

On the Legitimacy of Development : A Case Study of Communal Land Struggle in Kapalo Hilalang, West Sumatra, Indonesia

中島, 成久 / NAKASHIMA, Narihisa

(出版者 / Publisher)

Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University / 法政大学比較経済研究所

(雑誌名 / Journal or Publication Title)

Journal of International Economic Studies

(巻 / Volume)

21

(開始ページ / Start Page)

145

(終了ページ / End Page)

160

(発行年 / Year)

2007-03

(URL)

<https://doi.org/10.15002/00002051>

On the Legitimacy of Development : A Case Study of Communal Land Struggle in Kapalo Hilalang, West Sumatra, Indonesia

NAKASHIMA Narihisa

Professor

Faculty of Intercultural Communication, Hosei University

Abstract

Communal land has been an important resource for the Minangkabau people, not only for their economic life but also for their identity as a matrilineal society. In the Dutch colonial period, the land had been leased to foreign companies, and rent paid for it. Since the period of Development in the New Order Indonesia, however, the regional government and military forcefully confiscated those lands for enterprises such as developing plantations and resort facilities without any compensation. This made people very frustrated and triggered their movement to recover those lands after Suharto's decline in 1998. However, the regional government and military still have been relying on terror and violence to crush those movements. They used to deny the peoples' claim saying that the communal land which was used as foreign plantations became state land after the nationalization of foreign enterprises in 1957. One of the biggest issues is how the local government and military command assert the legitimacy of development, and how to change the understanding of the communal land. In this regard, the Kapalo Hilalang case study of communal land struggle provides useful information, suggests new ways of understanding the situation as well as ways of resolving the struggle.

1. The Fight of Communal Land after Suharto's Fall

May, 1998, when the Suharto's thirty two-year rule ended, was a time of turmoil. In Jakarta and Medan, some people attacked shops owned by Chinese and looted their goods, raped Chinese women, and even killed them. All of Indonesia's major islands have reported incidents of looting, riots, protests, assaults on local officials, truck hijackings and arson.

Three days after Suharto's resignation on May 21, the farmers of Tapos, West Java, returned to their communal land of 750 hectares which was seized in 1972 by Suharto and used as his ranch; and a huge golf course was constructed, too. They started again cultivating crops and raising cattle despite warnings from the local police and private military forces. The management negotiated with them to give all of them one and half hectares, however, the farmers said that was not enough, and kept on claiming their right to the land. Finally the company sent in a bulldozer to forcefully remove and wipe away them despite the strong demonstration of the farmers (Tesor 1998).

Protests and demands like those in Tapos were also seen in West Sumatra, the heartland of the Minangkabau people who are well-known as a matrilineal society. The population of

the Minangkabau people is four million, and another four million Minangkabau people live in Jakarta, Riau and Negri Sembilan in Malaysia.

As communal land (*tanah ulayat*), which used to be owned by *kaum* (maximum lineage), *suku* (clan) or *nagari* (village based on customary law), has been a very important resource for the Minangkabau matrilineal society, land issues have been very serious in West Sumatra. Before Suharto's fall in 1998 land issues in West Sumatra were discussed among *kaum* members, or *suku* members, or between a *suku* and other *suku*. But communal land issues after Suharto's decline are characterized as issues between local people and the government or military.

Under Dutch colonialism Minangkabau communal lands had been leased (*erpacht* in Dutch) to Dutch companies. Since the advent of the New Order Indonesia, when the Development (*Pembangunan*) policy was initiated, the communal land had been used for Development such as military and state businesses, regional government offices, and resort areas without any compensation or rent. People have not been able to claim their right due to the wide-spread of violence of the government and military of the New Order. Thus the people supported Reformation (*Reformasi*) movement in 1998, and local people came to be brave enough to claim their right to the communal lands.

There have been three kinds of land ownership in West Sumatra: state land (*tanah negara*), private land (*tanah pribadi*), and communal land (*tanah ulayat*). It is estimated that approximately eighty percent of rural areas in West Sumatra is still designated as communal land (Syhamunir 2001:21-29). As there are still only small amounts of state land and private land, the government took over the communal land without any consensus of the people under the name of Development.

The people's right to communal land is outlined in articles 3 and 5 of The Principle Law of Agriculture (*Undang-undang Pokok Agraria*), 1960. It is said that the Sukarno regime paid attention to the peoples' right to the communal land despite the Nationalization of Dutch companies in 1957¹. Nevertheless, the Suharto regime passed the Basic Forestry Law in 1967 (*Undang-undang* No5, 1967) and made it possible for the government and military to utilize the peoples' communal land without any compensation. People had to remain silent in the face of the violence and terror of the New Order period. According to Regulation of the Ministry of Inner Affairs in 1999 (*Peraturan Menteri Negara*, No.5, 1999), which basically admitted the people's right to communal land, prescribes that this right would not include HGU (usufruct) which had been designated prior to that regulation (Syhamunir 2001:21-29), many people were very disappointed in this regulation, as it made it difficult to make legitimate claims.

In the conclusion of his dissertation on the communal land issues in West Sumatra, Afrizal commented that the main concern of the people who were demanding the return of the land, rent, compensation for the community development (*siriah jariah* in Minang language) was not the return of the land itself but getting some benefit from the business on their land (Afrizal 2005:303).

My research corroborates his findings. Those people are not opposed to development itself, but they demand a legitimate process of decision-making and proper compensation and income. They claim that their right over the communal land is clearly legitimate, and is based on their customary law (*adat*). And they emphasize that their right was acknowledged by even the Dutch colonialists. It is no wonder that Reformation and Decentralization

¹ The targets of nationalization in West Sumatra were Teluk Bayur Harbor, Padang Cement and Ombilin Coal Mine.

(*Disentralisasi*) in the regions cannot be achieved unless these issues are resolved properly. Without attention to these issues, they may trigger real regionalism and rebellions in the near future. No doubt this position supported the legal pluralism in Indonesia (Harman et al: 1995).

For the last six years the author have been conducting field surveys on this topic in West Sumatra: specifically in Nagari Mungo, Limapuluh Kota Regency (*Kabupaten*), Nagari Kapalo Hilalang (Kepala Hilalang in Indonesian), Padang-Pariaman Regency, Bukit Gompong, Solok Regency, Nagari Kapar, West Passaman Regency² By 2006 more than twenty locations in West Sumatra have claimed their right over the communal land.

Through observations of these cases I have found that the communal land issues have involved violence, state terrors and under-the-table negotiations. In terms of these characteristics, there was no difference between the New Order Period and the Reformation Period. People are still threatened by violence and terror. The other authors used to express nearly the same opinion which I have concluded from my observations. It is astonishing to realize that the people received almost no benefits during the time of New Order Indonesia, even when compared to the situation of the communal land during the period of Dutch colonization. They have complained that even the Dutch admitted their right to the communal land under the lease system (*erpacht*) and lease number (*verponding*), and ask why the ‘brother government’ (*Pemerintah Saudara*) will not acknowledge their rights. The people have become suspicious that the development policies of the New Order Indonesia were not based on public interest, but on private interests of the government and military elite. The crucial question is how the New Order Indonesia did claim legitimacy in appropriating peoples’ communal land. This question might lead to an explanation why the development policies of the New Order had been maintained not only through the hegemonic State Ideologies imposed by the central government³, but also through daily violence on the part of the regional government and the military.

In this study, I will discuss the process and the logic of peoples’ claim on their communal land through a case study of Kapalo Hilalang. The Village Law of 1979 dissolved the Minangkabau local administration system. *Nagari*, which were once to be the minimal unit of the Minangkabau *adat* system, were dissolved into several administrative *desa*. However, with the advent of Local Autonomy Law of 1999, the *nagari* administration reinstated in West Sumatra and has been effect since 2001. Although once a *nagari* was recovered under the regional autonomy, regrettably all the apparatus of *nagari* are NOT in position to support the communal land rights, because the *nagari* mayor often says that he occupies the lowest status in the state, and the *nagari* budget mainly relies on the support of the upper apparatus of the state and a kind of tax from companies inside the *nagari*.

2. “Double Power Stage” in Kapalo Hilalang

2-1 Brief History of the Kapalo Hilalang Communal Land before 1998

Nagari Kapalo Hilalang is a *nagari* in Padang-Pariaman Regency, which is 48 kilometers from Padang, the provincial capital of West Sumatra. The total population is 6400 people

² My study was sponsored by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific research (C) under the title “Socio-cultural Study of the Movements for Recovery of Communal Land since Reformation Period – Case Study in the Minangkabau Society” (2000-2002, #12610316), and “Development and Environment through Palm Oil Plantation Development since Forest Fires in 1997 and 1998” (2004-2007, #16520509).

³ See my articles (1998) and (2002)!

(2005 census), and there are four *korong* (sub-villages); Simpang Balai Kamih (pop., 2100 people), Pasar Limau (pop., 1100 people), Puncaran Tujuh (pop., 800 people), and Tarok, (pop., 2100 people). Most of the people are farmers, and it should be noted that there are some hundreds of Javanese immigrants in Tarok. It is said that the Javanese immigrants constituted a third of Tarok population. The communal land of Kapalo Hilalang, which faces the southern slope of Mt. Tandikat, a volcano of nearly 2800 meters-high, comprises more than eight hundred hectares. It is useful to remember that the communal land of Kapalo Hilalang is in *korong* Tarok.

In 1904, a Dutch company, NY. Java Rubber Maaschapij leased 470 hectares of the communal land for one Dutch guilder per *bow* (0.7 hectare). Later this plantation was called Tandikat Lama with No. *Verponding* 163 and it was to last seventy-five years (1904-1979). In 1923, a German company, G.O.E Kreeber leased 68 hectares; this was called Tandikat Baru with No. *Verponding* 190, 199 (RISALA TIM, Afrizal 2005:70).

It is not clear what crops those companies planted before the Japanese occupation. Afrizal wrote that the Dutch company could not have planted rubber at the beginning, citing Oki Akira's comment that rubber cultivation started after 1916 (Afrizal:70).⁴ According to some informants, Dutch companies did not cultivate anything before the Japanese Occupation. They said it was the Japanese Military who made the people plant rubber trees there.⁵ However it is not realistic to suppose that the Japanese military planted rubber instead of rice, because the Japanese military needed rice much more than rubber (Stoler 1995 Chap 4)⁶.

TPTU (Team for Recovery of Communal Land, Kepala Hilalang) explained the situation after the Indonesian 'real' Independence in 1949, that young people who came from the guerilla war were given the opportunity to utilize the plantation crops, and that other *nagari* members were also given the chance to use the uncultivated parts of the communal land. This situation lasted until the PRRI rebellion in 1957⁷. Afrizal showed us two bodies of ownership of the Tandikat Plantation between Independence and the PRRI rebellion: one is PERPABRI (Association of Indonesian Veterans), and the other one is PURPET⁸ (Union of Tandikat Plantation Workers). Afrizal's remark was supported by my research which shows that the rubber plantation had been managed by veterans and local representatives until KODAM (Regional Military Commando) (Later KOREM [Military Commando below Residency]) Padang took the right of management in 1965.

Mr. Burhanudin, who returned to the region from migrating to Riau, had shed light on what happened before 1965. In 1960, Burhanudin came back to Kapalo Hilalang, and established PT Tandikat Baru LTD to control the rubber plantation. As his business had been doing well and many *nagari* people were employed as workers, Nagari Kapalo Hilalang admitted his business ability, and then his company was issued HGU (Afrizal:71-2). RISALAH TPTU (TPTU memorandum) made it clear that the Diponegoro Division of Central Java which con-

⁴ Oki said that an emigrant who had been working at a rubber plantation in Malay Peninsula and returned to his village near Padang Panjang, with four other members, rented a place for a small rubber plantation and planted rubber trees in 1916 for the first time in West Sumatra. They had to wait until 1922 to get some profits from their crops, and then they established *Sarikat Kebung Sikat*, a kind of stock company, to develop the rubber plantations. However, Oki also said that rubber plantations had already started around 1910 in Bangkinang, north-eastern area of West Sumatra (Oki 1984:120-26). Even in Deli, the heartland of Sumatran Plantation Belt, rubber was cultivated in 1906 (Fukazawa 1965:47).

⁵ As it took about ten years before rubber was ready to be tapped, it was only after the Independence when the people received profits from the plantations.

⁶ Iwatake summarized the occupation policy in 1943 of the Japanese Military based in Singapore that rubber tapping was restrained to increase the yield of rice (Iwatake 1981:233).

⁷ *Pemerintah Rakyat Republik Indonesia* (Revolutionary Government of Republic of Indonesia).

⁸ *Persatuan Purnawirawan Angkatan Republik Indonesia*, and *Persatuan Usaha Rakyat Perkebunan Tandikat*

trolled the plantation during the PRRI rebellion decided to transfer the right of management to PT Tandikat Baru LTD, but there was no approval from *Ninik-Mamak*, or the customary law leaders.

However, a major change occurred after the G-30-S (September 30th Movement) coup attempt in 1965. In 1965, Mr. Buhanurdin, the director of the company, Mr. Juliver, assistant director, and Mr. Talur (or Sulipno), a large stockholder, were arrested under suspicion of direct or indirect involvement in the coup attempt⁹, and KOREM Padang took over the property and right of management of the company¹⁰, then KOREM (-032 WIRABRATA) took control of the company. And PT Purna Karya LTD was created in 1974 to replace the management of the company from the army officers to veterans due to a regulation which forbids the army's direct control of business. Nevertheless the real power was still held by the army officers, especially on the top of KOREM Padang¹¹.

During my research I was very surprised to hear that the people of Kapalo Hilalang had been prohibited from entering the plantations even to get firewoods as they had done before, as the local police made money by selling them to the people. In 1984, the Regional Government of Padang-Pariaman issued HGU to PT Purna Karya, however, the people of Kapalo Hilalang did not accept the decision because it did not respect customary law¹²(Afrizal:71-2).

Besides the military business of PT Purna Karya, KOREM Padang made in 1975 two mineral water companies¹³, and the PDAM (*Perusahaan Daerah Air Minuman*; Regional Government Water Company¹⁴). In addition, a *pondok-pesantren*, or school for Koranic studies, was built in a place which belonged to Anai Resort, houses for the workers were built, and many immigrants from other regions came to Kapalo Hilalang. The people protested the policy of KOREM which required that they should get permission of KOREM in advance to cultivate crops¹⁵.

Through the process of the Military's take-over of the plantation on the communal land of Kapalo Hilalang, it is very clear that the military utilized the so-called PKI's coup to control the land and property of the people. The question is whether they have the legitimacy or not. In other words, what do the people think of the Military's business on their communal land.

2-2 People's Struggle and Military's Counterattack

Two weeks after Suharto's resignation, KAN of Kapalo Hilalang declared a fight to recover their communal land with the consensus of the youth group (Pemuda)¹⁶. KAN

⁹ West Sumatra was known as a province where PKI (*Partai Komunisme Indonesia*; Indonesia Communist Party) was very popular. I met some people who had executed PKI members with knives. For a discussion of the history of PKI in West Sumatra, see (Kahin 1999: chap 8)!

¹⁰ Surat Keputusan (letter of Decision) Nomor: KEP-023/KOKAM-SBR/6/1969.

¹¹ Afrizal and RISLAH TIM showed different dates.

¹² (Afrizal, *ibid*) However KAN of Kapalo Hilalang said the year of HGU's issue was 1992. I have a document about HGU of BPN Kantor Wilayah Propinsi Sumatera Barat, dated April 12, 1990.

¹³ One mineral water company, PT SLING LTD, contracted to KOREM with the condition to pay ten million rupiah each year for seven years, and the president of PT Purna Karya LTD sold some parts of the communal land to PT Malenggang Utama LTD in which some members of Kapalo Hilalang joined another mineral water company ELBI. See Laporan Investigasi Ks Tanah Ulayat Nagari di Kepala Hilalang (Report of the Investigation of the Communal Land in Kepala Hilalang), July 31, 1998.

¹⁴ The Regional Government Water Company supplies water not only for the people of Padang-Pariaman Residency but also for some amusement facilities and the new Minangkabau International Airport.

¹⁵ RISLAH TIM.

¹⁶ KAN signed by the chairman of KAN, B. DT. Rajo Mangkuto, and Vice-chairman of KAN, Asrizal Rajo Sutan, June 9, 1998.

(Customary Law Council) organized a Reformation organization to realize their purpose, and asked all the members of Kapalo Hilalang to support the fight. In June, 1998, KAN of Kapalo Hilalang organized a meeting to get their communal land back under the support from PEMUDA (Youth organization), *Mahasiswa* (students), *Cadiak Pandai* (Intellectuals), *Alim Ulama* (Representatives of the Muslim), and *Ninik-Mamak* (*adat-law* leaders), they organized TPTU. The leader of TPTU was B. DT Mangukuto, the chairman of KAN at the time. They wrote a letter to the chairman of DPRD (assembly at Regional Level) of Padang-Pariaman Regency explaining that the Tandikat Lama & Baru plantations used to be the communal land of Kapalo Hilalang under the contracts with Dutch and German companies, and that the military had took over the plantations after the 1965 coup without their approval. TPTU asked the communal land to be returned to the people immediately¹⁷.

Since the meeting the people of Kapalo Hilalang organized several large demonstrations; the first demonstration was organized on June 17, 1998, and marched to DPRD of Padang-Pariaman Regency, the second demonstration was a protest against PT Purna Karya LTD itself on August 25, 1998¹⁸. They claimed their right over the communal land of Tandikat Lama & Baru plantations, which had been occupied by KOREM since 1965.¹⁹ They asked LBH (Legal Aid Institute) Padang to help their struggle on June 30, 1998. LBH Padang commented that the people had enough evidence for their movement, and there was no ground for KOREM to control the plantations²⁰.

According to the peoples' opinion, the military had not contributed to the *nagari* development except for some donations for public activities, and KOREM had occupied 802 hectares of the communal land²¹. They objected to KOREM's policy: why only had people from places other than Kapalo Hilalang been allowed to own land? Why had the people of Kapalo Hilalang been excluded from landownership? Why had KOREM monopolized 75% of the total income of Purna Karya, and the company received only 25%²²? This meant that the military had received the whole income which was supposed to go to the State. The point is that people had no advantage from the military-run business.

First, the military announced that the people should rely on legal means to solve their request.²³ However, on August 22, 1998, Mr. Soewardi Broto, the president of Purna Karya at the time, expressed his personal opinion on the issue. He stated that the right of management of Tandikat Lama & Baru plantations should transfer to KAN and to the people of Kapalo Hilalang, and the transfer of the property of PT Purna Karya LTD would be negotiated in the near future, and he was very sorry, not only personally but also as the president, for the companies' inappropriate actions toward the people²⁴. Accepting the president's expression of his opinion, KAN ordered the people of Kapalo Hilalang not to cut rubber trees and tap the rubber trees illegally²⁵. In addition to these 'illegal' activities, the people started to cultivate crops in the plantation which was supposed to be their property. In 2003, I was informed that nearly

¹⁷ KAN Kepala Hilalang, No Date, June 1998.

¹⁸ *Mingguan Canan*, 20-6-1998, *Mingguan Canan*, 26-8-1998.

¹⁹ They have *surat pinjaman* (letter of lease) of the Dutch companies, and the *perantau* (emigrant) organization from Kepala Hilalang in Jakarta (*Ikatan Keluarga Kepala Hilalang Jabotabek*) also supported this struggle.

²⁰ *Singgalan*, 30-6-1998.

²¹ The rubber plantations occupy 697 hectares. 35 hectares are used for housings, 30 hectares for the fields for the populations, 5 hectares for public facilities, 35 hectares for the tourist facility at Lubuk Bonta.

²² Laporan Investigasi Ks Tanah Ulayat Nagari Kepala Hilalang, 31-7-1998.

²³ *Harian Haluan*, 26-8-1998.

²⁴ Surat-Pernyataan oleh Soewardi Broto Kepada Ketua Kan Kapalo Hilalang dll, 8-22-1998.

²⁵ Surat Tugas, KAN Kepala Hilalang, No.:01/ST/IX?KAN, September 1, 1998.

40 hectares were used for such purposes.

It was a big victory, although just a temporary one, for the people who had an agreement with the military a few days ago. KOREM-032/ Wirabraja and the PT Purna Karya LTD agreed to share with the people the profits from the plantations. Every three months tapped rubber is accumulated to weigh in Padang, and after the demonstrations the profit from selling the tapped rubber would be divided as follows: 37.5 % to KOREM, Kapalo Hilalang is also given 37.5%, and the rest of 25 % to PT Purna Karya²⁶. Mr. Taufic Syafe'i, the representative of *Forum Reformasi* (Reformation Forum), stated that the shares of 37.5% of Kapalo Hilalang would be divided follows: KAN would take 25 %. Tarok would be given 30 %, and the other three sub-villages would be given 15 % respectively. The reason why Tarok is given more than the other three sub-villages is that Tarok is closer to the communal land, and most of the workers are living in Tarok.

While the three sub-villages welcomed this treaty, the Tarok people strongly opposed this treaty. According to the head of *desa* Tarok in 2001, Tarok asked to be paid 25% from the whole income of PT Purna Karya. On October 12, 1998, 40 Tarok leaders expressed their opposition to this treaty. Basically they expressed that they supported the struggle of KAN to recover the communal land, however, they questioned the leadership of the struggle. They doubted that the KAN leaders monopolized the donations of 13 millions rupiah from KOREM which were paid in mid-June, 1998, and asked Mr. DT Rajo Mangkuto to resign, because they assumed that he was not the appropriate person for Reformation²⁷. And they asked the possibility whether or not KAN could become the subject of Reformation movement by referring to Provincial Regulation No. 13 of 1983 and the governor's decision No. Sk 189. 104 of 1991, which restricted KAN's function just as customary law matters — which effectively prohibits KAN from engaging some political functions. Then they requested that the reformation of Tandikat Lama & Baru plantations should be carried out by only the Tarok people²⁸.

Here, we should consider the background of conflict in Kapalo Hilalang. The communal land of Kapalo Hilalang is located in Tarok. Traditionally, all the members of Nagari Kapalo Hilalang were allowed to utilize the land. Nevertheless, after the military command occupied the plantations, most of the villagers other than Tarok people who became plantation workers were excluded from entering their own communal land.

Mr. Sutomo, the commander of KOREM Padang expressed his desire on August 31, 1999, to organize a new body from the members of the Indonesian Army which was stationed in Kapalo Hilalang, Tarok people, people from other sub-villages, representatives from PT Purna Karya LTD, KOREM stuff, and BABINSA²⁹, and which would attempt to resolve the communal land issue. He added that this body would enhance the productivity of the plantations and lessen distrust among the sub-villages³⁰. Then Mr. Dahler Syaiful Hasibuan, a new commander of KOREM Padang (032-Wirabraja), announced to make PT Purna Karya's management status clear, to solve the rubber plantation status in Tarok, and to solve the conflict between KAN and Tarok³¹. No doubt the military supported the Tarok people's opposition to KAN leadership. During the time of the demonstrations most Tarok people did not participate

²⁶ Pengumuman KAN Kelapa Hilalang, No.:Peng-/VII/98?KAN, August 30, 1998.

²⁷ Mr. Mangkuto answered that 13 million rupiah was consumed for the expenditures of transportation, drinks and foods during the demonstrations.

²⁸ Surat Penyataan Masyarakat Desa Tarok, Kenagarian Kepala Hilalang, October, 12, 1998.

²⁹ *Bintaro Pembina Desa*, noncommissioned Law enforcement officer posted in villages and affiliated with the civilian administration.

³⁰ A Letter from the Commander of KOREM to the Chairman of KAN, August 31, 1999.

³¹ Surat Perintah, No.: Sprin/398/1999, No Dated.

in the demonstrations. From the beginning of the struggle they seemed to be reluctant to join the movement under the KAN leadership.

Then, the 40 people, who had written a letter of protest against to the treaty one year earlier, wrote another letter of request to the regent of Padang-Pariaman regency on October 10, 1999. The letter said that the plantations which located on *Erpacht Verponding* No. 163, 190, 199, and 164 already belonged to the state due to HGU which was issued to PT Purna Karya in 1987. Based on the decision of the meeting in Tarok in which Tarok people, *Ninik-Mamak*, LMD/LKMD³² members participated, the letter requested that the right of management of the plantations should be transferred to Tarok in order to receive sufficient funds under the regional autonomy which would be put effect soon³³.

By that time, the leadership of KAN had drastically changed. B.DT. Rajo Mangkuto, KAN chairman at the time, resigned in December, 1998. On October 23, 1999, KAN declared new tactics of struggle under the new KAN chairman's name. Mr. SY DT. Panduko Sinaro, the new chairman of KAN, released a declaration that KAN had already changed TIM Reformasi's function, and that all the decisions of TIM activities had been cancelled³⁴. Although TIM showed a perspective to resolve the difficulty on April 8, 1999³⁵, the times had turned against them.

Finally, Tarok people sent a letter of request to the Governor of West Sumatra with the decision of July 7, 2000, that *desa* Tarok wanted to become an independent *nagari* within *Kecamatan 2 x 11 (Dua Kali Sebelas) Enam Lingkung Kayu Tanam*³⁶. The Javanese immigrants in Tarok came to this area as workers on the rubber plantations. And in 1974 a Javanese immigrant who came to Tarok in 1960 became a director, or a coordinator in the field, of PT Purna Karya. Since the PRRI rebellion in 1957, the Diponegoro Division of Central Java has had a strong influence on KOREM Padang. It seemed that KOREM Padang had been utilizing the Javanese immigrants to strengthen their control over the plantations. At the time of Reformation, the Javanese immigrants had been very worried about their status in Kapalo Hilalang after the old *nagari* was reunited under the West Sumatra Provincial Regulation of 2000 based on Regional Autonomy of 1999 Law No. 22. I have no evidence of how the Javanese immigrants influenced the Tarok's request of independent *nagari*. However, it was true that Tarok people of the Minangkabau origin also had desired to monopolize the benefits from the plantations. Therefore, two groups in Tarok had been together to pursue their own interests. That was why Tarok people wanted to make an independent *nagari* by themselves. There are many intermarriages between two groups.

On April 2001, Nagari Kapalo Hilalang reunited itself in spite of the Tarok peoples' opposition. The people of the three other sub-villages were strongly opposed to the request of Tarok people, saying that it was impossible to draw a borderline inside a *nagari*, and criticized that they wanted to monopolize the profits from the plantations. The *wali nagari pejabat sementara* (temporary *nagari* mayor) was elected in 2001, and in the following year, a new *nagari* mayor was elected. Moreover, the regent of Padang-Pariaman refused the Tarok peo-

³² LMD (*Lembaga Majelis Desa*; Desa Assembly), LKMD (*Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa*; Village Social Activities Group).

³³ Surat Permohonan Mengola Perkebunan Tandikat Lama & Baru, Tarok, 9-10-1999.

³⁴ Surat Keputusan Fungsional dan Tugas TIM Penyelesaian Pengembalian Tanah Ulayat Nagari Kepala Hilalang, October 23, 1999.

³⁵ Surat Keputusan No.: Skep-004/IV/1999/TPTU (TIM Penyelesaian Pengembalian Tanah Ulayat Nagari Kapalo Hilalang), April 8, 1999.

³⁶ Surat Perhal Permohonan Pengembalian Pemerintahan Desa Tarok ke Pemerintahan Nagari Tarok, August 17, 2000.

ples' request.

However, conflicts between Tarok and the three other sub-villages still existed. Then PT Purna Karya LTD publicly announced that they still wanted to run the rubber plantations, but they faced some difficulties.

2-3 “Double Power Stage” in Kapalo Hilalang

If we consider the decision of profit division among KOREM, PT Purna Karya, and sub-villages, we can guess that the military itself admitted the right of communal land of the people of Kapalo Hilalang even temporary. At least the villagers must have assumed so. This fact made the villagers very brave to ‘intrude’ into the plantations which were strictly off-limits before 1998. We can observe several changes in the conditions of communal land.

First, the amount of tapped rubber has been decreased to nearly half the amount it used to be. As everybody who sells the tapped rubber to PT Purna Karya would be paid half of the price of the rubber, non Purna Karya workers are of course, and even the company's workers, are reluctant to sell the tapped rubber to Purna Karya. They want to sell their product to a broker (*macular / token*), because they are paid all the money for their rubber, i.e. no commission. A *desa* head of Tarok in 2001 used to be a rubber collector (*pemgumpul getah karet*). According to him, *desa* Tarok raised a daily salary of up to 20,000 rupiah. Then each day laborer came to earn 300,000 rupiah per month. On each weighing, Tarok gets appropriately 600,000 rupiah, 15 rupiah per kilogram. For villagers other than those from Tarok, sub-village Tarok and the workers seemed to be rich. This consciousness made the conflict serious.

Second, since 1998 farmers have been very brave to cultivate land rice, avocado, cacao, clove (*cengkih*) and teak (*jati*)³⁷ in the plantations without permission, and it is said that the amount of such lands had already reached to 40 hectares. When I asked his opinion about this situation to the temporary *nagari* mayor, he changed the subject instead of answering my question. He cited a story about the regional government project that caused illegal cutting of rubber trees. Probably, he would have felt ashamed to admit the fact.

Rubber trees are very useful even after being cut. They are used for firewood for brick-making. Piles of rubber trees can be sold at fifty thousand rupiah per truckload. A big rubber tree quickly fills a truck. There is a regional government project to encourage the people to plant trees in 100 hectares of *ladang kosong* (literally “not-irrigated, empty field”). However, as there is not enough money, people would to cut rubber trees without permission to get money and plant something else after that.

As illegal cutting and tapping of rubber trees caused serious confusion on the plantations, farmers unions (*kelompok tani*), workers union of unirrigated field (*kelompok peladang*), *ninik-mamak*, the youth of Kapalo Hilalang have been ready to regulate such people's activities. On September 1, 1998, KAN ordered the people not to cut and tap the rubber trees illegally³⁸. Nevertheless, people still often enter the plantation to cultivate some crops.

On September 6, 2003, *Yayasan Pembangunan Nagari Kepala Hilalang* (Foundation of Nagari Kepala Hilalang Development) was founded to work with KOREM Padang to manage the plantations³⁹. While KOREM gets 40% of the whole income, the foundation gets 60%. Then from the portion of the foundation, the management, or the foundation takes 40% and the workers take 60%. The management would supply the workers' necessities for their work

³⁷ These crops would bring more benefit than rubber.

³⁸ See note 23!

³⁹ A letter to KAN chairman from Yayasan Pembangunan Nagari Kepala Hilalang dated on September 6, 2003.

and supply the school tuitions and money for stationeries to the workers' children. Although the letter stressed that both the foundation and KOREM would respect the status of customary law leaders, it did not mention anything about KAN's role in the letter. And it was not clear what role Nagari Kapalo Hilalang would perform. The commander of KOREM Padang immediately replied to this letter with approval⁴⁰. However, the *nagari* mayor sent a letter of disapproval⁴¹. Then the idea of the foundation was not supported by the people.

To counter these people's activities in the plantations, KOREM Padang practiced their training with real bullets inside the communal land. They have been threatening the people with violence as they used to do under the New Order Regime. They closed the land for a week or so, and destroyed the huts which people built for the work on the land. And it was announced that the military battalion in Padang City would move into this communal land someday. This news put pressure on the people who had been fighting for the recovery of the communal land. I was told that there were some people who stopped fighting; however, it was impossible to stop the people who had a strong will to fight the military to recover their rights some day.

B(Bahtian) DT. Rajo Mangkuto, who was forced to resign as KAN chairman in December, 1998, was reelected in January 2002, and told to me in February, 2006, that people were still fighting for the recovery of the communal land. He was very regretful that there was no unity in Kapalo Hilalang, because there were some KAN leaders who had different opinions in terms of the communal land issues. He said to me that he got a letter from the President of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudoyono, saying that the issue should be resolved through the procedure of *hukum-adat* (customary law). In fact, the letter was not from the president himself, but from his secretaries. And the letter said only that they have received his letter, and the issue should be resolved through both the state law and customary law⁴².

He explained that KOREM Padang nowadays receives almost nothing from the plantations, and that the Tarok people occupied most of the profits from the plantations. He said that the population of the Javanese in Tarok shared nearly 60% of the Tarok population (2400 people); however, his estimation was wrong. He overemphasized the strength of the Javanese in Tarok, and he said the population of Tarok was more than 4 thousand people, which was two times bigger than the real numbers.

And he denied the possibility of those Javanese people to become the members of the Minangkabau people. According to him, those Javanese choose *Penghulu Dagang*, literally a Customary Law Leader from outside the region, and his status would not be transferable to his descendant like the Minangkabau customary law leaders. He said that there used to be 5 *ninik-mamak* in Tarok, while there were 19 *ninik-mamak* in total. However, two of the 5 *ninik-mamak* in Tarok had died, and one resigned. Three successors have no clear position and there is only one *ninik-mamak* who still supports the Tarok independence. Although he denied the possibility of those Javanese to become the Minangkabau people, there are certainly some ways to make outsiders the Minangkabau people⁴³. Seeing from his attitude and opinion to the Tarok opposition, it seems to be very difficult to reach any kind of resolution in the near future. He criticized the *nagari* mayor, too, because he said that the *nagari* mayor was facing

⁴⁰ A letter from Komando Daerah Militer I Bukit Barisan to DANDIM 0308/Pariaman dated September 8, 2003.

⁴¹ A letter from Wali Nagari Kepala Hilalang to Ketua Yayasan Pembangunan Nagari Kepala Hilalang dated on September 10, 2003.

⁴² As one of the members of TIM Reformasi was a senior army official of Susilo Bambang Yudoyono, they were brave enough to send a letter to the president directory.

⁴³ ① *mengisi limbagok adat*, to fulfil the requirement from *adat* (customary law), ② *mengisi uang*, to fulfil the requirement of money, and ③ *menghumumkan keseluruhan nagari*, to announce to the whole *nagari*.

the upper apparatus rather than supporting the *nagari* interest itself.

I interviewed the *nagari* mayor, Mr. Nasrul Hamidi, two times: in 2003 and in 2006. He explained to me that he had the role to tell the government's intention to the people. He admitted that he was an instrument of the government. No wonder he repeated that the demands of TPTU were denied by National Bureau of Land (BPN) Jakarta, because HGU expired in 2003, the right of ownership was returned to the state. Then the ownership is in the hands of the regency of Padang-Pariaman Regional Government. "As he was my boss, I have to follow his decision." Furthermore, he replied to my question on the peoples' illegal activities on the land. He said the place where people planted were not the communal land but matrilineal clan communal land (*ulayat kaum*). Therefore there was no problem. But his remarks were contradictory due to the fact that the military had to practice in the communal land and had to threaten the people.

Each *nagari* has two sources of income. One is the PBB (*Pajak Bumi dan Bangun*; municipal property tax). Then the other is divided into two kinds of income: one is the budget from the government, and the other one is the income inside the *nagari*. The second budget is divided into two categories: one is market tax, and the second one is donations⁴⁴ from enterprises inside the *nagari*. As it is said that the government budget will be cut in the near future, the *nagari* has to rely on donations more and more. People criticized that PT Purna Karya had never made donations. Instead of Purna Karya, it is the two mineral water companies that make donations. We can see how strong and cunning the military business is.

Afrizal is right, because he mentioned the reason why the Padang city was not very sympathetic to the Padang Cement issue in Nagari Lubuk Kilangan. As Padang Cement contributes nearly 70% of the city budget, the city refuses to hand over 30% to Nagari Lubuk Kilangan as the law prescribed (Afrizal 2005:163-195). We need to pay more attention to the budget issue in order to understand the future of the communal land struggles.

3 Brief Description on Mungo Case

In order to understand the Kapalo Hilalang case, I want to cite briefly my report on Mungo⁴⁵, and present the recent news there.

Most of 8000 people in Mungo are farmers, cultivating fish and rearing cattle. During the time of the PRRI rebellion, Mungo was divided into two groups. There were pro-communists and anti-communists in Mungo so that led to a serious killing in 1965⁴⁶.

The communal land of Nagari Mungo, which was divided into ten *desa* in 1983, and reunited into one *nagari* Mungo in 2001, is located in the northern foothills of the Mt. Sago. People used to cultivate *palawjia* (second crop in the dry season) and wet rice, too. Tobacco was cultivated as a cash crop before 1965.

In 1918 1,500 *bow* (1,000ha) of the communal land of 7 *nagari* including Mungo had been leased to a Dutch company to raise horses and cows⁴⁷. After Indonesian Independence the right of using the land was transferred to BPT-HMT⁴⁸. In 1950, thirty-six hectares of the communal land was taken as a vegetable garden for the Regional Government of Limapuluh Kota by the Regent at the time. In 1974, BPT-HMT which was under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture, took two hundreds fifty hectares of the communal land, and opened a

⁴⁴ Donations are a kind of tax in this context.

⁴⁵ See my paper (2003)!

⁴⁶ Nagari Mungo Pemerintahan, Not dated.

⁴⁷ *Afschrift* No.2906/11, Pajakoemboch, 18 November 1918.

⁴⁸ *Balai Pembibitan Ternak dan Hijauan Makna Tanah* (A Division of Bureau of Cattle)

cattle ranch with aid from West Germany. Eighty percent of the ranch was on the communal land of Mungo; the other twenty-percent belonged to four other *nagari*.

Then, the regional government of Limapuluh Kota built an agriculture school which occupied seven hectares, and Military housings, which occupied five hectares. These buildings were also built on the people's communal land without any compensation.

In 1979, when the land title was given to BPT-HMT, the Mungo people were very frustrated, and asked that the land title would be returned to the people. Then the regional government of Limapuluh Kota organized a five-member committee to resolve the problem. In 1983, the committee announced an agreement between the regional government and customary law leaders, demanding that the government pay 2500 rupiah per square meter. Although the agreement was made, the government would not pay anything at all.

The Mungo people also became very brave after Suharto's fall. Five hundred people demonstrated on February 1, 2001, in front of BPT-HMT, making the demand to recover the communal land and to cancel the land title. Even this peaceful demonstration triggered the government's violence. On the evening of February 2, people in their *ladang* (un-irrigated agricultural field) noticed some people destroying long fences which separated the ranch and *ladang*, and they saw hundreds of cows being driven into the communal land, and trampling *palawijia* crops which were expected to be harvested in a few days. They went to BPT-HMT to ask why the accident happened, however, suddenly all the electricity was turned off, and most of huts in the field were set on fire and totally destroyed.

On the afternoon of February 3, thirty-two villagers were arrested. Immediately after the news of a police sweep, village men fled from the village. Many village men were put into jail on suspicion of being provocateurs of the demonstration. When those villagers came back, they found no goats, cows, and chickens in the dry land. As the people of the village lost very important economic resources, the regional government promised to give fifty cows to those people. Nevertheless the promise had not yet been fulfilled. There is no difference between the New Order and Reformation in terms of the police attitude to the people.

There used to be confrontations between the people of Mungo and Sei Kamunyang (Sungai Kamunyang in Indonesian), a neighboring *nagari* across the river, Batang Pinago, because most of the BPT-HMT workers came from Sei Kamunyang. Mungo people told me that the BPT-HMT workers were suspected of joining in the destruction of the dry land of Mungo in 2001. They had destroyed a dam on Batang Pinago River, which originates from the Mt. Sago and separate Mungo and Sei Kamunyang. The dam has been the only resource for irrigation of the communal land. No matter how much the people of Mungo accused the Sunggai Kamunyang workers who destroyed the dam, the regional police would not do anything to deal with it.

The people of Mungo had consulted LBH (Legal Aid Institute) Padang to get compensation for their damages. At the beginning, the temporary *nagari* mayor of Mungo, who was an ex-police man, seemed very cool to the people's struggle in 2001. Instead of showing some understanding of the people's difficulty, he said that the issue should be resolved with the whole *nagari* interest in mind. He assumed that the people's protest against BPT-HMT was based on their egoism. When I saw him a year later, he had become the regular *nagari* mayor, and had changed his mind to support the struggle with the pressure from the whole *nagari*. Now the people of Mungo have asked for some compensation from the terror and violence at an *adat* trial, however, they have been talking about this issue to the Regional Government only under the table due to the disappearance of documents during the time of the PRRI rebellion.

Four other *nagari*, whose 50 ha of their communal land became the ranch of BPT-HMT, were forced to support BPT-HMT saying that the land, which was claimed by the Mungo people, was already state land. It is not easy for the people to win at a trial; however, it seems very clear that these struggles would help the people to maintain their identity as Minangkabau people. Once a *nagari* was reunited under the regional autonomy, all the apparatus of *nagari* in Mungo had been in a position to support the claim to their rights. When I asked the *nagari* mayor if he was not afraid of fighting with the government, he immediately said he was not.

Since then the Mungo people have been cultivating crops, and rearing cattle and chickens on their communal land. But suddenly, on January 26, 2006, 300 people were forced to leave the land by local police and the military. Police and Military used bulldozers to destroy the field, and burnt the huts; nobody knew how great the losses were. The Governor of West Sumatra, DPRD, and Regent of Regional Government of Limapuluh Kota supported this action, and kept on telling to the people that the land was not communal land but state land⁴⁹.

Terror and violence instigated by the police and military have been very serious in Mungo. We could not see any spirit of Reformation in the Mungo case. We saw a conflict between Mungo and the neighboring *nagari*, Sei Kamunynang, from which the BPT-HMT workers came. The government used those agents to crush down the people's struggle in Mungo.

4. Conclusive Remarks

The Kapalo Hilalang and Mungo cases were not the only cases in West Sumatra's communal land struggles. However, it is possible to draw a conclusion of the legitimacy of development at the regional level in New Order Indonesia. The turning point was the 1965 coup. Since then, the Development policy has been in focus in West Sumatra, too. In Kapalo Hilalang KOREM Padang took over the Tandikat Lama & Baru rubber plantations, and then made PT Puyna Karya to run the plantations. In Mungo, the government kept on taking the communal land of Mungo as the place of cattle ranch, military housing, and government school. The lands were used for development without any compensation. I have to admit that the Kapalo Hilalang case was an exception. However, even in Kapalo Hilalang, the military had been relying on violence to threaten the people.

The regional government insisted that the land became state land after the nationalization of foreign companies in 1958. However, it is hard to make the interpretation that the nationalization of foreign companies involved the land ownership, too. Rather, it is moderate to interpret the nationalization only to have involved the properties of foreign companies, not land ownership.⁵⁰

It is true that some people are worried that collective land ownership does not make for easy decision-making among the members, and might lead to the loss of the chances for development such as World Bank projects. However, if these worries were to legitimize the case of Kapar in Kabupaten Passaman, it would mean that there remain disaster and despair among the people. The case of Kapar in Passaman is the one in which some local customary law leaders sold 3500 ha of communal land to make palm oil plantations without any consul-

⁴⁹ Kriminalisasi Terhadap Petani Dan Masyarakat Adat Terus Terjadi Di Sumatera Barat, oleh LBH Padang & P2TANRA SUMBAR, email from LBH Padang on June 9, 2006.

⁵⁰ Professor Syhaunir at Andalas University expressed his view to me, and sees his article in 2001!

tation with the village people. This caused a furious response and a lawsuit initiated by the people. Local police and military were brutal in Kapar, in West Passaman, too. The Kapar case is another story of terror by the regional police towards local people who do not accept the government's policy.

Moreover, the communal land issues should be understood from a political as well as an economic perspective. Generally speaking *nagari* autonomy under the regional autonomy would not always guarantee the right of the communal land in respective *nagari*. The *nagari* mayor cannot be said to be the representative of the people. We cannot expect that the *nagari* mayors would help the people's struggle. Many *nagari* mayors expressed that they were merely an apparatus of the central government. The more a *nagari* need funds, the more it relies on companies in the *nagari*. That is why the administration is not so sympathetic to the people's struggle.

Glossary and Acronyms

adat	customary law
DPDR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah , Assembly at Provisional, Regional, or Municipal Level
HGU	usufruct
kabupaten	regency
KAN	Kerapatan Adat Nagari, Customary Law Council
kaum	maximum lineage
KODAM	Komando Daerah Militer; Regional Military Commando
KOREM	Komando Resort Militer; Military Commando below Residency
nagari	village based on customary law
Ninik-Mamak	Customary Law Leaders
Pembangunan	Development
Reformasi	Reformation
suku	clan
tanah ulayat	communal land
TPTU	Tim Pengembalian Tanah Ulayat Nagari Kepala Hilalang (Team for Recovery of Communal Land, Kepala Hilalang)

References Cited

A. Not Published Documents:

Afscript No.2906/11, Pajakoemboch, 18 November 1918.

A Letter from the Commander of KOREM to the Chariman of KAN, August 31, 1999

A letter from Komando Daerah Militer I Bukit Barisan to DANDIM 0308/Pariaman dated September 8, 2003

A letter to Ketua Yayasan Pembangunan Nagari Kepala Hilalang from Wali Nagari Kepala Hilalang dated on September 10, 2003

A letter to KAN chairman from Yayasan Pembangunan Nagari Kepala Hilalang dated on September 6, 2003

BPN Kantor Wilayah Propinsi Sumatera Barat, 12 April 1990

KAN document signed by the chairman of KAN, B. DT. Rajo Mangkuto, and vice chairman of KAN, Asrizal Rajo Sutan, June 9, 1998
 KAN Kepala Hilalang, No Date, June 1998
 Kriminalisasi Terhadap Petani Dan Masyarakat Adat Terus Terjadi Di Sumatera Barat, oleh LBH Padang & P2TANRA SUMBAR, email from LBH Padang on June 9, 2006
 Laporan Investigasi Ks Tanah Ulayat Nagari di Kepala Hilalang, July 31, 1998
 Nagari Mungo Pemerintahan, Not dated
 Pengumuman KAN Kepala Hilalang, No.:Peng-/VII/98/KAN, August 30, 1998
 RISALAH TIM PENGEMBALIAN TANAH ULAYAT NAGARI KEPALA HILALANG Not dated
 Surat Keputusan Nomor:KEP-023/KOKAM-SBR/6/1969.
 Surat Keputusan Fungsi dan Tugas TIM Penelesaian Pengembalian Tanah Ulayat Nagari Kepala Hilalang, October 23, 1999.
 Surat Keputusan No.: Skep-004/IV/1999/TPTU (*TIM Penyelesaian Pengembalian Tanah Ulayat Nagari Kapalo Hilalang*), April 8, 1999.
 Surat Perintah, No.: Sprin/398/1999, No Dated.
 Surat Perhal Permohonan Pengembalian Pemerintahan Desa Tarok ke Pemerintahan Nagari Tarok, August 17, 2000.
 Surat Permohonan Mengola Perkebunan Tandikat Lama & Baru, Tarok, 9-10-1999.
 Surat-Purnyataan oleh Soewardi Broto Kepada Ketua Kan Kepala Hilalang dll, 8-22-1998
 Surat Penyataan Masyarakat Desa Tarok, Kenagarian Kepala Hilalang, October, 12, 1998.
 Surat Tugas, KAN Kepala Hilalang, No.:01/ST/IX?KAN, September 1, 1998.

B. Newspapers:

Harian Haluan, 26-8-1998
Mingguan Canan, 20-6-1998
Mingguan Canan, 26-8-1998
Singgalan, 30-6-1998

C. Books & Articles

Afrizal (2005) *The Nagari Community, Business and the State: The Origin and the Process of Contemporary Agrarian Protests in West Sumatra, Indonesia*, Thesis for PHD, The Flinders Asia Centre, School of Politics and International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Flinders University.
 Fukazawa, Hachiro (1965) *Indonesia, Malayasia ni okeru Plantation no Hattatu to Henbo (Development and Change of Plantations in Indonesia and Malaysia)*, *Kenkyu-Sanko Siryou* (Supplemental Study) No.78, Institute of Developing Economy.
 Harman, Benny K & Irianto, Paskah & Fauzi Noer & Fidro, Boy & Pranawa, Sigit (1995) *Pluralisme Hukum Pertanahan dan Kumpulan Kasus Tanah*, Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (Indonesia Legal Aid Foundation).
 Iwatake, Teruhiko (1981) *Nanpou-Gunsei kano Keizaiseisaku, Malay, Sumatra, Jawa no Kiroku (Joukan) (Economic Policy of Southeast Asia under the Japanese Occupation, Records of Malay, Sumatra and Java, Vol 1)*, Ryuhkei-syosya Publishing LTD.
 Kahin, Audrey (1999) *Rebellion To Integration; West Sumatra and The Indonesian Polity*, Amsterdam University Press.

- Nakashima, Narihisa (1998) Ethnicity and Religion in Suharto's New Order: Minangkabau Society under the Marriage Law of 1974, in *Nation-State, Identity and Religion in Southeast Asia*, pp.25-54, ed. by Tsuneo Ayabe, Singapore Society of Asian Studies, Asian Studies Monograph Series No. 4.
- _____ (2002) The State Ideology of *Rumah Tangga* (Household) and the Minangkabau View of Gender and Power, *IBUNKA (Other Cultures)*, Vol. 3, Faculty of Intercultural Communication, Hosei University, Tokyo.
- _____ (2003) *Tanah Ulayat and the Pembangunan* Issues in West Sumatra, *IBUNKA* 4, Faculty of Intercultural Communication, Hosei University.
- Oki, Akira (1984) *Indonesia Syakai Keizaishi Kenkyuu, syokuminchi-ki Minangkabau-no keizaikatei to syakaihenka* (Study of Indonesian Socio-economic History, economic process and social change of the Minangkabau society during the colonial periode), Keisoshobo Publishing LTD, 1984.
- Refinaldi (2000.) *Konflik Tanah Ulayat Di Sumatera Barat, Studi Kasus: Tanah Perkebunan Tandikat Lama Dan Tandikat Baru Di Kenagarian Kepala Hilalang Kabupaten Padang-Pariaman*, Program Pasca Sarjana Universitas Negeri Padang.
- Syahmunir. (2001) Pengadaan Tanah Untuk Kepentingan Pembangunan, *Himpunan Makalah dan Rumusan Workshop Tanah Ulayat di Sumatera Barat*, ed. By H. Syofyan Jallaluddin, Padang.
- Stoler, Ann Laura. (1995) *Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatran Plantation Belt, 1870-1979*, Second Edition, Michigan University Press.
- Tesor, Jose Manuel (1998) Indonesia's Descent to Chaos, *Asia Week*, September 25 1998, <http://www.antenna.nl/indonesia/mn07446.html>.