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A Sketch on The Hauntology of Capital:

Towards Theory of Community

Yutaka Nagahara

—*Tarō Matsuo in memoriam*

How to Mourn Him to *Conjure* Him (Up)?

Each single one of memories and situations of expectancy which demonstrate the libido's attachment to the lost object is met by the verdict of reality that the object no longer exists; and the ego, confronted as it were with the question whether it shall share this fate, is persuaded by the sum of the narcissistic satisfactions it derives from being alive to sever its attachment to the object that has been abolished. (Freud)

Unlike Freud, to mourn her or his passing should be not to sort her or him out in the understandable *savoir/pouvoir* just in order for the alive to be able to sedate its anxiety and then re-establish the order. Rather we have to *soliciter*—in a full sense of the word, *sollicitāre*—the passing to haunt ourselves.

The late professor Tarō Matsuo, especially in his closing years, thought (about) the co-existence of modernity and pre-modernity (the binary of which will be dismantled later though), and its socio-historical *signification* associated with it. He, as a student of economic history, reformulated this problematique as and upon the relationship

between an advent of capitalist-system and *its* traditional community. Only in this regard did he try to ascetically (of course in a Weberian sense of the word) establish the *Theory* of Community even though and/or while he was an able and patient historian. Rather, it must be said, his historiographical works throughout his academic life should be seen as always, if not explicitly, motivated by his theoretical ambition to built the very *Theory* of Community (re)thought from the comparative viewpoint of history. This long-standing ambition of his apparently flowered and culminated in his very last *theoretical* work by still exploiting his own field (Ireland Question),¹ about which I unfortunately have to have another chance to examine in detail.²

Although what I shall attempt here is to take a very first step at once to take over and overtake—if possible—his own project *interrupted* by, sadly enough, an unexpected end of his *physical* life, I would promote my own project by getting myself positioned *in distanz* from his own.³ This *distanz* must be very important for me not to simply follow but to translate his project from my own standpoint. My own way to translate Matsuo's project is being given a clear direction by two following discourses:

1 M. Tarō, "Hisao Otsuka's *The Principle of the traditional community (Kyodotai no Kisoriron)*— as a framework of references for the Study of the nationalistic movements in Ireland," *The Journal of Political Economy and Economic History (Tochiseidoshigaku)*, Vol. XL, No. 1, 1997.

2 It might be strange for some Japanese readers that this note includes some very general knowledge about the history of Japanese marxians. It is because that this short note is originated in the essay read, at Annual Meeting of Association for Asian Studies 1997, for those who are not so familiar with the history of Japanese marxians together with Karatani Kōjin *et al.* This note is a revised version. I would appreciate all the comments I had at that moment.

3 See Y. Nagahara, "Class 'Is' An Undecidable Proper-name of Those Who Go By: The Style of the historiographical predicative/supplément in E. P. Thompson," *Shiso*, no. 890, 1998.

Répétition *et* première fois, voilà peut-être la question de l'événement comme question du fantôme: qu'est-ce qu'un fantôme? qu'est-ce que l'effectivité ou la *présence* d'un spectre, c'est-à-dire de ce qui semble rester aussi ineffectif, virtuel, inconsistant qu'un simulacre? Y a-t-il là, entre la chose même et son simulacre, une opposition qui tienne? Répétition *et* première fois mais aussi répétition *et* dernière fois, car la singularité de toute *première fois* en fait aussi une *dernière fois*. Chaque fois, c'est l'événement même, une première fois est une dernière fois. Toute autre. Mise en scène pour une fin de l'histoire. Appelons cela une *hantologie*. Cette logique de la hantise ne serait pas seulement plus ample et plus puissante qu'une ontologie ou qu'une pensée de l'être (du «to be», à supposer qu'il y aille de l'être dans le «to be or not to be», et rien n'est moins sûr).....*Hamlet* commençait déjà par le retour attendu du roi mort. Après la fin de l'histoire, l'esprit vient en *revenant*, il figure *à la fois* un mort qui revient et un fantôme dont le retour attendu se répète, encore et encore.⁴

and:

I do not applaud Derrida because he has said hello to Marx but because, once again, there is a lesson in reading here. *Specters of Marx* lets me read *Far from Medina* as a ghost dance, a prayer to be haunted, a learning to live at the seam of the past and the present, "a heterodidactics between life and death." (emphases are mine)⁵

I would "translate" these two discourses again into my own as follows (since translation *is* always already re-translation): that is, my style of historiography must be haunted by "La vie des hommes infâmes."⁶ And again this translation should be translated into my current target

4 J. Derrida, *Spectres de Marx*, Paris: Galilée, 1993.

5 G. C. Spivak, "Ghostwriting," *Diacritics*, 25(2), 1995.

6 See Y. Nagahara, "Particules, ou *Qualunque-Quelconque*," *Gendaishiso*, forthcoming.

that is to re-think the marxian epistemology of history under the *pre/text* (literally and figuratively) of the so-called *Debate on Japanese Capitalism* (which, henceforth, I shall simply refer to the “debate”).

My remarks must remain sketchy here, but this strategic starting-over after the collapse of the Berlin Wall involves not generally my personal project of reconsidering the “debate” as an actual intervention⁷ but particularly an ambition I have to “negotiate” with Karatani’s readings of Marx in his masterpiece which came out approximately two decades ago and still echoes deep in my methodology. That is his book, *Marx—the Centre of its Possibility*, which as far as I know is not yet translated, or say, transformed, in English.⁸

Where to start?

Modernity belongs to that small family of theories that both declares and desires universal applicability for itself. (Appadurai)

Thus, the main task here is not to historically and historiographically track down the details of the “debate” as such exhaustively. My special concern instead is aimed at the particular theoretical stance (“instance” in a strict sense of French word), or the “reasonable” obsession that haunts the understandings of Japanese “modernity.” The particular theoretical stance under question here is, roughly speaking, the obsessive assumption that: It is not “capital” but “modernity” that is the source or the libido of both the potential and the necessity to dominate the social⁹ as a whole. Instead, I prefer to insist that this

7 My intervention here is to introduce the fruitful achievement of the Japanese marxian’s theoretical works into the Anglophone countries.

8 For the time being, his *Architecture as Metaphor: Language, Number, Money*, tr. by S. Kohso, ed. by Michael Speaks, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995 is very convenient for the understanding of the kernel of his thought.

9 For “not society but the social,” see E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, London: Verso, 1985.

assumption be inverted in an elaborate manner to enable me to reach the very simple or even naïve conclusion that: It is not “modernity” but “capital” that dominates the social in the last instance, even if this conclusion may appear to be somewhat old-fashioned. To put it in other way, that which exists in our history is not “modernity” by, in, for, and to It/Self but “modernity” specifically seized and in-formed by “capital.” Only in this sense can “modernity” be regarded as being identical to “capital-ism.”

However, I have no intention to rotate the conjuncture at which we are standing counterclockwise so as to return to the age before the advent of deconstruction so-called. Accordingly, I have to be very quick to add that, in order for “capital” to be able to come to terms with the social on which “capital” itself lives, “capital” has the task of incessantly inventing or fabricating something that seems to be at once coexistent and simultaneous with the social, something that allows “capital” to remain inside the social. As I will discuss again shortly, this is because “capital” is extraneous to the social by its definition, comes from *in-between* as such, from *ex-nihilo* if I may borrow the expression Deleuze and Guattari use when they describe the same agenda that I am dealing with right now.¹⁰ *In-between* by which I purport to mean that *In-between* between nodal-points which are belatedly discovered to constitute this *in-between*. You may well suspect that to say that is very tautological or circular, the very point at issue about which I am about to discuss here hypothetically. Anyway, this “something” that capital must fabricate is that which must be called “modernity”, but by no means simply the “modernity” we have commonly believed in: it is specifically the “modernity” that operates or takes place (literally, *avoir-lieu*) within the context of “capital”-ist movement.

The sole ideological task that “capital” demands of “modernity” is

10 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, *L'anti-œdipe: Capitalisme et schizophrénie*, Paris: Minuit, 1972.

to procure the minimum conditions for the accumulation movement of “capital” which is at work on the surface of the social (only through the commodification of labour-power). For “capital,” “modernity” is expected to be not a device that can fully envelop the social, but rather one that enables “capital” to remain on the social. This can be defined as the inevitably “partial modernity” that results from the extraneousness of “capital” to the social, or simply, from the somatic “repression of the social.” The reciprocal relations and/or the necessary discrepancy between this partial “modernity” and the ubiquity of “capital” coerces the social to experience repetitive and material spastic paralyses, because the social has an uncontainable desire to achieve a totality of its own without having recourse to “capital.” This desire is continually invested/cathected by its remembering of (or by the effort not to forget) that which is presumptively imagined to have existed as a totality in the past imagined. The first remedy diagnosed for these spastic paralyses came in the form of the actual territorial closure historically called nation-state. So much so that this nation-state has to face either cyclical or intermittent economic crises or fascisms, sometimes both at once, in the context of the world economy that national economies subsequently constitute. It is from these crises that all ideologies and counter-ideologies emerge and make a “*clinamen*,” and it is towards these crises that not only such repressive apparatuses as technologies and institutions but also new collectivities can be invented or anticipated.

In this regard, some lines from Homi Bhabha’s foreword to Franz Fanon’s *Black Skin, White Masks* should be quoted.¹¹

11 H. Bhabha, “Remembering Fanon: Self, Psyche and the Colonial Condition” foreworded to Franz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, London: Pluto, 1986, pp. xxii, xxv. This somewhat abrupt reference to Franz Fanon has something to do with my frustration towards the recent interpretations of Fanon (including Bhabha). See my essay, “The Getting-Home of D-FENS” (unpublished).

Remembering is never a quiet act of introspection or retrospection..... [It is] a painful re-membering, a putting together of the dismembered past to make sense of the trauma of the present.

Nevertheless, before going any deeper into this problem (and about which this sketch can not talk here at any rate), I feel it necessary to define the kernel point at issue in the “debate.” I am not going to documentate the details of the “debate”, not only because I want to economize my scarce resources but in order to simplify the field with which I am going to deal.¹²

As is well known, the “debate” originated from the establishment of the platform of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), founded in 1922. However, the full-scale “debate” started around 1927, that is, the year of the financial crisis peculiar to the Japanese national economy at that time. The “debate” ended about 1937, when organized financial capital shook itself free from the *Showa Crisis* only in terms of production levels (and only in the industrial sector). To put it schematically, the arguments in the “debate” were precisely over the strategy of the Japanese Revolution, and the participants included on the one hand the pro-JCP *Kōza-ha* and on the other the independent marxists rallying around the journal *Rōnō*, loosely called the *Rōnō-ha*. The *Kōza-ha* insisted on the necessity of first realizing a bourgeois-democratic revolution, which was then immediately to be followed by a socialist one. The *Rōnō-ha* opposed the *Kōza-ha* and insisted on a strategy of promoting the immediate realization of a socialist revolution. The former is usually called the “Two-stage strategy of revolution,” and the latter the “One-stage strategy.”

12 See G. A. Hoston, *Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986; do., *The State, Identity, and the National Question in China and Japan*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. I'm not going to touch these two works here. All I would say about these here is that it's impossible to elucidate the “debate” by simply sorting it out or tracing back through it.

This rivalry stemmed from and revolved around differences in how to interpret the so-called “semi-feudal” factors that continued to dominate rural areas, the so-called “absolutist” form of the state-power (i. e., the emperor-system), as well as the relationship between those two. However, insofar as the phenomenal observation of the “facts” are concerned, both sides equally discovered an adamant stagnation in the stratification of peasants and an under-development of agrarian capitalism as compared to the hyper growth seen in the industrial sector, especially monopoly-capitals. By basing themselves on the “same facts”, yet by dealing with them in different manners, the two sides tried to give “persuasive” explanations for the persistent existence of the “non-modern” communal customs in rural areas and its “conjunctural” meanings, and then proposed different strategies. (I refuse to use the chronological term “*pre-modernity*”, —the reasons for this will be clear shortly.) This being the case, I now have to ask whether or not the theoretical approaches the two sides exploited were different from each other. From my viewpoint, the answer is unequivocal: they were not. (For clarity’s sake, I would skip over any discussion of the interventions made by folklorists such as Kunio Yanagita and others in the 30s. But I have to confess that my standpoint is something close to yet epistemologically different from theirs.)

The Kōza -ha, exploiting such marxian concepts as “non-economic compulsion” (that is to say, *ausserökonomischer Zwang*), saw those persistent “non-modern” or “feudal” remnants in the rural areas as being based on a semi-feudal system of landed property. (Here I want to remind you that Jacques Lacan translated the Freudian “Zwang” into the French word “obsession”, to which I will touch later yet in an indirect way.¹³) And they saw that Japanese capitalism was established on a power-equilibrium between the feudal landlords and the capitalist class. (So much so that the concept of so-called *Bonapartism*

13 See J. Laplanche, *Jean Laplanche: Seduction, Translation, and the Drives*, A Dossier edited by J. Fletcher and M. Stanton, tr. by M. Stanton, Institute of Contemporary Arts London, 1992.

has long been argued in relation to the nature of the emperor-system in Japan.) Therefore, the Kōza-ha claimed that the emperor system, while being relatively independent of yet at the same time predicated upon both constitutive factors, was "absolutist" in its state-form. Comparing this state-form to the western typology of historical processes, the Kōza-ha maintained that it corresponded to the transitional phase from the feudal institutions to the capitalist system. Thus, for the Kōza-ha, the Meiji Restoration was not a bourgeois revolution; it was the re-formation of state-power from the stage of *pure* feudalism (which was defined due to Marx's own unprepared definition in *Capital*.¹⁴) to that of absolutism. Because of this interpretation, the main goal of the Kōza-ha was a bourgeois revolution immediately followed by a socialist one.

On the other hand, the Rōnō-ha put forward a counter-argument that the establishment of capitalism was first and foremost based on the dismantling of the feudal system if not as a whole, and hence there could not exist such an odd architecture as a capitalism that was established on the basis of a feudal landlord system. They insisted that the high land-rent in kind should not be understood by way of so-called non-economic compulsion, but should instead be regarded as a certain kind of rack-rent caused by hyper-competition among peasants over scarce arable lands. They also insisted that the consciousness of the peasants had already been monetarized. In this regard, the landlords and peasants after the Meiji Restoration should be seen as existing in a transitional phase leading towards the formation of an agrarian capitalism that was allegedly to come: for the Rōnō-ha, it is obvious that the peasant's politico-economic consciousness was riv-

14 Marx wrote as follows: "Japan, with its purely feudal organization of landed property and its developed small-scale agriculture, gives a much truer picture of the European Middle Ages than all our history books, dictated as these are, for the most part, by bourgeois prejudices. It is far too easy to be 'liberal' at the expense of the Middle Ages." in *Capital*, vol. I, p. 878.

eted down to the modern right to landed property as defined as commodity in the civil code even if it was delimited by the Imperial Constitution. Like Lenin when he analyzed the Russian peasants, they apparently thought that capitalist development would sooner or later decompose them into the two big classes; proletarians and capitalists. Accordingly the Rōnō-ha argued that the state-power, although it continued to contain remnants of “non-modernity” within it, primarily belonged to and with the category of the bourgeois state. In this respect, the emperor-system was a constitutional monarchy. Thus, the Rōnō-ha *calculated* that the Meiji Restoration had been a bourgeois revolution, and as a result a strategy of calling for an immediate socialist revolution was adopted.

The two camps seem to have adopted different theoretical standpoints. However, as contemporary critiques show, both sides in the “debate” shared a linear model of history, including a linear procession from feudalism to absolutism and then to capitalism (or say, liberalism). Moreover, their frameworks are both equally based on the short-circuit, that is, on a one-to-one correspondence between economic production relation and the state-form, from which they proposed both the mechanical economism of their analyses and the politicism of their actual activities in its return. I must admit that these critiques are basically correct, but I would like to point out that these critiques cannot avoid one pitfall, which is very crucial as far as my framework is concerned. That is, the contemporary critiques overlook that both camps equally presumed a substantiation/fixation of categories which was teleologically or proleptically set out. They first substantiate “modernity” and something other than “modernity” separately, and then attempt to explain the so-called transition, linear or not, between the two. Although all of them seem to talk about the development of “capital”-ism, what they are actually talking about is the degree and extent of achievement of the “modernity” derived from the ideal “modernity”, where we can see, if I may surrender to the

Lacanian knots, the desire to identify “moi idéal” with “idéal du moi” on the mirror in which “surmoi/superego” has already been deployed. (These substantiated terms are also the bases for the binary between Occident and Non-Occident; Not between Orient and Non-Orient.) To return to my subject matter: this is done without any consideration of the particular relationship between “modernity” and “capital.”

For the Kōza-ha, time makes no sense whatsoever; for the Rōnō-ha, time is everything. In any case, they are “dancing” around the Newtonian/Hegelian understanding of “time” with a readily understandable belief that to historicize is to think about time and make a chronological table at once. I would and must criticize this kind of substantiation of both terms of the transition. My intervention there fore might also amount to a critique of the notion of “transition” as such, a critique that nonetheless never abandons the historian’s gaze. In order to make this persuasive, I need to return to Marx.

Aporia

.....the partitioning [*partage*] among multiple figures of aporia does not oppose figures to each other, but instead installs the haunting of the one in the other. (Derrida)

Marx explained the so-called “law of history” by proposing the formulation that “[t]he country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future”, and then named this law “the iron necessity.” Nevertheless, at the same time, he also mentioned, perhaps from the viewpoint of a revolutionary activist, that “we suffer not only from the development of capitalist production, but also from the incompleteness of that development.” And immediately after these propositions he left the very famous lines. Marx said:¹⁵

15 Marx, *Capital*, vol. I, p. 91.

Wir leiden nicht nur von den Lebenden, sondern auch von den Toten. *Le mort saisit le vif!* (We suffer not only from the living, but from the dead. *Le mort saisit le vif!* —The dead man clutches the living!)

The usual way to understand this passage might be through the context of Marx's linear and productivist interpretation of historical development of "capital," against which what we can have as critiques of it are solely Trotsky's, Lenin's, and Gramsci's. I, however, read this as a clue to finding "Marx; the centre of its possibility." Another name for what I am insisting on here is the "Hauntology of Capital."

Marx described the direct exchange of products as follows.¹⁶ You can find these passages where "The Process of Exchange" is discussed. Marx said:

The articles A and B in this case are not as yet commodities, but become so only through the act of exchange. The first way in which an object of utility attains the possibility of becoming an exchange-value is to exist as a non-use-value superfluous to the immediate needs of its owner..... But this relationship of reciprocal isolation and foreignness does not exist for the members of a primitive community of natural origin..... The exchange of commodities begins where communities have their boundaries, at their points of contact with other communities, or with members of the latter. However, as soon as products have become commodities in the external relations of a community, they also, by reaction, become commodities in the internal life of the community.

This argument can be seen as the articulation of the following three

¹⁶ Marx, *Capital*, vol. I, pp. 181-2.

points:

First, the very basis on which commodity can become commodity issues from the exchange as such. **Second**, this exchange takes place (*avoir lieu*) at the non-territorial sphere or the boundary/limit of communities, which, at the same time, involves not only the recognition of the “other” as the “other” but also the confirmation of the encounter with the “other” in and through that cognitive/communicative process. **Third**, “by reaction,” this exchange, or say, communication penetrates and dissolves communities, and finally transmutes them into the pure “world of commodities,” from which, interestingly enough, Marx started his arguments on value. Which means that Marx presumed a capitalist commodity in order to demonstrate the process of formation of capitalist commodity.

These logical—epistemological—processes, Marx believes, are identical with those of the establishment of *possessive individualism* in terms of the social as Crawford Macpherson succinctly describes it.¹⁷ (And I am tempted to call it *obsessive individualism*.) Marx’s theoretical formulations here have, as their point of departure, one premise which neither is, nor needs to be, logically verified. That is, in these formulations, it must always already be assumed that there exist at least two closed communities that are expected to be the very moment at and by which the “other” can be recognized as the “other.” For Marx, in order for products to be recognized as commodities, it is logically necessary at once to recognize and to fabricate the “other” as the “other,” only through this process of which can the encounter/exchange of products be achieved. However, this exchange-process at the same time is recognized as being that of both formation and affirmation of identity or self-interest. At any rate we have been understanding this process as the establishment of a “modernity” that allegedly covers the social as a whole. That is known as the Haberma-

17 C. B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.

sian thesis such as "The Dominant Ideology Thesis."¹⁸

But what we have to have in mind right here is that this "other" cannot and must not consist of familiar others who co-belong to the same community. After all, for the members of the single shared community, there is no need to identify each other. And there is no moment at which products are transformed into commodities because the so-called *profit upon alienation* cannot and must not be generated among community members. Rather it is obvious that commodification of products among the same community members threatens the existence as well as subsistence of that community. Therefore, the "other" for Marx here is "those other than 'we'" whose filiation needed neither investigation nor interpellation. As a result, logically, this discovery of the "other" is, at the same time, a re-discovery of "we." This "we" must be fragile unless something substantial is given.¹⁹ The mutual recognition which accompanies the transmutation of products into commodities first and foremost creates the collectivities of "we" on the two sides that are othering each other. This is not the individual "I" on which "modernity" is believed to be established.

If this is so, then, although the community is premised as the point of departure of Marx's logical procedures, this community comes at the very last as the originary (beginning). It is a belatedness. In this regard, I am not going to be against Karatani when he says that "the *a-priori* is in fact belatedness," or "the transcendental methodology (like those of Kant and Deleuze) is properly belatedness, and is also the method for belatedly discovering the medium already finished up and missed, and then concealed." At any rate it is always already under erasure like Derrida alludes. However, it is imperative for us to be attentive to the way in which this aporia—I am allowed to

18 As to the debate on "the dominant ideology thesis," see Abercrombie *et al.*, *The Dominant Ideology Thesis*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1980.

19 See L. Vogel, *The Fragile "We,"* Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1994.

read Karatani's belatedness as the Derridian "aporia,"²⁰ the Freudian "Nachträglichkeit,"²¹ the Lacanian "après coup"—is dissolved (and absorbed perhaps) into the actual historical invention and imagination,²² which nevertheless must be incessantly and infinitesimally adapted to the movement of "capital." That process of dissolution is "the reality of imagination."

This actual historical construct is the newly imagined and invented closedness, enclosure, or community called the nation-state. This nation-state is very substantive (*imagined* though),²³ whereas the assumed originary community that was required only for the logical process has vanished in terms of the logics. (I could take this originary community to be the "vanishing mediator" as defined by Frederick Jameson or Max Weber²⁴—not Alain Badiou.)²⁵ At stake here is Marx's idea that this mutual recognition is solely mediated by products, and, *by this very reason*, the filiation of products is neither investigated nor interpellated at the act of exchange. The concern of each party in the exchange is directed solely at products. In other words, the emergence of "capital" whose sole ground is the transmutation of products into commodities is caused by the limitless repetition of circulation without concern to the nature of communities: "capital" doesn't pay any attention to whether the communities concerned are "asiatic," capitalist, feudal, colonial, even post-colonial; or not. In this

20 J. Derrida, *Aporias*, tr. by T. Dutoit, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993.

21 J. Laplanche, *op. cit.*

22 See R. Gasché, *Inventions of Difference: On Jacques Derrida*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994.

23 B. Anderson, *Imagined Community*, revised and extended ed., London: Verso, 1993.

24 F. Jameson, "The Vanishing Mediator; or, Max Weber as Storyteller (1973)," In do., *The Ideologies of Theory: Essays 1971–1986*, Volume 2 (*Syntax of History*), London: Routledge, 1988.

25 A. Badiou, *Theories du sujet*, Paris: Seuil, 1982.

light, Marx describes “trading nations” as follows:²⁶

Trading nations, properly so called, exist only in the interstices of the ancient world, like the gods of Epicurus in the *intermundia*, or Jews in the pores of Polish society.

“Capital” is international precisely as inter-national. This hyphen is dubiously fragile though, and is only guaranteed by axiological praxis. There can be no “internationality” as substance whatsoever. “Inter-national” is in process towards the coming community as Giorgio Agamben would put it yet in a different dimension (i. e., communist movement).²⁷ Thus, “capital” can be defined as the pure desire which desires to remain itself as a pure circulation. As such, it is independent of and indifferent to the production organizations of the two communities from which the exchanged products are generated—so much so we have to further to elaborate on the “subsumption of labour” in two (formal and substantive) ways which Toni Negri meticulously expands for the communist revolution of his own.²⁸ But, as I pointed out earlier, this process is accompanied by a “becoming/devenant” through which an assumed originary community required for theoretical consistency is replaced by the community as “we.” This “becoming” is very substantive and actually historical, even though it must be incessantly invented and imagined in order for the community as “we” to achieve substantive and historical existence in return. This is the big point at issue—a leap—about which we have to seriously think.

To be sure, Marx furthermore walks (or runs) along his logical path for the purpose of “discovering” the pure “world of commodities”

26 Marx, *Capital*, vol. I, p. 172.

27 G. Agamben, *The Coming Community*, tr. by M. Hardt, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.

28 M. Hardt and A. Negri, *Labor of Dionysus: A Critique of the State-Form*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994.

on which "modernity" properly so called is alleged to establish itself. He claims that this community as "we" is inevitably destined to be dissolved into atomistic individuals who are indifferent to each other except for their respective self-interest or self-profit. Nevertheless, in so far as "capital" wants to remain itself as pure circulation as such, the "modernity" required by "capital" turns out to have no necessity of fully covering the social as "we." Nor is it obliged by "capital" to do so. It is enough for "capital" to partially give the form of "modernity" to the social and to create the "formalistic/legal" holders and/or carriers of products appropriate to this partial "modernity," since the sole concern for "capital" is circulation unperturbed by something other than "capital." Only by this "partial modernity" can "capital" make a detour to avoid the disturbing part of the social. It is realized by fictitiously yet institutionally formalizing land-holdings as land-ownership and commodifying human beings as labor-power, to which I may have to add "money" as a fictitious commodity.

Thus "capital" requires the nation-state as a substitute for the full realization of the pure world of commodities that "capital" by its nature has long been dreaming of, even as it is very aware of its impossibility. The newly built community as "we," which is given or gifted such forms of collectivity as the nation-state, comes into being from this ineluctable partiality of "modernity." To repeat: this partiality derives from the fissure between "capital's" dream of the establishment of a pure world of commodities and its historically actual impossibility, which in return entails the incessant longing for the suture of this fissure. Therefore, I can say that the originary community introduced for Marx's logical consistency as a vanishing mediator does not simply vanish; as a vanishing mediator, it is interminably obliged to transmute itself into the actual community of the nation-state in the course of very logical procedures. What is haunting "capital" is nothing but this ghostly vanishing mediator, this aporia, this belatedness, this *Nachträglichkeit*, this *après coup*, this originary community. (Communist movements are nothing but movement towards this

originary community through the attempt to overcome its substitute. In this very sense communism is “*ana-chronique*.”²⁹) In this respect, I am allowed to say that Marx’s logic is open-ended in a ghostly way to actually historical processes; I would like to tag this open-ended logic as being “historical materialistic,” not historical materialism.

“Capital” as repetitive exchange or circulation is ever restricted to this historico-logical amalgam of the vectors of both (re)territorialization and de-territorialization of community.³⁰ The reason why “capital,” which is most “international” by its nature, is actualized historically as the national economy and the nation-state, lies in these dialectic **power** processes. The necessary discrepancy between the desire of “capital” whose general form is de-territorialization or axiomization on the one hand, and the partial “modernity” required by this “capital” whose general form is (re)territorialization or the closedness as the nation-state on the other, is required to be dissolved yet maintained at once (i. e., sublimated). This *aporétique* process is limitless to the point of ghostliness or spectrality as Derrida put it.

In this way “modernity” is partially established according to the movement of “capital.” The general form of “modernity” is incessantly haunted by something other than this “modernity” that is necessitated by “capital” in relation to the social. It should be defined as neither the backward-ness of “capital”-ist development nor the dys-function of “modernization,” but rather the result of the politico-economically “rational” movement of “capital,” which is generally called “modern.” What “capital” must do, and what it can only do, is negotiate with the actually historical situations with which “capital” has to confront each time it is required to do so by the social. In this sense, it can be said that “non-modernity” haunts “modernity.” Not the other way around.

“Modernity” is possessed with “non-modernity” whose logical origin is the originary community that must be *logically* introduced.

29 J. Derrida, *Spectres de Marx*, *op. cit.*

30 Deleuze and Guattari, *op. cit.*

Nevertheless, the ghost that haunts “modernity” is a friend of “capital.” “Modernity” curses “non-modernity” as its dys-functional double, and tried to incessantly and belatedly measure the distance between the open-ended itself and its double, which “modernity” itself ceaselessly creates. This measurement or curse is a kind of repetitive compulsion/obsession for “modernity.” This “non-modernity” is interminably being created by “modernity” with which “capital” negotiates for its own existence, and therefore it is by no means an obstacle to the movement of “capital.” Rather, “capital,” being based on or hiding itself behind this repetitive compulsion, is invested/cathected in the expansionary movement of itself into both the inside and outside of the social, while at the same time it fabricates the demarcating boundaries between the inside and outside. This demarcation is another name for the ever lasting movements of (re)territorialization and deterritorialization as Deleuze and Guattari put it. The relationship between “capital,” “modernity,” and hence “non-modernity” across the social cannot be understood by simply replacing the linear interpretation of history with a spatial multilateral one, because “non-modernity” can not exist without “modernity.” It is not the other way around.

Arts, politics, law, revolution, and whatever institutional, ideological, and counter-ideological apparatuses arise their significance or signification precisely here. These emerge not simply from the interstices or in-between pores but from the historically inevitable discrepancies/encounters between the interstices and national substitutes. Karatani once said that these interstices, these pores were “society” in a strictly sense of the word. And I have to admit that. Nevertheless, historically, society is closed as the nation-state. In other words, the Reality of Imagination is always actualized as the partial “modernity” and the social is continually repressed by “capital” with this Reality of Imagination.

Marjorie Garber concludes her enjoyable book, *Shakespeare's Ghost Writer*³¹ by quoting from Paul de Man's brilliant remark on Baudelaire in *Blindness and Insight*.³² She said that "Yet his (Baudelaire's) modernity too, like Nietzsche's, is a forgetting or a suppression of anteriority." Garber concludes her book as follows:

But it could be said of Hamlet—and of Shakespeare. This Baudelaireization is not Bowdlerization, but transference, co-texting. We know that Shakespeare played the part of the Ghost in *Hamlet*. What could not be foreseen, except through anamorphic reading, was that he would *become* that Ghost. "Remember me!" the Ghost cries. "Do not forget." And, indeed, we do not yet seem quite able to give up that ghost.

"Non-modernity" can exist only after "modernity" is partially and minimally created by "capital" with regard to the social. Therefore "non-modernity" always haunts "modernity." This haunting, this ghost that is always instigated by "capital" cries "Remember me!" and "Do not forget," which reminds us of the Hegelian *Geist*, the process of which Marx declared to invert but never to reject at all.³³

31 M. Garber, *Shakespeare's Ghost Writers: Literature as uncanny causality*, New York and London: Methuen, 1987.

32 P. de Man, *Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism*, second ed., Revised. Intro. by W. Godzich, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983.

33 A. Warminski, "Hegel/Marx: Consciousness and life," *Hegel After Derrida*, ed. by S. Barnett, London: Routledge, 1998.