紀要論文

債権者間の協調の失敗と大口債権者

The Role of Large Creditors in Debt Defaults Due to Coordination Failure

jpn

00229741

https://doi.org/10.15002/00003199

法政大学経済学部学会

71

1

191

221

2003-07-05

Version of Record

Large creditors can exercise a disproportionate influence on the likelihood of debt defaults due to coordination failure. Even though the fundamentals are sound, concern of premature foreclosure by a single large creditor may give rise to preemptive actions by others and the consequent liquidation of the distressed borrower's assets can cause self-fulfilling debt defaults. To examine the influence of large creditors on coordination problems faced by creditors, this paper offers a model where a large creditor and a continuum of small creditors independently decide whether to foreclose on the loan based on their private information about fundamentals. Without common knowledge of fundamentals, the incidence of failure is uniquely determined. Comparative statistics on the unique equilibrium provides several insights on the role of large creditors. Our results show that the smaller the size of the large creditor is, the more the borrower is vulnerable to premature foreclosure. We also find that high degree of large creditor's information accuracy reduces the probability of the failure.

Article

AN00071028