

# Globalization and Nationalism in Postcommunist East Central Europe : Yugoslavia and East Central Europe under the EU Enlargement

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# **Globalization and Nationalism in Postcommunist East Central Europe**

— Yugoslavia and East Central Europe under the EU Enlargement —

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## **1. Introduction:**

### **(1) Yugoslavia and International Politics: The collapse of the Socialist System and “Europeanization”**

It is already 12 years since the collapse of the Socialist System in Eastern Europe. The end of the Cold War, which was a result of the conclusion of a treaty between the US and the USSR, affected the end of a divided Europe, and the euphoria of a “United, One Europe” promoted the progressing European Integration at that time.

The so called ‘Luxembourg Group’, the first 6 applicants for the EU (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, and Cyprus) is accomplishing the *Acqui Communautaires*, which includes political democratization, economic marketization, protection of minority’s rights, etc. for joining to the EU in 2004–2005. As an effect of that, the inflation and unemployment decreased gradually and their GDP is gradually rising in Central Europe (Table 1 & Table 2).<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, the second 6 applicants, the ‘Helsinki Group’ (Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia and Malta) also have an effort to accomplish democratization of political systems and economic reform, which is difficult to perform for these countries. In the Prague NATO’s Top level’s Summit in 2002, it seems that Slovakia and in the Baltic some countries are going to join NATO,<sup>2</sup> after Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic in 1999.

In these circumstances, the old Yugoslavia successor countries were the isolated orphans of Europe, as they couldn’t belong to most of all European organizations until the end of 2000. But it also changed at last by a series of ‘democratization’ processes: that is, in the Presidential election and national elections in the Yugoslavian Federal Republic on 24 September 2000, President Kostunica’s inaugural declaration on 5 October, and the formation of Serbian National Government in the election of Serbian Parliament by Dindić Prime Minister on 26 January 2001.

The new Yugoslavia’s aim is ‘to return to being a European member’, to become a member of the EU one decade later, and now Yugoslavia strengthens it’s relationship to Western Europe, the US, and it’s neighboring countries especially the Balkans and Central Europe.

The biggest subject of the East and Central Europe after the collapse of the Socialist System is how do they manage to reorganize East Central Europe and Balkans, which exists between Russia and Germany, and how can they live more peacefully in international

**Table 1. Member countries of the EU and candidate countries**



Source: *The Politics of the New Europe*, ed. By Ian Budge, Kenneth Newton et al., Longman, London & New York, 1997, p. 35

**Society in the 21st century?**

**(1)-1. Foreign Policy: Approach toward Europe and the US, acceleration of separating from Russia**

Their choice in International Relations is not on the side of Russia. (But they must not stimulate Russia, but rather make a friendly communication with it). Not only Central Europe, but also the Balkan countries must make an effort as to how they desire to access Western Europe and the US, and to cut off the relationship with Russia. That is the reason why the Central European countries actively applied to join the EU, and swiftly joined NATO. Security questions as well as political and economic development is of primary importance for these countries. Yugoslavia is not exception, either. President Kostunica, who was a strong nationalist against the US, is also approaching western countries in hopes to get western and 'international society's support for the state reorganization of Monte

**Table 2. Agenda 2000: Economic and Social Situations of EU Candidate countries**

## 1) Inflation rates (1990–1999)

COUNTRY	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998*	1999*
Cyprus	4.5	5.0	6.5	4.9	4.7	2.6	2.9	3.6	—	—
Malta	3.0	2.5	1.6	4.1	4.1	4.0	2.5	3.2	—	—
Poland	585.8	70.3	43	35.3	32.2	27.8	19.9	13	10	7.5
Hungary	28.9	35	23	22.5	18.8	28.2	23.6	18.1	15	12
Czech Rep.	9.7	56.5	11.1	20.8	10	9.1	8.8	10	12	11.4
Slovenia	549.7	117.7	201.3	32.3	19.8	12.6	9.7	9.1	8	—
Estonia	—	—	1,076	89.8	47.7	29	23.1	11.1	10	—
Romania	5.1	170.2	210.4	256.1	136.7	32.3	38.8	154.8	54	—
Slovakia	10.4	61.2	10	23.2	13.4	9.9	5.8	6.4	10.4	10
Latvia	10.5	172.2	951.2	109.2	35.9	25	17.6	8.5	5	—
Lithuania	9.1	216.4	1,020.8	410.2	72.2	39.6	24.6	8.9	7	—
Bulgaria	23.8	338.5	79.4	56.1	87.1	62.1	123	1,089	35	—

\* forecasts

Sources: *Economic Survey of Europe* 1998, no. 1, U.N. *World Economic Outlook*, 1998, IMF. *Deutsche Morgan Grenfell*.

## 2) Annual percentage change of GDP (1991–1998)

COUNTRY	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998*
Cyprus	0.6	9.8	0.7	5.8	5.5	1.9	2.4	—
Malta	6.3	4.7	4.5	2.1	7.3	4.2	2.8	—
Poland	—	—	—	5.2	7.0	6.1	6.9	5.7
Hungary	—	-3.1	-0.6	2.9	1.5	1.3	4.0	4.8
Czech Rep.	-14.2	-6.4	-0.9	2.6	5.8	4.1	1.2	2.2
Slovenia	-8.9	-5.5	2.8	5.3	3.9	3.1	3.7	4.2
Estonia	—	—	-8.5	-1.8	4.3	4.0	10.9	6.0
Romania	-12.9	-8.8	1.5	3.9	7.1	4.1	-6.6	2.0
Slovakia	-14.6	-6.5	-3.9	4.9	6.8	6.9	5.7	4.0
Latvia	-10.4	-34.9	-14.9	0.6	-1.6	5.1	6.0	6.0
Litbuania	-13.1	-34.0	-30.4	1.0	3.0	3.6	3.8	5.0
Bulgaria	—	-7.3	-1.5	1.8	2.1	-10.9	-7.4	4.0

\* Forecasts

Sources: *World Economic Outlook*, May 1998, IMF. *Economic Survey of Europe*, 1998, Vol. 1, U.N.

## 3) Unemployment rates (1993–1999)

COUNTRY	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998*	1999*
Cyprus	2.6	2.7	2.6	23.0	3.4	—	—
Malta	4.5	4.0	3.6	3.7	4.4	—	—
Poland	14.0	14.4	13.3	12.3	11.2	10.1	9.3
Hungary	12.1	10.8	10.3	10.0	8.7	7.8	7.3
Czech Rep.	3.6	3.2	3.1	3.5	4.4	5.8	6.6
Slovenia	15.5	14.2	14.5	14.4	14.8	—	—
Estonia	5.0	5.1	5.0	5.6	4.6	—	—
Romania	10.4	10.9	9.5	6.3	8.8	—	—
Slovakia	14.4	14.8	13.1	12.8	12.5	—	—
Latvia	5.8	6.5	6.6	7.2	6.7	—	—
Lithuania	3.4	4.5	7.3	6.2	6.7	—	—
Bulgaria	16.4	12.8	11.1	12.5	13.7	—	—

Sources: *OECD Economic Outlook*, June 1998. *Economic Survey of Europe*, 1998 No. 1, UN. *Agenda 2000, Enlargement*, 1999. 1), 2), 3)

## 4) GDP per capita in East Central Europe (EU average: 100)

		1995	1996	1997	2000	2005	2010
EU Candidate	Czech	56	58		62	68	
	Hungary	35	35	37	39	43	48
	Poland	29	30	32	34	38	42
	Slovakia	39	41	43	46	51	56
	Slovenia	56	57		63	69	
	Bulgaria	23	21	19	2	23	25
	Romania	23	24	22	23	26	28
	Austria	111	111	110	110	110	110
	Germany	110	110	109	109	109	109
	Greece	65	66	67	67	67	67
	Portugal	67	68	68	68	68	68
	Spain	77	77	78	78	78	78

Joining to EU

Source: Masumi Hakogi, "New Economic subject and perspective in East Central Europe", *World Economic Review*, January 1999.

Negro and Kosovo, and for political and economic development.

Why do East Central European countries wish to be apart from Russia? The reasons are the memory of the militaristic, political oppression reign of the USSR, the failure of reform in Russia after the Socialist System, long term economic decline, and in consequence of that, the Russian people's demand to recover a "Strong Russia", as well as the strong desire to maintain a foothold in Europe (ambition for influence to the Balkan and Baltic areas). East Central Europe tightens their guard against such Russian behavior conversely. Moreover they have learned from the long continuing Chechen conflict and Yugoslavian civil war, that their cooperation is not with Russia, but with Western Europe, as it brings them economic development and regional consolidation in the near future.<sup>3</sup>

**(1)-2. Domestic Policy: Democratization, Marketization, and Europeanization program:**

Under the Globalization and European Integration process, the choice for East Central European governments is no alternative.: Democratization, marketization and Europeanization, or/autocracy, nationalization, and anti-Westernization which is historically somehow remaining in the Balkan Social structure and historical characteristics. Even the old conservative communists, for example Rumanian President Iiescu and the Romanian Socialist Party, or Türmer's Workers Party in Hungary also affirms to join the EU.

## **(2) Intensification of National Conflict and Reorganization of States**

On the other hand, if we ask whether the choice of "global regional integration" makes people who live in East Central Europe happier or not the answer is not easy. It is well known that these 12 years' social mobility brought great success to the economic globalization and European Integration, System transformation from Socialistic politics, economics, and society to Capitalistic ones, but this process was always performed with great sacrifices and burdens to people who live there.

As an effect of that, various people's dissatisfaction, ethnic conflicts and micro regional repulsion broke out. These dissatisfactions are often brought against the West and their own various assertions.

The most important illustration is the assertion of national identity. "Nationality"

under the Socialist system was formally protected, but actually neglected and oppressed, so it appeared first as their own assertion when the Socialist system collapsed.

But after emancipation from the military and political oppression of the Soviet Union, their national demand changed, not for a multinational integration of nations, but rather for disintegration and national independence or fragmentation. Furthermore, Western Europe also supported such behavior because of their strategy of dissolution of the socialist system.

As a consequence of it, the break up of the national conflicts started in Balkan countries, by the support of “International Society”. It started with the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, and swift ‘state recognition’ by Western Europe. And continued with the independence of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the collapse of Federal republic of Yugoslavia, and the “velvet divorce” of Czech-Slovakia.

As is well known recent state framework is 200 at most, but ethnicity is increasing recently from 3,000 to 7,000 as a consequence of distinction from the others and self-identification. But if such nationality and ethnicity wish to assert themselves by asking for “their own nation state and independence” in the multinational area in East Central Europe and the Balkans, it is clear that many conflicts and chaos will result. It was a tactic for the collapse of the socialist system and Westernization, that western countries permitted the ethnic self-assertion.

Under such circumstances, Yugoslavian national conflicts started resulted in individual nation states during 10 years after its collapse. But such serious problems didn’t happen in other East Central European countries which have minority problem inside or outside of their state. Why?

Now the author wishes to investigate the differences between Yugoslavia and Central European countries national identity problems.

## **2. Reorganization of Nation, State, and Region in East Central Europe**

— 12 years of searching for a solution of the nationality problem in East Central Europe —

Here we would like to investigate the difference between Central Europe and Yugoslavia on the solution of minority problems.

Why didn’t the Central European Minorities wish for independence or to re-draw their national borders, even though the Yugoslavian disintegration occurred at their nearest border?

The answer is because they learned from Yugoslavia, that if they solved national problems by force, it consequently introduced wars and was not in their own interest.

### **(1) Hungary’s case: European Integration and Conclusion of Bilateral Treaties with Neighboring countries**

First, I would like to investigate the case study of Hungary.

It is known that there remains 3 million Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries, near the border and it was said that if it will cause the Third World War, it might happen in Transylvania. But until now these countries and regions have managed to solve nationality problems peacefully.<sup>4</sup> So we would like to see the Hungarian successful case, which created stability in minority questions, achieved economic and political development, and joined NATO in 1999 with aims to join to EU during 2003 to 2004.

Democratic Forum and their coalition government, which won the first general elec-

tion in Hungary in 1990, were a little nationalistic. Prime Minister József Antal declared that he is the Prime Minister of 15 million Hungarians, although in Hungary there is only a population of 10 million. It caused friction among neighboring countries with fears that Hungary wished to change their border.

The turning point in Hungary was after the change of the Hungarian Government to the Socialist Party in 1994. Prime Minister Horn changed his policy to cooperate with neighbor countries, and the Hungarian people also learned by the “Chechen conflict and Yugoslavian disintegration”, that war and isolation from international society is no use for their interest. They learned of the many sacrifices in national or ethnic conflict very near their border, and changed their policy that European integration and people’s and goods’ free movement among borders solves the minority problems. (As was seen in the case study of North Ireland and Catalonia in Western Europe)

Hungarian President Árpád Göncz said in the Hungarian minority’s Burgenland in the spring of 1995, “When Hungary will join to EU, we can guarantee you free movement between Hungary and Austria and wish to finish nationality problems in the long term”.<sup>5</sup>

Seeing these words of the Hungarian President, one aim for joining to the EU and NATO is to solve national problems for them, and the Hungarian Government and nations tried to accomplish their own political, economic, and legal criteria.

After that the Hungarian government tried to conclude bilateral treaties between Hungary and Slovakia, and Hungary and Romania, where many Hungarian minorities lived.

By doing so, the Hungarian minority was guaranteed human rights, Minority’s cultural, language and regional rights as a condition of ‘non-aggression of national borders’ by the support of EU Western countries.<sup>6</sup>

## **(2) The case study of Romania and Slovakia**

— From the formation of Nation State to Minority Right —

On the other hand, multinational states like Romania and Slovakia have minorities in their land, who have a motherland outside of their borders. So in these countries, the national centripetal force was very weak. That is why strong leadership and a nationalistic President like Roman Iliescu in Romania and Mecial in Slovakia became a symbol of national integration, and put strong power to the ‘formation of the nation state’, and started minority’s nationalization.<sup>7</sup> Under these circumstances, the EU advised correction of minority’s human right’s infringement.

This Nationalization of Minorities and delay of Democratization and Privatization made their countries estimation of criteria for joining to EU lower, and these countries could not be nominated in the first group of EU aspirants. But as a consequence of it, the Romanian government changed to a Democratic coalition in the election of November 1996, a little to late, and under President Constantinescu and a coalition government invited the Hungarian Minority Party (RMDSz) to their own cabinet, and not only marketization and democratization but also minority’s human rights policy was mandated by Presidential law.

On the other hand in Slovakia, Zuzana’s democratic Government was established in October 1998 and they learned from Romania, to put their Minority Party in their Cabinet, and started swift democratization, privatization, and recognition of minority’s rights.

The effect of the human rights policy was remarkable. Both of the two countries are nominated in the second group of negotiation with the EU. Especially Slovakia seems to be a very important country in the geopolitical view, because all the neighboring countries,

Czech, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO on 13 March 1999, so Slovakia hoped to join NATO as a result of a geopolitical strategy of Central Europe. So these are successful cases.

But the Zuzina government does not succeed so much in the economic policy as in the human policy, so the government does not get the people's support much like the Mecial party. Mecial's influence with the Slovakian people has remained strong, so in the next general election, there is no guarantee of Zuzina government continuity.

### **(3) The Influence to Yugoslavia**

These solutions of democratization and guaranteed human rights in Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia were influenced by the Yugoslavia governments actions very much.

Under President Milosević's government, Yugoslavia was shut out from many European organizations (for example the, Partnership for Peace, European Atlantic Partnership Committee: EAPC, PHARE: Poland and Hungary Aid for Reorganization of Economics, and Central European Initiative), because of International public opinion against national cleansing' policy.

The widening of Serbian national policy and the Albanian national conflict in Kosovo introduced Kosovo's bombing by NATO. But in such Serbian nationality politics, Vojvodina was the only place that did not force the Minority's ethnic cleansing, under Milosević era, many immigrants came in and went out, but the ethnic minority was comparatively guaranteed some cultural rights.

Vojvodina is the granary of Northern Yugoslavia and a comparatively rich area. There were 340 thousand Hungarian Minority residents in Vojvodina: 2 million total population, and 285 thousand (1996) Hungarian Minority even after the Bosnia-Herzegovina's conflict and so much immigration.<sup>8</sup>

Such militaristic or fierce national cleansing didn't happen here like in other areas (even though many existing rights were deprived under President Milosević's rule). As a consequence of it, many Serbian and other immigrants escaped to Vojvodina and further via Hungary to the Western Countries. The Hungarian Minority in Vojvodina took a parliamentary strategy and they achieved representative parliamentary members or mayors in some municipal area, and members.<sup>9</sup> (This activity helped Kasa, Minority leader (Hungarian Union of Vojvodina: VMSz) to get the position of vice President in the new Yugoslavian government in January 2001).

## **3. NATO's Kosovo Bombing and the Influence towards neighboring countries**

### **(1) Nationality Problems in the Balkans and NATO intervention**

When one surveys East European National Questions in the Habsburg Monarchy from the 19th to 20th century, he can easily know that it is very complicated and difficult to decide which is wrong or right.

In this area, historically national and regional conflicts lead to two World Wars, with a result that the big powers supported one side because of geo-political and strategic points of view. They arose from the various policies and movements, which resulted under the complicated regional and ethnic balance. Historical ethnic conflict in Kosovo is one such case that 'International society' and NATO supported Kosovo's Albanians from 'human intervention' and decided against Serbian military and Milosevic's evil. But this anti-



Yugoslavia and protection of Albanians resulted in a deadlock. It is clear that if they admit the Albanian independent claim, they will open 'Pandora's Box', which means ethnic and border conflicts will burst out in many neighboring countries as well.

Extraterritorial dispatching of troops for the aim of urgent "humanitarian assistance" was regarded by Albanians to guarantee their activity's legitimacy, that is their demand of independence against Milosevic's Yugoslavia was understood. As a result of that, after establishment of a 'democratic' Yugoslavia in the autumn 2000, Albanians of Kosovo did not agree to negotiate with the Serbians, and continued to assert independence. But the independence of Kosovo might bring minority independence and reconsidering of national borders throughout the Balkan multinational area, so it was impossible to admit. Considering such things, it reveals that the intervention in Kosovo itself lacked a concrete perspective to the solution of ethnic and national problems in Yugoslavia in the first place.

NATO's intervention in Bosnia Hercegovina and the Kosovo bombing were closely connected to the 'new strategic idea' of NATO, which manifested the 50th anniversary in its changing role after the Cold War<sup>10</sup>. It is not permitted, however, to sacrifice many local people for 'humanitarian intervention' in Kosovo, or to widen damage and to make increase immigrants not only in Yugoslavia, but also in neighboring countries. As an effect of that, it urged Albanian terror, which regarded that international public opinion supported Albanian independence in Kosovo.

As a result, NATO's bombing strengthened Serbian nationalism and anti-US feeling under Milosevic's power even if temporarily.<sup>11</sup> From such a point of view, NATO's bombing rather might have prolonged Yugoslavian autocracy even temporarily resulting in great sacrifice by the people.

#### **4. Co-existence with Neighbors and the Perspective of a Solution**

##### **(1) Newly 'democratized' Yugoslavia and change of national policy**

President Kostunica, who came to power in the new Yugoslavia after October 2000, declared on the 4th December that they couldn't accept the change of the national border, because it would bring new conflict and new war. On the other hand, he started a dialogue with Kosovo's Albanians, and efforts toward going back to the IMF system and European Integration, and maintaining Yugoslavian national interest<sup>12</sup>.

The new Yugoslavian Government started democratization, privatization, adjustment of law, and began to negotiate with Western countries, to (re)join a variety of East Central European organizations, and furthermore started to show perspective to improve minority policy concluding treaties with neighboring countries.

President Kostunica said that they would contribute regional security and consolidation by concluding mutual treaties on minorities such as the treaty of Hungarians&Slovakians, or Hungarians & Romanians in May 2001.<sup>13</sup>

The new Yugoslavia tried to conclude mutual treaties on Minorities, negotiating with neighboring governments of Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Macedonia.

##### **(2) Co-existence with Macedonia, Albania, and other Balkan Countries**

But the relations between Macedonia and Yugoslavia began to be strained because of the Macedonian, Tetovo's, Albanian extremist's attack in early 2001. The Macedonian Government took a policy to consider regional Albanians and put Albanians in the Govern-

ment Ministries to manage multinational Macedonia fairly.

After the Tetovo attack, the Macedonian government started to form a national unity cabinet on 14 May 2001, and included Albanians. The Macedonian Government put 6 ministers from the Albanian parties, and wishes to protect Minorities and more democratization.<sup>14</sup> But Albanians still menaced the Macedonian Government by the presence of an armed extremist group.

The Macedonian Government declared that they will not do business with armed groups, so it began to fight in May 2001.

Most of the Balkan countries agreed concerning supporting the Albanian Government, and supported new Yugoslavia and Macedonia, and condemned Albanian armed groups in Kosovo in Yugoslavia and Tetovo in Macedonia. The Albanian government also wished to solve these problems by establishing consolidating coexistence with neighboring countries and with European Integration (joining NATO, for the present aim).

At the Foreign Minister's summit of South East European Cooperation Process on 16 May 2001, it supported Macedonian sovereignty, territorial integrity, support of Macedonian National Unity Government, and criticism against the Albanian militant group.<sup>15</sup>

### **(3) Improvement in Relations between Yugoslavia and Central Europe: Hungary, Czech, and Poland**

The relations between Yugoslavia and Central Europe are not so strong compared with neighboring Balkan countries.

However, Yugoslavia again joined the Central European Initiative (now 17 countries with Yugoslavia) in Budapest on 21 November 2000, and tried to cooperate with the Visegrad countries and CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Association).

Most especially the Hungarian Government began to establish positive relations with Yugoslavia, because Hungary shared a long border with Yugoslavia and there is a strong Hungarian Minority in Vojvodina outside of the border.

The Hungarian government policy attaching importance to Serbia was continued even after NATO's Kosovo bombing. When the author visited Hungary and Yugoslavia after the Kosovo Bombing, Hungarian President Genz said 'Serbia is an important historical neighbor country for Hungary, so if there is a difficult situation we have to make efforts to understand each other.'<sup>16</sup>

Hungarians in Vojvodina tried to make such efforts to reform Yugoslavian politics concerning cooperating with the Hungarian Government.

After the establishment of the Dindic Government in Serbia on January 2001, Kasa, the leader of the Hungarian Union of Vojvodina (VMSz) was inaugurated Vice Prime Minister. Inside of the Cabinet, VMSz Hungarian Minority plays an active part to protect and achieve Minority's Culture, Language, Religion and Regional autonomy.<sup>17</sup>

### **(4) Stable Agreement in South Eastern Europe and Dialogue with Neighbors: For solution of the Problem**

In such circumstances, 'Regional insistence' already began.

Not only global region (EU Integration) but also micro region (living area, border area) co-existence and communication became active.

So the Conclusion of this article will be following.

1. EU and NATO's Reorganization and Enlargement

EU and NATO Enlargement is widening even toward the Balkan countries. But it will

take a little more time for the Balkan countries to join the EU and NATO due to nationalism problems. In the following years, if ethnic wars and instability increases again in this area, it is possible that new ethno-centrism will arise against the West and the EU, and it might damage not only the Balkan countries, but also the EU itself.

## 2. About NATO's Kosovo Bombing.

It seems that humanitarian intervention didn't bring a big effect to Yugoslavia and even to the Albanians. Through Albanian terror in Macedonia, we know that Albanians, who believed they had the support of NATO and international Society, began to believe that independence by any means of terror in Kosovo or Tetovo, and other places could work. This also brings great instability all over the Balkans.

## 3. The Minority Problem.

If many minorities begin to assert their own nation state and independence, in this area, it will be difficult to solve ethnic and regional conflicts in many places. How can we solve the nationalism problems?

It might be only by ethnic co-existence and regional cooperation in multinational areas which was analyzed in my paper.

Now for people in the Balkans, regional stability, and mutual understanding are the primary issue for the solution of problems, especially seeing that the Kosovo Problem is

**Table 3. PHARE programmes and East Central Europe**

1) Phare priorities, 1990–1993 and 1994–1996  
(% of total Phare commitments)

Sector	1990–93 (%)	1994–96 (%)
Critical aid	10.3	5.3
*Economic restructuring	38.7	20.8
*Human resources and social development	19.6	16.4
Environmental and nuclear safety	9.9	6.4
*Infrastructure (including cross-border)	8.5	36.2
Public administration, civil society, general technical assistance, etc.	13.0	14.9

2) Country distribution of national programme commitments, 1990–1996

Country	Total Phare commitments 1990–1996 MECU	Country population (million)	Share of Phare funds (%)	Share of population (%)
*Poland	1,388	38.5	30.8	36.3
*Hungary	684	10.3	15.2	21.5
*Czech Rep.	429	10.3	9.5	9.8
Slovakia	207	5.3	4.6	5.0
Slovenia	91	2.0	2.0	1.9
*Romania	726	22.7	16.1	21.5
*Bulgaria	539	8.4	12.0	8.1
Estonia	130	1.5	2.9	1.4
Lithuania	179	3.8	4.0	3.6
Latvia	132	2.5	2.9	2.5
Total	4,505	105.3	100	100

Note: Population data from World Bank tables. Allocations to Czech and Slovak Republics include the allocations to the Czech Slovak Federal Republic of 222 EMCU.

Source: *Phare, An interim evaluation*. Published by European Commission, 1999.

widening to Macedonian problems.

4. On the role of Western countries, they begin with two things.

One is making an EU army, and another is the support for regions.

Later, PHARE, EU Regional support is functioning in various sectors like economic restructuring, human resources and social development, environmental and nuclear safety, and infrastructure etc.<sup>18</sup> (See Table 3)

Such stable treaties and regional cooperation of neighbors, like the Mutual Friendship Treaty on Minorities, the Central European Initiative and Stable Agreement in South East Europe will be one of the real methods of 'preventive diplomacy' in this area.<sup>19</sup>

### Notes

- 1 About this process we can see many monographs and books, but at first EU homepage (<http://europa.eu.int/>)'s each part and see: Kumiko Haba, *Expanding Europe, Central European grope*, Iwanami Shoten, 1998. And Kumiko Haba, "EU and NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: nations on national borders", ed. by Miyajima & Haba, *Whereabouts of European Integration*, Jinbunshoin, 2001.
- 2 Sonoko Shima, "European Integration and Regional Cooperation — Baltic three countries —", ed. by Miyajima & Haba, *op. cit.*
- 3 About the relation between Russia and Central Europe growing worse and Russian Isolation under EU and NATO Enlargement, see Kumiko Haba, "NATO's Eastern Enlargement and Central Europe — Central Europe joining NATO and Kosovo Bombing", Working Paper of Japan Association International Relation, Nagoya, May 2000.
- 4 But in April and May 2001, about the 'Treaty on the position of outside Hungarian habitants', there are some problems and frictions between Hungary and Romania on borders and immigrants. About this problem, see Haba (2001), and Hungarians outside national border Center's homepage: (<http://www.htmh.hu/>) Inside that homepage there is some discussion on the treaty about outside Hungarians. (19 April and 29 May 2001).
- 5 Hungarian President Göncz Árpád's opinion in Burgenland, Austria. (Duna TV in Hungary, Spring 1995).
- 6 Hungary already concluded various treaties after 1991. Treaty on Minority's right with Ukraine (31 May 1991), with Slovenia (6 November 1992), with Croatia (5 April 1995), and Treaty of neighborly friendship with Slovakia (19 March 1995), with Romania (16 September 1996). In each treaty they agreed with protection of Minority's human rights and nonaggression of national borders. About each treaty, see Hungarian minority Center's homepage: (<http://www.meh.hu/nekh/defhu.htm>). About Romania and Slovakian Hungarian Minority, see Romanian Hungarian Democratic Union's homepage (<http://www.rmdsz.ro>), and Slovakian Hungarian coalition homepage (<http://www.mkp.sz>), and Hungarian Foundation of Human Right homepage (<http://www.hhrf.org>) are useful.
- 7 As a case which Minority's nationalization progressed quickly in Romania after democratization earlier than Csaushescu government, See: *A Marosvásárhely magyar nyelvű orvos és gyógyszereszkészés 50 éve (50 years history of Hungarian doctor and pharmacist in Tîrgmureş)*, Budapest, 1996, and Kumiko Haba (1998).
- 8 Károly Kocsis and Eszter Kocis-Hodosi, *Ethnic Geography of the Hungarian Minorities in the Carpathian Basin*, Budapest, 1998, p. 143.
- 9 *Vajdasági Magyar Kalendárium (Calendar of Hungarians in Vojvodina)*, Szabadka, Yugoslavia, 1999.
- 10 Mamoru Sadakata, "Kosovo Conflict and NATO intervention", and Kumiko Haba, "NATO East Enlargement and Central Europe", both Working Paper of Japan Association International Relation Annual Congress, 2000.

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- 13 Kostunica, President of Yugoslavia, "Regional Process for the Strengthening and Reaffirmation of Territorial Integrity, Minority Rights and Security in South Eastern Europe", 18 May 2001.
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- 15 About the meeting of South East Europe Cooperation process was Central and Eastern Europe Fax news, 16 May 2001.
- 16 Interview to Gonz Arpad, on 25 August 1999.
- 17 Hungarian Minority in Yugoslavia can see homepage of Hungarian Minority (<http://www.htmh.hu/jelentesek/situation.voivodina.htm>).
- 18 About PHARE program, which started from Poland and Hungarian economic aid of EC, see homepage: (<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgla/phare>).
- 19 About Balkan Regional cooperation, Nobuhiro Siba, "European Integration and Balkan", Miyajima & Haba eds., Whereabouts of European Integration, Jinbunshoin, 2001.

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