kosaku kanko*(Customs of Tenancy in Japan), Tokyo:Norinsho.
- ,1927. *Dai kyu kai chiho kosakukan kaigiroku*(The Proceedings of the Fourth Meeting of Local Tenant Officials), Tokyo:Norinsho.
- ,1935. *Dai kyu kai chiho kosaku kan kaigiroku*(The Proceedings of the Ninth Meeting of Local Tenant Officials), Tokyo:Norinsho.
- ,1957. *Nomu tenmatsu*(Details of Agriculture), Vol.6, Tokyo:Norinsho.
- ,1926-27. *Kosaku chotei nenpo*(Annual Report of Tenancy Arbitration), Tokyo: Norinsho.
- ,1928-40. *Kosaku nenpo*(Annual Report of Tenancy), Tokyo:Norinsho.
- ,1972. *1970nen sekai noringyo sensasu nogyo shuraku chosa hokokusho*(Report on Agricultural Village:World Census of Agriculture and Forestry), Tokyo: Norinsho.
- NOSHOMUSHO,1922. *Kosaku sogi ni kansuru chosa*(Inquiries on Tenancy Disputes), 2 Vols., Tokyo.
- OLSON,M.,1965. *The Logic of Collective Action*, Mass.:Harvard University Press.
- ONISHI,T.,1930. *Nomin undo no michi*(Roads to Peasant Movement), Tokyo:Kibokaku.
- ONO,T.,1925. *Nomin undo no genzai oyobi shorai*(Present and Future of Peasant Movement), Tokyo:Nihon gakujutsu hukyukai.
- ,1931. *Tochi keizai kosho*(Investigations on Land Economy), Tokyo:Ganshodo

- shoten.
- OSHIMA,M.,1977. *Meiji no mura*(Villages in Meiji), Tokyo:Kyoikusha.
- OTA,T.,1925. *Noson shakai mondai no sukyo*(Trends of Rural Problems), Tokyo:Nihon hyoron sha.
- PRZEWORSKI,A.,1985. *Capitalism and Social Democracy*, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
- POLANYI,K.,1957. "The Economy As Instituted Process" in POLANYI,K. *et al. Trade and Market in the Early Empires*, Illinois:Falcon's Wing Press.
- POPKIN,S.L.,1979. *The Rational Peasant*, Berkeley:University of California Press.
- REDFIELD,R.,1989(first published in 1956). *The Little Community and Peasant Society and Culture*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- SAITO,H.,1989. *Nogyo mondai no tenkai to jichi sonraku*(The Development of Agricultural Problems and Autonomous Village Communities), Tokyo:Nihon keizai hyoron sha.
- SAKAMOTO,T.,1922. "Kanto rengokai yori" (From the Kanto Federation), *TJ*, No.5, 25 May.
- SCOTT,J.C.,1976. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*, New Haven:Yale University Press.
- ,1985. *Weapons of the Weak*, New haven:Yale University Press.
- SHANIN,T.,1972. *The Awkward Class*, Oxford:Clarendon Press.
- ,1973. "The Nature and Logic of the Peasant Economy I," *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol.1, No.1.
- ,1987. "Peasant as a concept," in do.(ed.), *Peasants and Peasant Societies*, 2nd Edition, London:Penguin.
- SHOBARA,T.,1927. *Nomin kumiai ron*(On Peasants' Union), Tokyo:Shakai hyoron sha.
- SIMON,H.A.,1955. "A behavioral model of rational choice," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 69.
- ,1956. "Rational choice and the structure of the environment," *Psychological Review*, 63.
- SKOCPOL,T.,1979. *States and Social Revolutions*, Cambridge:Cambridge University

- Press.
- ,1982. "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?," in Weller,R.P.(eds.), *Power and Protest in the Countryside*, North Carolina:Duke University Press.
- SMETHURST,R.J.,1974. *A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- ,1986. *Agricultural Development and Tenancy Disputes in Japan,1870-1940*, New Jersey:Princeton University Press.
- SMITH,H.,1972. *Japan's First Student Radicals*, Mass.:Harvard University Press.
- SMITH,R.,1967. "The Japanese Rural Community:Norms, Sanctions and Ostracism," in J.M.POTTER(ed.), *Peasant Society*, Berkeley:University of California Press.
- STEINER,K.,1965. *Local Government in Japan*, California:Stanford University Press.
- SUEHIRO,I.,1977(first published in 1924). *Noson horitsu mondai*(Studies on Rural Laws), in *Meiji Taisho nosei keizai meicho shu*(Collected Seminal Works on Agricultural Political Economy during Meiji and Taisho), Vol.16, Tokyo:Nosangyoson bunka kyokai.
- SUGIYAMA,M.,1924. "Kosaku mondai to choson jichi" (Tenancy Problems and Municipal Autonomy), *TJ*, No.35, 11 Nove.
- ,1924. "Iwayuru noson shinko saku" (The So-called Rural Promotion Policy), *TJ*, No.26, 25 Feb.
- ,1926. *Kosaku sogi no jissai*(Actualities of Tenancy Disputes), Tokyo:Keimei sha.
- TACHIKAWA,K.,1922. "Kosaku nomin no shimei" (Missions of Tenant Farmers), *TJ*, No.12, 25 Dec.
- TAYLOR,M.(ed.),1988. *Rationality and Revolution*, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
- THOMAS,W.I.& F.Znaniiecki,1918. *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, Boston: The Gorham Press.
- THOMPSON,E.P.,1968. *The Making of the English Working Class*, London:Penguin.
- UNIDENTIFIED,1925. "Kochi no shiyu mondai" (On the Issue of Private Ownership of Land), *TJ*, No.41, 10 May.
- ,1925. "Kosaku ken no kakuritsu" (The Establishment of Tenant Rights),

TJ(Osaka edition), No.47, 6 Nov.

———, "Kosakunin no tachiba kara" (From the Standpoint of Tenant Farmer), in
AOKI.

WOLF, E.R., 1966. *Peasants*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

YANAGITA, K., 1969. *Teihon Yanagita Kunio shu* (Complete Works of Yanagita Kunio),
Tokyo: Chikuma shobo.

YONEMURA, S., 1930. "Kosaku sogi to minji saiban" (Tenancy disputes and Civil
Cases), *Horitsu Jiho*, Vol.2, No.10.

YOSHIDA, K., 1924. "Jisakuno sosetsu no otoshiana" (Pitfalls of the Policy to Establish
Owner Farmers), *TJ*, No.26, 24 Feb.